



GENEROLO JONO ŽEMAIČIO LIETUVOS KARO AKADEMIJA  
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VILNIAUS UNIVERSITETO TARPTAUTINIŲ SANTYKIŲ  
IR POLITIKOS MOKSLŲ INSTITUTAS  
Institute of International Relations and  
Political Science of Vilnius University

**Naujoji JAV globali strategija: iššūkis ar galimybė?**  
**Poveikis Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybėms**  
Tarptautinės konferencijos medžiaga  
Vilnius, 2004 m. vasario 27 d.

**The New Global Strategy of the US: a Challenge or Chance?**  
**Implications for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe**  
Proceedings of the International Conference  
Vilnius, February 27, 2004

Vilnius, 2005

UDK ???????



Konferencijos komitetas:

Dr. Pranas Jankauskas, Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos viršininko pavaduotojas mokslui ir studijoms

Anthoni Pahigian, JAV ambasados spaudos ir kultūros atašė

Dr. Gediminas Vitkus, Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademijos Politikos mokslų katedros vedėjas, Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų instituto docentas

Atsakingoji redaktorė **Margarita Šešelgytė**

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## TARPTAUTINĖS KONFERENCIJOS MEDŽLAGA

*Naujoji JAV globali strategija: iššūkis ar galimybė? Poveikis Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybėms*

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### KONFERENCIJOS PROGRAMA

#### I dalis. **Besikeičianti JAV globali strategija**

Pirmininkauja dr. Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos karo akademijos  
Politikos mokslų katedros vedėjas

- 12.00–12.30 Įvadinės pastabos  
*Linas Linkevičius, krašto apsaugos ministras*
- 12.30–13.00 Naujoji JAV globali strategija ir VRE regionas  
*J. E. Stephen Donald Mull, JAV ambasadorius Lietuvai*
- 13.00–13.30 NATO, JAV politika ir VRE saugumas\*  
*Dr. Mark Kramer, Harvardo universiteto Šaltojo karo studijų projekto vadovas ir Daviso Rusijos studijų centro vyr. bendradarbis*

#### II dalis. **Vidurio ir Rytų Europa JAV globalioje strategijoje**

Pirmininkauja dr. Egidijus Vareikis, Seimo narys

- 14.00–14.10 Politinės ir saugumo pasekmės – naujos viltys ir senos baimės  
*Tomas Janeliūnas, Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų instituto doktorantas*
- 14.10–14.40 Diskusija
- 14.40–15.00 Ekonominiai VRE saugumo veiksniai  
*Dr. Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinio verslo mokyklos docentė*
- 15.00 – 15.10 Ekonominės pasekmės: užsienyje dirbančių JAV verslininkų požiūris  
*Thomas Wilbur, Amerikos prekybos rūmų Lietuvoje narys*

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\* Šio pranešimo tekstas publikavimui nebuvo pateiktas (red. pastaba).

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- 15.10–15.30      Diskusija
- 15.30–15.40      Karinės NATO plėtros pasekmės JAV globaliai strategijai  
*Vaidotas Urbelis, Krašto apsaugos ministerijos Gynybos politikos  
planavimo departamento direktorius*
- 15.40–16.00      Diskusija

**III dalis. JAV ir VRE bendradarbiavimas: darbotvarkė ateičiai**

Televizijos tiltas (Vilnius–Vašingtonas)

Pirmininkauja Kęstutis Jankauskas, Užsienio reikalų ministerijos  
Saugumo politikos departamento direktorius

- 16.30–16.45      Transatlantinio ryšio ateitis: „naujoji“ ir „senoji“ Europa JAV  
globalioje strategijoje  
*Robert Bradtke, JAV Valstybės Sekretoriaus padėjėjas Europai  
ir Eurazijai*
- 16.45–17.30      Diskusija

## PRATARMĖ

2004 metų vasario 27 dieną Vilniuje, Lietuvos karo akademijoje, vyko tarptautinė konferencija „Naujoji JAV globali strategija: iššūkis ar galimybė? Poveikis Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybėms“. Konferenciją surengė Lietuvos karo akademijos Politikos mokslų katedra drauge su JAV ambasados Amerikos centru Lietuvoje ir Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų institutu.

Konferencijoje buvo siekiama išgilinti, kaip struktūriniai politikos pokyčiai ir besikeičianti saugumo aplinka veikia JAV globalią strategiją. Šiandien JAV yra politiškai įtakingiausia, ekonomiškai pajėgiausia, kariniu požiūriu stipriausia pasaulio valstybė. Tarptautinėje politikoje JAV atlieka lyderės vaidmenį, kartais imdamasi vienašalių veiksmų, kurie kelia kitų šalių nepasitenkinimą. Tradiciniai JAV sąjungininkai Europoje, šaltojo karo metais rėmę visas JAV iniciatyvas, dabar siekia užsitikrinti savarankiškesnę poziciją tarptautinėje arenoje ir vis dažniau kritikuoja JAV užsienio politiką.

Nors parama JAV vykdomai tarptautinei politikai Vakarų Europoje sumažėjo, aktyviomis amerikiečių šalininkėmis tampa naujosios sąjungininkės Vidurio ir Rytų Europoje (VRE). Komunizmo ir totalitarinio režimo baisumus patyrusios valstybės, atkūrusios nepriklausomybę, pasirinko integracijos į transatlantines politines, ekonomines bei karines institucijas kelią. Integracija į euroatlantines struktūras VRE visuomet siejosi su tvirta parama glaudiems JAV ir Europos ryšiams užtikrinti bei neretai su proamerikietiška pozicija, kuri šiandien dažnai susilaukia priešiškų vertinimų kai kuriose Vakarų Europos šalyse. Nuomonių išsiskyrimas „senojoje“ ir „naujojoje“ Europoje gali tapti svaria prielaida dar labiau sutvirtėti JAV ir VRE šalių ryšiams.

Pagrindinis konferencijos tikslas buvo sudaryti galimybę Lietuvos ir JAV mokslininkams, diplomatams, vyriausybinių institucijų atstovams, parlamentarams, kariškiams ir žurnalistams labiau išgilinti ir perprasti naujas

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JAV globalios politikos kryptis, jos priežastis bei pasaulinio masto pasekmės, kurios neišvengiamai veiks ir Vidurio bei Rytų Europą. Tam pasitarnavo ir konferencijos trečiosios dalies metu nutiestas tiesioginis televizijos tiltas su JAV Valstybės departamentu, leidęs tiesiogiai bendrauti su atsakingais šios institucijos pareigūnais.

Manydami, kad konferencijos dalyvių mintys ir pamąstymai turi išliekamąją vertą, šiame leidinyje skelbiame konferencijos metu skaitytus pranešimus. Pranešimai skelbiami anglų kalba, t.y. ta pačia kalba, kuria jie buvo skaityti konferencijoje.

**Margarita Šešelgytė**

*Lietuvos karo akademijos*

*Politikos mokslų katedros lektorė*

**PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE**

**I session. The Changing Global Strategy of the US**

Chair Dr. Gediminas Vitkus, Head of the Political Science Department, Lithuanian Military Academy

- 12.00–12.30      Introductory Remarks  
*Mr. Linas Linkevičius, Minister of Defence*
- 12.30–13.00      The New US Global Strategy and the CEE Region  
*H. E. Stephen Donald Mull, USA Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania*
- 13.00–13.30      NATO, US Policy and Security of Central and Eastern Europe\*  
*Dr. Mark Kramer, Director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies and a Senior Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies*

**II session. CEE in the New US Global Strategy**

**Chair Dr. Egidijus Vareikis, Member of Seimas**

- 14.00–14.10      Political and Security Implications - New Hopes and Old Fears  
*Mr. Tomas Janeliūnas, PhD Candidate of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University*
- 14.10–14.40      Discussion
- 14.40–15.00      Economic Determinants for CEE's Security  
*Dr. Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Associated Professor of the International Business School, Vilnius University*

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\* Paper for publication was not available (editor's note).



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- 15.00–15.10 Economic Implications: Opinions of US Businesses Abroad  
*Mr. Thomas Wilbur, Member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Lithuania*
- 15.10–15.30 Discussion
- 15.30–15.40 Military Implications of NATO enlargement for the US Global Strategy  
*Mr. Vaidotas Urbelis, Director of the Defence Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defence*
- 15.40–16.00 Discussion

**III session. The US - CEE Cooperation: Agenda for the Future VTC (Vilnius - Washington D.C.)**

Chair Mr. Kęstutis Jankauskas, Director of Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- 16.30–16.45 The Future of Transatlantic Link: the “New” and “Old” Europe in the US Global Strategy  
*Mr. Robert Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs*
- 16.45–17.30 Discussion

## EDITOR'S FOREWORD

On 27 February 2004 Lithuanian Military Academy convened an international conference “The New Global Strategy of the US: a Challenge or a Chance? Implications for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Conference was organized by the Department of Political Science of Lithuanian Military Academy, the American Center, and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University.

Structural changes in world politics and changing security environment have considerable effects on the USA global strategy. The United States enjoys an undeniable position of World's military and, in a way, economic and political strength. It takes a leading role in international politics, sometimes taking unilateral steps, which raise dissatisfaction of the rest of the World. Traditional allies of the USA in Europe, which used to support every initiative of the United States during the Cold War, now are searching for more autonomous role and often criticize the USA foreign policy.

Although the support for the USA in the Western Europe is undermined, new allies in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are becoming the most active advocates of American policy. States that once lived under totalitarian or communist rule reclaimed their independence and set their course towards a full integration in the political, economic and security transatlantic institutions at the same time taking a strong pro-Atlantic orientation, which is in opposition with some of the Western Europe states. This new trend might become a starting point for the new relations between the USA and the CEE.

The main aim of the organizers was to bring together scientists, diplomats, government officials, parliamentarians, military officers, and media representatives from Lithuania and the United States and try to understand the new course of the USA global policy, its causes and globally extending

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implications which will inevitably affect the CEE region and Lithuania as its part. Organizers also sought to provide a high quality discussion on the future CEE - USA relations. Video – teleconference Vilnius – Washington DC and direct connection with the USA State Department substantially contributed to the quality of the discussions.

**Ms. Margarita Šešelgytė**  
Lecturer Political Science Department  
Lithuanian Military academy

I session

**The Changing Global Strategy of the US**

Chair: Dr. Gediminas Vitkus  
Head of the Political Science Department,  
Lithuanian Military Academy

**Linas Linkevičius**  
*Minister of Defence*

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS



Your Excellency Ambassador,  
Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentle-  
men,

Let me welcome all of you to the Lithuanian military academy – the place where we generate the officers of our future Armed Forces. I am glad to see that this academy, besides its primary educational function, is also becoming a think tank which fosters discussions on the

most important strategic matters.

First of all, I would like to address the question posed in the title of this conference. I think it is irrelevant. The changing global strategy of the United States is neither a challenge nor opportunity. It is an inevitable reality which is already taking place. The question is whether the rest of the world including Lithuania will be able to keep in step with the United States.

Ever since 9/11 we live in a world of great uncertainty. We can only be sure about one thing: we don't know where the terrorists will strike next. This honest acknowledgement calls for a radical change in our thinking, transformation of our military and realignment of our forces. We must think globally, we must respond immediately, we must act pre-emptively. I want to emphasize that in this regard I do not see any difference between the strategy of the US, Lithuania and other allies.

Size does not matter. Even small countries must act globally if they want to feel safe at home. The strategy of a rabbit is hopeless in today's world – hiding from challenges is equivalent to failure. We cannot wait until echoes of ethnic and religious hatred, genocide and civil wars will overwhelm us.

This is why Lithuania has been involved in all the major peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, this is why we have staunchly supported the global war on terrorism and this is why Lithuanian troops stand shoulder to shoulder with Americans and other allies working hard to win peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is why we actively support reform efforts in the South Caucasus.

The new environment ignited military transformation throughout the Alliance. The changing US global strategy and NATO transformation are reinforcing each other. A radical change is taking place in the type, location and numbers of US armed forces. The same changes must occur in other NATO countries as well. The troops of the European countries must finally come out of the trenches that were built during the Second World War. If there is any gap in transatlantic relations, it is a gap in Europe between wishful thinking and the reality of difficult challenges streaming from outside Europe. The transformation logic is very simple: we must fight the threats where they arise and even before they arise, not when they turn into a crisis or a catastrophe. This logic is the driving force behind the review of the US global defence posture.

The US is going to move some of its assets and troops to Central and Eastern Europe and create forward operating sites with appropriate infrastructure that would be closer to areas of operations. Such strategic realignment became possible only due to NATO enlargement. It also demonstrates the importance of the CEE countries in the global US strategy. By active, I would say, even aggressive efforts to reform our countries and integrate with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, we managed to transform from forgotten objects of international politics into visible players on the world arena. Part of the success came from combining our efforts inside the region – Vishegrad group and Vilnius 10 were crucial in this process. Most of CEE countries are relatively small, but when they speak together they are listened to.

In the Munich Conference my Russian counterpart argued if there were any NATO or US facilities established on the soil of Lithuania, Russia would send military commissions to inspect them. It is a fascinating example of Cold War-type thinking. The US re-basing effort is in no way directed against Russia. On the contrary, it is very much in line with NATO – Russia cooperation in the fight against both terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction. Wherever the new facilities will be established, they will substantially enhance the flexibility, mobility and readiness of the Alliance's troops to deal with future challenges.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to address some speculations about the possible deployment of American or NATO facilities in Lithuania. In the first case, the Constitution of Lithuania clearly forbids deployment of a base of a foreign country. Yet I do not exclude the possibility that certain infrastructure in Lithuania could be used to assist movement, training or occasional operational presence of the US troops or those of any other Ally. In the case of NATO, there are no restrictions in the Constitution or the Laws of Lithuania to establish even a permanent base of the Alliance. For example, we are seeking for a collective solution of the air-policing problem, which may lead to permanent deployment of some NATO aircraft at Šiauliai aviation base. Other defence-related infrastructure (training bases, firing ranges etc.), may also be used for the Alliance's needs.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I voiced a few ideas about the new US global strategy and its implications to Europe, NATO and Lithuania. I believe these ideas will be further discussed in a more academic and elaborate manner during this conference. As the Minister of Defence, I would also like to stress that the defence posture of Lithuania is also becoming global if not in numbers, at least in thinking and determination.

**H. E. Stephen Donald Mull,**

*USA Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania*

## **THE NEW US GLOBAL STRATEGY AND THE CEE REGION**

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thank you, Colonel Vyšniauskas, for the invitation to speak today. Having briefly toured this impressive Academy and with an opportunity to speak with some of the cadets, I can honestly say that NATO will be a stronger alliance with Lithuania as a member, just as your soldiers have made stronger each international force in which they serve.



I had the honour earlier this week to participate in a welcoming ceremony for the troops of the Grand Duke Algirdas Motorized Infantry Battalion returning from Iraq. Hearing of the accomplishments of these troops, their valour under fire, and their dedication to their mission, I was inspired and gratified. On behalf of the United States, I thanked them for their contributions to establishing peace, stability and democracy in a country that has only known war, extremism and tyranny for the last five decades. I likewise thanked their families and the Lithuanian people for so embracing the principles of democracy and freedom and for recognizing the responsibility of freedom-loving people that you would send your young soldiers into harm's way to secure those principles – for one and for all.

The experience of these Lithuanian soldiers reflects the mission we, the U.S., our allies and partners, are undertaking to fight terrorism and promote stability throughout the world. Their experience also highlights the



special relationship the United States enjoys with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: a relationship that shares the common values and ideas that transcend borders and helps to improve the lives of our fellow human beings.

## **Common Threats: Past and Present**

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and its European allies stood together to confront the common threat posed by the Soviet Union. Winning the Cold War – and by doing so unifying Europe and freeing millions of people trapped under the yoke of oppression – required a sense of purpose and clarity to understand what the challenge was and how we were going to defeat it. The threat was clear, unambiguous and understood by our allies, which united Europe and the U.S. and gave us a common sense of purpose to bring the light of freedom and democracy - which today glows bright and strong - to Central and Eastern Europe.

Today a new challenge to international security threatens countries that cherish freedom, democracy and peace. Terrorism – fostered by Al Qaeda and other extremist groups – targets the innocent and will indiscriminately kill by the thousands – it already has. Its goal is to destroy a way of life and the democratic principles on which so many nations in the world are founded.

## **Meeting the Challenge – An International Effort**

Addressing this challenge in the world, whether we are in Vilnius, Warsaw or Washington, DC, requires the common efforts of like-minded friends. No nation can hope to tackle successfully the decisive challenges of this age alone. Only the combined effort of friends and allies will defeat terrorism.

And defeating it we are. We continue to help enhance the capabilities of our allies to fight the terrorist threat and facilitate the disruption of terrorist networks and the apprehension of terrorist suspects. With the assistance of the largest coalition of nations in history, we have arrested more than 3400 Al-Qaeda suspects worldwide, capturing a large percentage of Qaeda leadership and have kept Osama bin Laden on the run. Law enforce-

ment, banking and intelligence officials worldwide, have worked together to freeze over \$100 million in assets associated with terrorist financing and thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have contributed from the beginning. From the Vilnius Ten statement to troop deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, Lithuania and others have stood with freedom-loving countries to defend what you have so recently won here. While we have accomplished much together, there is still a long road ahead – most of which lies beyond the battlefield. No place currently is this clearer than our joint efforts in the Greater Middle East.

## **The Greater Middle East Initiative**

President Bush said in London last November, “If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. As we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and our way of life. If the Greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.”

Promoting democracy and opportunity in the Greater Middle East is consonant with both America’s and Europe’s national interests and core values and recognizes the inextricable link between the two.

For too long the people of the Greater Middle East have been denied the tools to build a free society – education, free press, religious and economic liberty, political participation and respect for the rights of women. The recently released UN Report on Arab Human Development paints a sobering picture on the challenges the Greater Middle East faces to move forward in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In Saudi Arabia there are only .2 internet hosts per 1000 people - in Latvia 10.7; in Lithuania there were almost 1100 book titles per million people published during the 1990s - in Jordan just 5; in Poland during the same time period there were 1460 scientists and engineers per million people in Research and Development – in Syria just 29.

These large deficits in essential ingredients to building knowledge-based

societies have hindered the progress of many countries in this region. A lack of opportunities has engendered despair, isolation and frustration, and fuelled the spread of extremism, fundamentalism and intolerance.

Miraculously, just as in Lithuania's darkest times, you did not give up the hope of freedom, across the Greater Middle East, from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, there are the stirrings of reform. Free and fair elections are taking place, laws are extending new protections and rights for women, and there are signs of political pluralism. Governments are realizing that dictatorships do not lead to national greatness, but to national ruin; that when governments are just and people are free, a nation can achieve progress and dignity. As President Bush stated in his November speech outlining our Greater Middle East Initiative, "Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it."

The U.S. Greater Middle East Initiative looks to build on the region's nascent economic, political, and social reform movements. This initiative is by no means U.S.-only and we welcome the participation of all like-minded countries from around the world, standing together to nurture the ideas of freedom and democracy. These are ideas on which we are rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan.

Together, we support efforts to increase freedom, strengthen democratic processes, and grant equal rights for women. We would like to see countries embrace the rule of law, religious tolerance, civil society and anti-corruption. We encourage countries in this region to strengthen market economies and improve access to education, especially for girls and women, and reduce illiteracy rates. We hope to improve interoperability of our forces, so we can work together more effectively in peacekeeping and stability operations, and we seek to work with our NATO partners and allies to address common security concerns like terrorism, border security, and proliferation.

## **Proliferation Security Initiative**

We have seen much progress in Afghanistan and in Iraq, but real change will not come overnight. Our goal is to allow those in the Greater Middle East who are deprived of democracy with a choice. As Secretary Powell has said, “They can move forward with the rest of the world, or stagnate in their own insecurities. Those imprisoned, not by Islam, but by a lack of confidence in their societies’ ability to embrace a better future, will no longer be able to intimidate others into joining their cabals of the close minded.”

There is, perhaps, no greater danger than those weapons of mass destruction fall into dangerous hands. It is clear that we must stop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from flowing to and from state or non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is equally clear that we need a coordinated effort to ensure the success of any proliferation security initiative. To interdict the unauthorized transport of these materials, in other words, to disarm terrorists, we need national and international legal authority, we need vigilance at our ports, airfields, and borders, and we need the political commitment. And when I speak of “we,” I do not speak of the United States; I speak of a broader union. This is an initiative of friends and allies.

This common commitment of Central and Eastern European nations, their willingness to assist in the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan, to see democracy take hold in places so far and so different from their own is an important component of this initiative. It is an expression of dearly held values preserved at great cost over years of struggle and deprivation. The free and democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe know —Lithuanians know — that sometime you have to fight for your freedom. Today they fight the terrorists that threaten freedom around the world.

## **Community of Democracies**

As we have said, nations in despair export violence and terrorism. Nations at peace export democracy. The free and democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe also know – Lithuanians know – that you also fight terrorism by never allowing it a foothold. Where people have freedom, op-

portunities, and political power, terrorism does not flourish. That is why the free and democratic countries have a special role within the Community of Democracies. We should consider this global movement, bringing democracies together to promote democratic values and institutions, as another front line offensive, a guarantee of our security.

Lithuania and others now on the new frontiers of Europe feel the urgency of this mission and are already advancing this work. In Belarus, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Poles encourage the nascent groups struggling against an autocratic regime, and nurture the grass roots development of political parties. In the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and beyond, the Central and Eastern Europeans offer to share their lessons learned during their recent years of transformation to viable polities and healthy economies.

### **A Special Relationship – The U.S. and Central and Eastern Europe**

While the memories of the trauma and upheaval of World War II begin to fade in the collective memory of Western Europe – a region that now enjoys mature, successful democracies – the memories of Central and Eastern European countries' recent struggle for democracy and independence remain fresh in people's minds. As President Bush remarked in his speech following the unanimous U.S. Senate vote to accept the seven Central and Eastern European nations into NATO, "The peoples of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have a fresh memory of tyranny. And they know the consequences of complacency in the face of danger."

It was only thirteen years ago on a cold night in January that fathers, mothers, sons and daughters left families and loved ones to go to the TV tower right here in Vilnius and add their voices to the growing cry for independence. Many of you remember the night of January 13, 1991 and the outcome – what people were willing to risk - and the ultimate price 13 of your citizens paid to attain the goals of freedom, liberty and independence.

In many parts of the world where Central and Eastern European soldiers serve, the same yearning for freedom and democracy exists – and similar breaks from tyranny and oppression have occurred. Your past experi-

ences fighting for independence and freedom and your successful transition to democracy and free market economies inspire those who dream of a brighter future – both close to home and further abroad.

During those years under Soviet rule, the U.S. always recognized the independence of the Baltic nations, forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union, and knew that some day they would join the international community of nations.

As President Bush said so poignantly last November 23<sup>rd</sup> in Rotušė (Town Hall) Square:

“Many doubted that freedom would come to this country, but the United States always recognized an independent Lithuania. We knew that this continent would not remain divided. We knew that arbitrary lines drawn by dictators would be erased and those lines are now gone.”

## **The New NATO and EU: Making the Transatlantic Relationship Stronger**

As these last 13 years have shown, Lithuania – and its Baltic neighbors — have not only joined the international community but have become models for other countries making the same transition. Lithuania’s willingness to engage and add its energy and fresh ideas on the international stage shows that it – and the other countries in the region - does not forget from whence they came.

In just over a decade, this region of the world – whose dreams of joining NATO many critics thought would remain just that – has become one of the most stable in Europe. Lithuania can be considered a cornerstone for this stability. Its active engagement in the world’s most demanding and challenging regions have made Lithuania and its regional NATO partners and soon-to-be NATO partners security exporters. We look forward to working with these new members and tapping their energy and creativity to make NATO stronger, and use other international initiatives like EPINE and the Community of Democracies to bring the same freedom and democracy that you enjoy here to other hopeful nations near and far.

Because of their successful transition to free market economies and democracies, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not only about to become members of NATO, but of the EU as well. As the recent discord between the U.S. and EU regarding Iraq has shown, relationships between old friends are not always harmonious. But as good friends do, we work out our differences. Never has our common agenda been so large and mutually beneficial - from advancing free trade to counter-proliferation efforts. The transatlantic relationship is grounded so solidly on common interests and values that neither feuding personalities nor divergent perceptions can derail it.

As Defence Minister Linkevičius and others have so often and correctly pointed out, the NATO they are joining is not the same NATO they originally asked to join. Being a member of the new NATO brings with it new challenges and responsibilities and deployments ever further a field. As I have mentioned, NATO has a critical and ever-expanding role in providing security in Afghanistan. While Article 5 guarantees still anchor the Alliance, the new Strategic Concept recognizes the new threats and challenges it faces – and makes clear the capabilities that NATO needs to combat them. Lithuania and its regional partners have shown they are ready and willing to meet these challenges – wherever they may arise.

But to meet these new challenges will require new capabilities, and to make these capabilities a reality will require countries to provide adequate defence resources. It requires parliamentarians to understand the nature of the threat and why it is important to provide resources for a military that will contribute to collective security.

I was happy to hear that a new defence spending agreement guaranteeing 2% of GDP for national defence might be reached in April among the political parties in the Seimas. Lithuania is fortunate to have such parliamentarians. Of course, it is important to explain to the public why Lithuania puts its soldiers in harm's way—to help others benefit from the hard-won gains of democracy.

## **The Road Ahead**

With the day quickly approaching that NATO gains seven new members at the table, we can look back over the last thirteen years with pride for what we have accomplished – a unified, free, and stable Europe with the roots of democracy firmly planted - but also must look forward to threats we still must tackle – extremism, proliferation of WMD and terror. The world has changed and the threats we face are real and challenging, but with a concerted, unified effort we can vanquish our enemies – those who loathe the basic values we share and cherish – and bring freedom to the many people who have yet to experience a better life they so rightly deserve. In this effort, the United States and our allies and friends of Central and Eastern Europe are united - by history and by experience.

The U.S. commitment to international cooperation is strong, as it is indispensable to guaranteeing the freedom and security in the free world. It reflects a mixture of pragmatism and principle and runs through our history and our vision of the future. U.S. foreign policy seeks not only to serve the interests of the United States but the “cause of human dignity” on every continent.

During the still oppressive days of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian author Victor Narkus wrote, “Today democracy is more important than ever to the inhabitants of East Europe, precisely because it holds out the promise of that which is most completely denied them - individual and national freedom.” It is the spirit of this idea that binds us, and it will be this idea that guides us as we face the global security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Thank you.



II session

**CEE in the New US Global Strategy**

Chair: Dr. Egidijus Vareikis  
Member of Seimas

**Tomas Janeliūnas**

*PhD Candidate of the Institute of International Relations  
and Political Science, Vilnius University*



## **POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR CEE: NEW HOPES AND OLD FEARS**

The main suggestion of this presentation is that Central and Eastern European states are facing a time of political uncertainty and more political or sometimes moral support from the U.S. is needed. Will the new global strategy of the U.S. reduce these concerns, is an open question for discussions.

### **What's going on in CEE?**

For CEE the year 2004 started with a challenge of political changes or at least with a prediction of political instability.

For instance, Georgia elected the new president and is on the way to change all almost establishment completely. However, the threat of separatism and disintegration in this country is still very high and the new government cannot be sure it will successfully deal with this challenge.

Ukraine is preparing for presidential elections in autumn of this year and the parliament tries to shape the constitution for possible new configuration of powers – that is, to limit president's powers in case the opposition takes the office of president. These preparations increase political tension between ruling government and opposition, which sees the chance to win the race for presidency.

Lithuania is facing the impeachment of president and possible new president elections. Besides there will be elections to the parliament this autumn.

All these events may radically change the existing balance of political powers and (as some fears) even geopolitical orientation of the country.

The government of Latvia was forced to resign few weeks ago and it is still not clear will the new cabinet be a long-ruling one.

The government of Slovakia is also at the edge of resignation, because it has only minority support in the parliament from January.

In Poland the Prime Minister L. Miller is facing pressure to leave the post because the public support for his party is falling consistently.

Even in Belarus, where political stability seems to be one of the most unshakable, Lukashenka is facing an unpredicted challenge – the decision of “Gazprom” to stop gas supply turned in a very serious diplomatic tension between Minsk and Moscow. There is well-known fact that without support in Moscow, Lukashenko cannot be sure about his own future in Belarus.

All these signs of political instability raise a lot of questions – are these only domestic problems and coincidences, the democratic processes and politics as usual or does this situation reflect the changing relationships on a global scale and redistribution of geopolitical influence in the region between the great powers?

So many coincidences at the same time seem to be very suspicious. One could assume that an increasing geopolitical competition between Russia and U.S is on rise. And it seems that CEE region is the main area of this intensifying competition.

If it is true, the old fears for CEE may revive, if it is not – there could be hopes, that after all changes the democracies in CEE will become much stronger.

## **Old Fears**

The eventual membership in NATO for CEE states seems to be the final breakaway from the sphere of Russian influence. The fact that Russia was not opposing NATO enlargement very actively however, does not mean that Moscow has lost any interest in CEE. Membership in NATO still does not guarantee political stability and domestic security or full integration to the West.

If Russia would really want to have influence in new the NATO states, it's likely that it would find the capabilities to put the hands on these states. Means and instruments of pressure could be various – for instance, possibility to dictate the terms of economic treaties, especially in the field of supply or transition of energy resources; indirect or hidden support for some political parties or individual politicians, finally – the traditional activities of intelligence services in the region.

It would be naïve to think that Russia would completely abandon its influence in the region where it had interests for centuries. Membership of CEE states in NATO should even increase the attention of Russia to these countries. The old relations from the time of Soviet Union can be used effectively to get some benefits for Moscow – not only in the economic but in political and security meaning. Societies in these countries have short democratic traditions and could be easily influenced by modern instruments of political propaganda and public relations.

The second thing, which may raise some concern in the CEE, is that in the strategy of the U.S. relations with major powers – that means, Russia, China, India – are among top priorities. Such emphasis on relations with Russia could raise a fear that sometimes the U.S., trying to maintain good relations with Russia, will give priorities to interest of Moscow instead of smaller states of CEE.

## **What are the new hopes for CEE?**

The same things that are raising concerns could be perceived as new possibilities and new hopes.

Collin Powell stresses the fact that NATO states are best friends of the U.S. That gives hopes that even the importance of the Russia's factor will not overshadow the interest of new NATO members. Hence at least those CEE countries that are current or eventual NATO members and are actively supporting the U.S. politics, to say in Iraq of Afghanistan, may hope for a real support of the U.S. in the time of political insurance or instability.

The words of the U.S. President George W. Bush said in Vilnius in 2002 that enemies of Lithuania will be enemies of the U.S. could serve as the best

example to inspire CEE states. If these words have a comprehensive meaning, not only in the military sense, the politicians of CEE states may believe that political security in CEE and their general orientation to the West is also one of the priorities of the U.S. This assurance is very important in situations like today. In the face of political changes the politicians of CEE want to know what is happening and what forces drive all of these processes we are seeing today in Georgia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine. Are the attempts of the U.S. to turn political course in these states to the West unstoppable or is a distribution of geopolitical influence between Russia and U.S. taking place – who will get what. If the CEE countries are partners and best friends of the U.S. it is fair to expect that more clearness and trust among friends will persist.

On the other hand, the U.S. concentration on relations with major powers, notably with Russia, may raise not only fears but new hopes as well. New hopes that tension between U.S. and Russia will not grow or some kind of the new Cold War will not begin. Such hopes give a reason to believe that CEE region will no longer be the arena of competition or manipulation between major powers. If an external, and often invisible, influence on the political processes in the CEE would be absent, these countries perhaps could expect faster growing of their civil societies and stronger democracy at home.

**Margarita Starkevičiūtė,**

*Associated Professor of the International Business School,  
Vilnius University*



## **ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS FOR CEE'S SECURITY**

When discussing the problems of security, military aspects of ensuring it are emphasised most often, yet under the conditions of global economy, with free movement of capital flows, increasing functional division of human labour, hidden ownership via

financial intermediaries, economic factors become increasingly important.

### **Importance of economic factors**

All CEE countries face similar social problems and it is unavoidable outcome of the drastic economic reforms, during which the outdated economic system and management structure were dismantled. A relatively rapid reform process, which took only a decade, was extremely costly in human development, social terms. Time is required for the positive effects of the economic reform to manifest themselves, therefore the different social groups do not immediately feel the benefits. It takes some time to establish a well functioning strong private or governmental institution necessary for ensuring individual freedom, whereas for individuals and their established companies in order that new opportunities be revealed to take advantage of EU support and to implement new ideas. Unfortunately, this institution still weak, while there is ample evidence to suggest that pervasive corruption, mafia-dominated economic activity, nepotistic-cum-despotic politicians and grey market enterprises, which can be found in neighbourhoods, are unlikely to provide a proper institutional foundation for sustained long-term growth and

security.

The best illustration to the above statement may serve a threat to the sound functioning of the economy, which arose after the supply of natural gas for Lithuania was disrupted during Russia's economic dispute with Belarus and was restored by only opening an alternative pipeline from Latvia. The incident demonstrated how vulnerable a country may be if its economic decisions are not evaluated in terms of security, and what influence has economic cooperation on ensuring security.

### **Security vs economy – inevitable confrontation?**

Therefore, cooperation of the countries within the Eastern and Central European region should be valued in the economic and security terms. Unfortunately, such evaluation reveals a natural confrontation arising from the objectives of regional cooperation and hindering the formulation of a consistent policy for the regional security. From the point of view of security, efforts to unite the Central European and the Baltic countries into one block with Poland ahead might seem rational, yet economically this is of little use. Under conditions of modern economy, the growth of national income is driven by structural changes – the shift of resources from low-productivity agriculture and industry to higher productivity services, which is happening with the accumulation of knowledge. Compared to the EU average, the productivity of the countries in the region is moderate and to increase it is only possible by way of gaining new knowledge, i.e. we need to cooperate and trade with the Western countries that have accumulated higher knowledge. The remains of the Berlin Wall still exist in the knowledge area and objective economic laws force the countries within the region to look for more advanced partners outside the region and to limit the possibility of mutual cooperation. The openness of companies and economies at large, through increased capability to interact and trade, allows many people to exchange new knowledge, which can become the catalysts the processes of innovation. In the long run, higher productivity is the only way to create higher standards of living with social and political stability across an economy.

Lithuania has no large economic projects implemented even with its closest neighbour Poland; by the way, the Baltic States' common market has

not been developed either: it is not interesting for us together, as we cannot learn anything brand new from one another. Yet if the Eastern and Central European countries focus more attention on cooperation within the region, this will rather meet Russia's strategic objectives. Russia is now forced to reform the economy of Kaliningrad region so that its backwardness is not so obvious in the environment of the rapidly developing neighbouring new EU countries. It seems there are plans to further alter the status of this region. Consequently, a successful and fast modernisation of the new EU countries will urge Russia to follow the path of reforms too. The positive impact of the EU development may become a good example for the population of the other, formerly Soviet block countries to follow, and make a new shift for democratic movements in these countries, which, in turn, would increase the security and stability across the entire region.

### **A decisive factor determining whether the security policy is successful**

However, to achieve a faster development of the stability area, better coordination of actions is necessary. A memorandum, leaked to press, that the European Union has conceded that its attempts to manage relations with Russia are ineffective and flawed, and lack an overall strategy, testifies how many problems have accumulated in this area. It is in this respect that the new EU countries' joint efforts would have much sense, but they should be geared in a single direction and in a centralised way via Brussels, not on the basis of programmes of bilateral cooperation between the new EU member states and their eastern neighbours. In order to gain the strategic advantage, Russia, the EU experts emphasise, although our country is perfectly well aware of this from its historical experience, is able to skilfully take advantage of the disagreements among member states. Consequently, all differences in views should be discussed in advance, establishing clear attitudes that would reflect democratic principles, on which transparent and mutually beneficial economic relations between the EU and its largest eastern neighbour would be based. The fiction that there is an alternative to the common approach is both naïve and dangerous. Such a solution would also be in line with the



Russian authorities' currently declared intentions to reform the domestic economy in such a way that its activities would meet the populations' expectations and would be based on the principles of modern economy and not on the interests of business groupings, often related with criminal elements.

### **US strategy: regional security vs. corporate profit**

Development of the area of economic and political stability would also meet the strategic security interests of the USA, yet if this would always be compatible with its economic interests, is hard to tell. Lithuania's experience shows that implementing a balanced policy in our region is a hard job for the USA. Russia's energy resources provide a real alternative to supplies from the countries in the Middle East, enabling to diversify the energy risk; the fact that this business is extremely profitable should not be ignored either. Therefore during the large countries' negotiations on energy, the security interests of the small Baltic States are simply neglected. Here it is worthwhile remembering the unfavourable for Lithuania agreement with „Williams International“ on the transfer of the oil refinery's shares, naively signed in the expectation of higher security guarantees from the USA. With changes in the economic environment, the US company sold this enterprise to the Russian giant “Yukos” and it now may be taken over by the Russian government. Thus the agreement that was to increase Lithuania's security actually increases threats to the country.

Economically, for the USA it is not very important through which port Russia will be supplying oil, whereas the Baltic States, if oil transportation from their ports were transferred to St Petersburg region, according to the calculations of Russia itself, will lose USD 5 billion of annual income and feel Russia's economic pressure that will have to be compensated by developing more rapidly other economic activities.

Another example, based on the IMF recommendations, could be the most consistently conducted of all the countries Lithuania's supply side and liberalisation policy, which is in line with the international corporations' expansion strategy but is not socially balanced. Obvious, it is not the economic liberalisation process itself that is to be blamed for social problems,

but the rate at which the process was being implemented irrespective, which outpaced development of a respective legal base and effectively functioning supervisory institutions. Such environment provided favourable conditions for cartel large-scale business agreements and increase of corruption, pushing small manufacturers out of the market and limiting the rise of the labour force price. Let us just compare the economic indicators of Lithuania and the other EU acceding countries. In 2000-2003, with the most rapid growth of the domestic economy – by average 6 per cent, the growth rate of real wages and salaries in Lithuania was quite low and the financing of the social infrastructure totally scarce. In a situation where ordinary citizen feel no positive changes in their life while hearing daily speeches about prospering economy, there naturally arises discontent, which can be used by external forces for the political destabilisation of the country.

The conclusion that can be drawn is quite disappointing. While it is widely spoken about the regional security and guarantees issued, the real US policy provides conditions for the expansion of Russia's influence within the region and tells unfavourably on the democratic processes in Russia itself and on the other CIS countries.

### **Employing factors of economic growth for ensuring regional security**

In the economic view, security guarantees could be enhanced by simpler, though unconventional decisions. For example, by transferring part of high-tech defence production to the Central European and Baltic countries, the level of knowledge in economy might be increased and the economic modernisation rates speeded up. Yet the regional security would be most positively affected by a decline in oil prices on the international market. This would help cut costs of production and encourage democratic economic reforms in Russia and the entire post-Soviet area

**Thomas Wilbur**

*Member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Lithuania*

## **ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS: OPINION OF US BUSINESS ABROAD**

First, I'd like to thank the organizers for inviting me here; it's a great honour, a great group. I would also like to thank the Lithuanian Armed Forces. They have an excellent job of re-establishing themselves and providing security, the best job in the region I think, and security is essential for business investment.

I'm not a distinguished guest like you but just as an American small businessman who has a little extra insight into the local economy through working with the American Chamber for the last 8 years. The Chamber represents about 50 American owned companies and 30 Lithuanian ones. I'll speak less from theoretical or policy analytic approach, which the other speakers are accomplished at, or go through the numbers again, which I think Dr. Starkevičiūtė just covered, but from practical experience.

To get the "Opinions of US Businesses Abroad", I did some really unscientific opinion sampling of American Chamber of Commerce Lithuania colleagues and contacted the Directors of the American Chambers of Commerce in our neighbouring countries of Poland and Latvia, trying to get a sense of the economic impact of the change in US global strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe.

US businesses are expanding more here in "New" not "Old" Europe", because they agree, like most other foreign investors, that the New Europe offers fast growth open market niches, bridge to the Eastern markets, lower material and wage costs, none which Old Europe, mature, slow growth economies, have. And it's still a nice place to live.

Business certainly hopes that the US government's increase in political interest in New Europe will be followed, as it often is, by a parallel increase in US government promotion of US business here. I say "hope" because at

this point, an increase in US government interest is not very apparent to US business here, the predominant opinion was “I haven’t noticed”.

Government interest can be expressed in several ways: the most obvious indicator is the end of most US “handouts” – its assistance programs – whether for advice, training programs, adjustment etc., as Lithuania’s economy has matured at a rapid rate, it is harder to argue that it needs direct assistance, so that is expected by the US community to end.

Commerce Department Trade Missions – US government organized “Business following the Flag” – not an increase in activity, actually a concern that the Baltic Region’s Department of Commerce Representative would not be replaced this year.

New programs - the direct result of US policy recently is the opening of Iraq Assistance procurement contracting to allies and this new business is apparent only for textile makers so far.

Overall, the feeling is there has not been any big economic “payback” from New Europe’s political support of US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. That has led to some disappointment, particularly in Poland. Many of the US business managers here simply “don’t know” what the impact of this change in US policy means for them.

So US business opinion abroad runs the gamut from “Haven’t noticed” to “Worried about a withdrawal of US interest” to “Don’t know”. That indicates that the US government has a big job to do convincing its own investors over here that there is a change.

Thank you.

**Vaidotas Urbelis**

*Director of the Defence Policy and Planning  
Department Ministry of Defence*

## MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT FOR THE US GLOBAL STRATEGY



This presentation aims to discern the military dimension of the US global strategy towards Lithuania and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In political strategic terms several factors play the most important role in defining relations between the US and countries of CEE, including Lithuania.

First of all, most CEE and especially the Baltic states are no longer perceived as a problem of US strategy – together with other CEE countries they are all players and allies. Even more - CEE countries more frequently act as US force multipliers, as a bridge to other regions in exporting of stability and are engaged in antiterrorist activities.

Secondly, CEE countries are still trying to escape from security dilemma with Russia. In their relations to Russia all CEE countries experience shift from giving focus to domestic policy to pragmatic cooperation. Time for rhetoric is over - now countries must get more practical. At this level relations with Russia can only get better now. CEE countries have to prove that NATO enlargement not a zero sum game. Russia has serious benefits from the enlargement: safe western neighbourhood, which allows focusing more energy on the Southern flank – Central Asia, Caucasus, China. Still, in these area the US presence in perceived by Russia in security dilemma terms and con-

stitutes significant psychological problem.

And finally, In CEE economic dimension does not overlap with political dimension. The US economic influence in CEE countries is negligible while Russian investments are souring. On the contrary, in military sphere CEE countries feel dependent on the US, and they support bigger US role in European security. As a consequence CEE countries have to combine diverging economic and security interests.

### **US Foreign trade with Central European and Northern European countries**

	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2002	2003
B3 (Baltic states)	0,02	0,03	0,04	0,06	0,04	0,05	0,07
Central Europe	0,23	0,22	0,29	0,34	0,43	0,43	0,50
Central and Northern Europe	1,72	1,81	1,86	1,95	2,02	2,04	1,96
Baltic sea states	6,64	6,71	6,56	6,96	6,98	7,07	7,07

Impact of the new NATO members for the Alliance and US role in this organisation will be substantial. In terms of the US strategy many new questions could be raised. Are ad-hoc coalitions modus operandi of the future? What will happen with NATO? Will collective defence become national responsibility or national defence – collective responsibility? If security is renationalised then CEE countries will diminish their reliance on NATO and concentrate on domestic issues. In my opinion several factors should be mentioned:

- New NATO members have political will to promote collective thinking in areas multinational solutions are feasible, e.g. air policing, multinational logistics, role specialisation. They are eager to implement military reforms and go out of area – Po-

land, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania or Lithuania have no psychological problems like some continental countries.

- Inside the EU they will act to preserve transatlantic link and avoid militarization of the EU structures. In fact EU members are already militarised – member states have about 2 million troops but they never leave the territory of their barracks.

As a consequence “Three speed NATO” could emerge: those who have political will (new members), those who have capabilities (Germany, France), and those who have both (UK, US), others – lack a little bit of both.

CEE countries join the alliance with their own agenda at hand. First of all, they want visible NATO presence for domestic reasons. Secondly, they seek to reinforce deterrence against traditional threats (cycle of logic is the following: if Russia is afraid of enlargement and threatens NATO, new NATO members will get even more worried about re-emerging Russian threat and ask for NATO bases, contingency plans, airplanes. Therefore, Russian strategy is counterproductive). Thirdly, CEE countries hope to attract investment that comes with establishment of NATO military structures in their countries. CEE countries understand that permanent bases like Ramstein in Germany are out of question. But the US could consider establishing smaller infrastructure, training, transit and logistics (permanent security locations) near zones of conflicts. Large bases are good targets for terrorists and require a lot of investment in maintenance and protection. Benefits of pre-positioned equipment and small troop presence area evident – they allow quick response to terrorist threat, deployment to operation areas and conduct of anti-terrorist activities inside countries, e.g. in Georgia.

The role of CEE in the global antiterrorist campaign is worth mentioning. The countries of the region have provided their military units to the US led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Contribution of new NATO members alone reached 4,000 troops in 2002. This constitutes more than 7 per cent of total allied troops in Afghanistan. In the future, these numbers are likely to increase due to ongoing modernization of NATO new members’ armies. For example, Lithuania plans to increase its participation in international operations by 10 times in 2009 – from a 100 strong company size unit to a 1,000 strong battalion size task group. On the regional scale, this growth will be even more substantial.

**Contribution of new NATO members to the Alliance**

	<b>Before NATO enlargement</b>	<b>After NATO enlargement</b>	<b>Change (%)</b>	<b>Forecast</b>
Population (million)	735	839	14	~
Armed forces (thousands troops)	3,448	3,986	16	Will decrease
GDP (billion USD)	18074	18446	2	Will increase
Defence budget (billion USD)	460	467	1,5	Will increase
Troops deployed abroad (thousands)	59	63	7	Will increase substantially

The changing US attitude towards armed forces of CEE countries is reflected in the strategic recommendations drafted by the US experts. E.g. in Lithuania in 1997-1998, a group of experts led by Major General Kievenaar carried out Lithuanian Defence Assessment study. A similar study was conducted in 2001. The first study clearly advocated the principle of territorial defence for Lithuania and was rather sceptical about Lithuania's capabilities to contribute to peace support or NATO Article 5 operations. Lithuania's capacities to provide Host Nation Support facilities were not even considered. The US experts advocated the view that in case of aggression Lithuania would have to rely primarily on its own armed forces. However, the study carried out in 2001 presents Lithuanian armed forces in a completely different light. Huge attention is paid to C3I (command, control, communications, intelligence) capacities and their interoperability with NATO. The study stresses the importance of English language skills and Host Nation Support preparedness. A strategic role is provided to the Klaipėda sea port and the Šiauliai airbase. The study tells nothing about the model of territorial defence, but instead it urges Lithuanian government to develop mobile armed forces interoperable with those of NATO.

In order to perform military reforms Lithuania and other CEE countries should start from changing their strategic culture. Joining the alliance



has profound impact upon their defence planning - now they can rely on American security guarantees and move from the concept of fighting alone to collective defence. This requires different type of forces – from territorial defence to expeditionary forces. One day Lithuania may end up with its brigade deployed in the Far East with no military forces in the country. Are we ready for that? Change of strategic culture must be radical – soldier is no more defender of the Motherland but the one who performs his duties abroad. Such transition will be extremely difficult since CEE countries have no economic interests and justification to go abroad. It is not a visible investment, it is hard to justify to the public. There are no sexy issue to support for politicians – it is easier to reallocate money to “education” and “health” and “social policy”. Western support in public relations campaign is critical in this context.

The West must demonstrate political will to strengthen its military engagement in CEE countries and dividends will come pretty soon. So far, two different scenarios could be envisaged. First, if Iraq trends persist - worst case scenario: the US Coalition vs. the European Defence Union competing for global dominance, Russia is changing camps in her own interest. Second, the best case scenario happened if lessons learned are really learned. This could result in reinforced transatlantic Alliance with Russia kept on short leash – not too far, not too close.

Most likely scenario is between these two extremes. We talk about uncertainty here, but actually, it's the end of the world as we know it: terrorists bomb New York, Russia is afraid of Baltic States (and NATO), Germany does not want to fight, Great Britain wants a strong EU, and Col Gaddafi wants to disarm. What's next? As Rumsfeld said, “There are things we know we don't know but there are also things we don't know, we don't know” – and this is the worst part of defence planning”.

III session

**The US - CEE Cooperation: Agenda for the Future  
VTC (Vilnius - Washington D.C.)**

Chair: Mr. Kęstutis Jankauskas, Director of Security Policy  
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Robert Bradtke**

*Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs*

## **THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC LINK: THE “NEW” AND “OLD” EUROPE IN THE US GLOBAL STRATEGY**

Thank you very much. Let me start out by saying that it is a particular pleasure for me to be with you on a day which marks one more step for Lithuania's entry into NATO. I am happy to report today, that we will have all the instruments of ratification for the changes that countries needed to make in their constitutional procedures to bring Lithuania and the other six members into the alliance. We will be getting the last of these instruments of ratification, from the Turkish government, it will be delivered to undersecretary Grossman today; the president has signed ours for ratification so all 19 countries have informed us of this in the way the NATO treaty requires, so this is an important day when we will have, as I say, in hand the instruments of ratification, for all 19 of the current NATO members.

I also at the start want to thank Lithuania for its contributions even before becoming a member of the NATO alliance. Lithuania has been helping with dealing with the problems of security. Its contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq are very much appreciated in Washington.

Before I look to the future of the transatlantic link, I want to look back to last year as the storyboard; last year was clearly a difficult year in transatlantic relations, we had a significant disagreement with some of our European allies and partners over Iraq, and how to deal with Iraq. This dispute, this disagreement I think contributed to a certain debate on both sides of the Atlantic about differences between Americans and Europeans. The academic discussion talked about Americans being from Mars and Europeans being from Venus, the suggestion was that as the Europeans built the European

Union, they would become more and more different from the United States in their cultures and problems, and this is going to keep us from working together. So we had as I say, a difficult year last year at transatlantic relations.

What I think we have seen though, beginning at the end of last year, and continuing on through the beginning of this year is a return to a more normal pattern of relationships. I think we've seen that whatever our differences are, that what keeps us together, the values that we share, that this is once again I think the focus of the transatlantic relationship. Not our disagreements, not how we differ, but what brings us together and we see once more, that the things that bring us together are somewhat greater than the things that divide us. I will just site two small examples of things that are happening today that I think show how different the relationships are and how we have come back to a more normal pattern of cooperation. Even with countries that have disagreed with us.

We have in Washington today, Chancellor Schröder from Germany and he will be at the White house today to meet with President Bush and he will be having lunch with President Bush. Again, I think something indicates the willingness on both sides the desire on both sides to work together. Another small example which I will mention as well is the kind of cooperation that United States and France are having on the problem of hate in Caribbean that is experiencing so much trouble. Secretary Powell and foreign minister de Villepin have been on the phone not just once a day every day this week, but in some cases two or even three times a day to coordinate US and French policy. I site these two examples, Chancellor's visit and Secretary Powell's phone calls with French foreign minister, not because in and of themselves they aren't that important, however, I feel they indicate the direction of coming back together, even with countries that disagree with us strongly on the other side of the Atlantic, and I think we are going to see more evidence of that coming together, working together on common problems.

Let me mention a couple of those that I think will be very much at the center of attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The first is what we call in Washington the Greater Middle East. We have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the problems between the Israelis and Palestinians. This are, roughly from Morocco, Tunisia, and Tehran, all the way through the Middle East,

into the Gulf, and into South Asia; has been the source of problems, which have spread beyond the region, which have involved the United States, which have involved the countries of Europe and we need now to work together on both sides of the Atlantic to see how we can deal with this set of problems that are coming from this area. The president talked about the forward expansion of freedom when he gave his speech to Congress in January, the State of Union Address. We are looking in ways we can work with our European partners on this forward strategy of freedom.

How can we promote political, economic, educational reforms in the countries of this region, to deal with some of the underlying causes of instability? We are looking at ways to do this with a group of eight; we'll have the G8 summit, this year in the United States. We are looking at ways we can do this with our partners in the European Union, and again, we will have an important summit meeting, in June between the United States and the European Union. We are looking at what NATO might do for expanding its Mediterranean dialog, reaching out to new continents, trying to take some of the tools that were so successful in the partnership for peace, and will again have an important summit in Istanbul, at the end of June, so this set issues of how we can work together to try to promote reform, long term change, a transformation of the Middle East so we can work with countries of that region. This is a very important part of the agenda on both sides of the Atlantic.

We also have, of course, major challenges still in Iraq; we are working very hard with our European partners, political and economic, and military support to permit the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government, on July 1<sup>st</sup>. We want to look within NATO; at ways NATO could play a larger role in helping deal with the problem of instability in Iraq. We already have 17 countries of the 26 current and 2 to-be members of the alliance who are present on the ground in Iraq, so we think that this already shows an important degree in which NATO countries are involved. The question is whether NATO can do more here, to help bring about stability, and this is something that we'll be looking at the Istanbul summit, and even countries such as Germany and France who disagreed with the decision to go to war in Iraq, have said that they would not block a larger NATO role if a sovereign Iraqi government invited such a role.

We also have lots of hard work to do in Afghanistan. Here too, NATO has an extremely important role with the way it is contributing to the important efforts in Afghanistan, but we in the United States think that NATO should play a larger role, and it's started to do that already. We've made decisions, first that NATO would be involved in providing security in Kabul, and then moving out to establish what we call, "provisional reconstruction teams," to help move out into particularly the north and west of Afghanistan, to help to bring more stability to those parts of the country. And we think that in the long run, that all the operations, all the military operations in Afghanistan, should be brought under a unified command, and that should be a NATO command, so we will be discussing this as we come up to this NATO summit in Istanbul.

We have important work to do together with our European partners, unfinished business in the Balkans. At Istanbul, we'll be discussing ending NATO's current mission in the Balkans, SFOR, and setting up a different type of NATO mission, a NATO headquarters, which will be much smaller, which will focus on helping Bosnian defence reforms. It would also have a central role in dealing with the issues of war criminals and counter-terrorism; and then NATO would support a European Union mission, under the cooperative arrangements between NATO and the European Union that would see the European Union take on a larger role in maintaining a secure environment in Bosnia. This is going to be a major challenge, it is going to be a major test with NATO and European Union, and how they can work together. I think this is a very, very important development for Bosnia and for the development of NATO here with the EU relations.

Finally, I think both sides of the Atlantic need to be working on our relations with Russia. There are very important questions that during this year we will need to address. We have major issues involving areas which are in the wider Europe as I would call it. Countries that are not part of the European Union, not part of NATO, that are not likely to become part of the EU or NATO in the near future, but where there is instability and problems. I mention two countries in particular: Moldova and Georgia, where we the United States, together with our NATO allies, have been very strong in insisting upon the removal of Russian munitions, troops from Moldova. We have insisted that about Georgia, that Russia agree with the Georgian gov-

ernment on a timetable for removal of military. So again, we think these issues which have been unresolved for a number of years now, that we should put new emphasis on trying to resolve these issues.

On trying to get the Russian government to fulfil the commitments it made at the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999, so we will want to work very closely with all our European partners on this to see how we can bring better stability, greater stability to the Caucuses, to Moldova, and work on helping those countries develop their European aspirations.

So again, if I can sum up, we came through a difficult year last year. Iraq was really a very divisive issue, how did we, how should we respond do Saddam Hussein's violations of UN Security Council resolutions. We disagreed, but now we are moving on, we are moving on to deal with the problems we face today, and I think we are working together in a new cooperative spirit on both sides of the Atlantic, to deal with the Greater Middle East and the problems it poses, to deal with Iraq, and how we can make Iraq a stable country that doesn't threaten its neighbors, to deal with Afghanistan, to make sure Afghanistan never again becomes a source for terrorism, to deal with the unfinished business in the Balkans, and to deal with the aspirations of countries that are part of the wider Europe. Again, I feel optimistic that we will work very well together, with our European partners in this year ahead.

Vilnius - Washington D.C.

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