



General Jonas Žemaitis  
Military Academy of Lithuania

POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

## **NEW DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY**

### **THE ESDP AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION**

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**Reviewers:**

*Prof. dr. Gediminas Vitkus* - Head of the Political Science Department of the Lithuanian Military Academy, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

*Dr. Vaidotas Urbelis*, Head of the Defence Policy Planning Department of the Ministry of National Defence

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## Preface

The genesis of this book lies in the conference “Contemporary European Security and Defence Policy and the Baltic Sea Region” held by the Military Academy of Lithuania in September 2005. The contributors to this book presented the first versions of their papers at the conference.

The issue of the conference and the book was chosen to prompt reflection about the ESDP and its relationship with the Nordic Baltic region in the context of the wider security situation and the theoretical approaches that may help explain security policies. Accordingly the book consists of two parts: the first, “New dimensions of European security” provides a description of some general security issues and related theoretical considerations. The second, “The ESDP and the Nordic-Baltic security” covers the current situation ranging from the dominating political discourse to practical decision making in military structures.

The first part of the book starts with *Alyson J.K. Bailes* paper which examines the security challenges related to the crisis over the proposed EU constitution in Spring 2005. The paper addresses the question “what issues or aspects within the ESDP field are likely to pose the main challenges for the Nordic/Baltic region and its constituent states?” It picks out three challenges. Firstly, the problems related to further national defence restructuring, and multi-national specialization and integration. Secondly, some “pressure to develop tough EU-wide internal security policies, especially against terrorism and illegal migration, arising both from those large EU members that are most exposed to such threats and from the USA’s demands for EU cooperation”. Thirdly, the management of regional and national interest blocs within the enlarged EU.

*Frank Möller*’s paper examines selected aspects of the language of the European Security Strategy. It argues that the inclusion in the document of power political elements and the increase in securitizing moves expand the social frame within which the European Union claims to have the right to act. In the long term these changes may also affect the European Union’s image of a civilian power. *Patrick M. Mayerchak, Algirdas V. Kanauka and Jyri Raitasalo* papers cover various aspects of USA –Europe relations. All three contributors express concern about a rift between America and Europe. Nevertheless, all of them are optimistic about the future of the transatlantic partnership.

The contributors to part two discuss the ESDP and the Nordic and Baltic States. *Clive Archer* considers why it is important to analyze the Baltic-Nordic region. He specifies a number of reasons, among them: the region has nuclear power Russia as a neighbour; it has seen a considerable shift of security issues from the traditional ones

to the variety of “new” security concerns; the region consists of small states which now constitute a majority of the EU member states. Investigation of the ESDP and the states of the region should provide insights into the development potential of the ESDP as a whole; the region provides a good testing-ground for a number of theoretical approaches to security. The following papers about each individual state elaborate these issues.

*Henri Larsen*’s paper on Denmark and the ESDP examines why there is a difference between the extensive military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU. The argument is that the main lines in the Danish policy towards the ESDP can be explained with reference to the domestic framework of meaning within which Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor takes place. *Carl-Einar Stålvant* provides some reflections on the question “how has Swedish security and defence politics been adapted with regard to developments in adjacent areas and by commitments entailed in EU membership?” *Hanna Ojanen*’ paper depicts Finland’s view on, and its relationship with, the European Security and Defence Policy by using the concept of credibility. *Nina Græger*’ paper analyses how Norway has adapted to a new security environment and to the European Security and Defense Policy. The paper is organised around three empirical questions, which are central to Norway’s security context: To what degree has the ESDP influenced on Norwegian security and defense discourses? What has been the Norwegian authorities’ response to the ESDP, both in terms of political and military cooperation? To what extent has the ESDP triggered a breech with the defining concepts and core practices of Norway’s security and defense policy?

*Kęstutis Paulauskas*’ paper discusses the opportunities and challenges the Baltic governments face after their nation states became member states of both NATO and the EU. The author prompts Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius to reappraise their approach towards CFSP and ESDP, to internalise the EU in their strategic thinking and to become normal and credible member states instead of “a special case”. *Lars Wedin*’ paper considers Baltic Security and Western Crisis Management. The idea is to look at possible western responses in the case of Russian aggression – more or less overt – against the three Baltic States. The paper analyses three possible, albeit not necessary likely, crisis scenarios.

*Erik Männik* paper discusses the role of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Estonia’s security policy. The ESDP has been increasingly directed towards developing military capabilities for the whole spectrum of conflict. These developments are bound to influence Estonia’s security policy and have serious resource implications for the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF). *Žaneta Ozoliņa*’ analyses the challenges to Latvian security policy after the accession to the EU and NATO. She emphasizes that adaptation to new policies developed by the EU

put an additional burden on Latvia. NATO still remains a priority while ESDP is treated as one of the EU projects that should be followed but not treated as a substitute to NATO. The book ends with *Bartłomiej Lachowski* paper on the ESDP from the Polish perspective.

The contributors to this volume do not, by any means, settle all the complex problems that are raised by the development of the ESDP. However, setting out and discussing some of the theoretical and practical problems that arise in the Nordic-Baltic states in relation to the ESDP, the authors have contributed to a debate that will continue to preoccupy international relations scholars and policy-makers for many years to come.



**Alyson J.K. Bailes\***

*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*

# The European Defence and Security Environment: What Way Ahead for the EU?

The crisis over the proposed EU constitution in Spring 2005 was partly a reaction to over-hasty advances made since 2003 in several fields of EU business, including security and defence. Even so, no important new defence provisions were lost with the blocking of the Constitutional Treaty. The EU is likely to go on growing as a defence and security actor under pressure of its existing commitments, influences from the external environment, and also considerations of prestige. This will call for the further evolution of Nordic and Baltic states' related policies notably as regards military integration and specialization, 'homeland security' issues, and ways of better asserting the interests of the region's small and medium-sized states.

## Introduction and Background: Europe under the shadow of constitutional crisis

When he arrived in Washington as the new Head of the EU office in autumn 2004, former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton immediately launched a campaign to convince the American people of the value – not least in the field of security - of the forthcoming new EU Constitutional Treaty (often called '*Constitution tout court*) that had been drafted first by a special Convention and then agreed by 25 states through an Inter-Governmental Conference<sup>1</sup>. Within barely half a year, the fate of the Constitution had become something that any sensible EU representative abroad would do his or her best to keep quiet about. The failure in Spring 2005 of national referendums in France and the Netherlands, seeking approval of the draft Constitutional Treaty, threw the EU into a state of political anomie in which its progress in almost any conceivable field – including its development as a major security power – has been cast into serious doubt.

To digress for a moment on terminology, the term 'security power' will be used rather than 'defence power' in this account because the EU is unique among regional organizations in the breadth of its security-related competences and hence of its potential security action and identity. The new European Security and Defence Policy

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\* Alyson J. Bailes is the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

<sup>1</sup> The resulting text in the form of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed at Rome on 29 October 2004, is at [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm).

(ESDP) launched with the Helsinki European Council decisions of December 1999<sup>2</sup> has provided the Union with a new set of interventionist capacities, military and civilian. The EU's new-found military competence also allows it to make institutional and national partnerships with a military aspect; to develop a guided policy for the defence industry that is related directly to operational needs; and if it so wishes, to engage in military assistance and support for military reform in other regions. In the broader frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however, the EU possesses many more (and perhaps ultimately more important?) instruments, including not just positive modes of non-military action like crisis mediation and regional security-building, but also an increasingly comprehensive set of policies on arms control and non-proliferation. Aspects of internal security are handled in the 'Justice and Home Affairs' framework (also referred to as the 'third pillar'), including policies relevant to anti-terrorism, crime and smuggling control and border security generally: while the core powers of the European Community in 'pillar one' include dimensions like energy security, transport security, environmental security and disaster management; the potential use of development aid for constructive security purposes; and the whole enormous question of how the Union's enlargement policy serves, and how far it should serve, security goals. Any commentary on the EU's present and future evolution as a security actor must properly take account of all these dimensions.

Returning to the constitutional crisis of 2005, it can perhaps best be seen in historical context as a reaction to one of those periods of forced and accelerated progress – a '*fuite en avant*', in the security field as in others – to which the dynamics of European integration seem particularly prone. On this theory, the story really starts with the events of late 2002 and early Spring 2003, when the US invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq split European states into the two camps of those who were prepared to support and those who condemned the action: but when some other aspects of Washington's 'Global War on Terror' were causing dissent and division between the US super-power and Europe as a whole<sup>3</sup>. Already by the EU's high-level meetings of mid-2003, there were signs that European governments of all shades of opinion had realized how damaging such rifts were becoming for their separate and collective interests. The anti-US camp had not in practice been able to stop the USA, but those coalition partners who accompanied US troops into Iraq were not able to buy any substantial correction of the US course as the price of their assistance either. As a

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<sup>2</sup> Council of the European Union, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 Dec. 1999, 'Presidency Conclusions', URL <[http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm)>.

<sup>3</sup> US/European differences on the 'new threats' agenda are discussed in Bailes, A.J.K., "The Price of Survival: Shared Objectives, Different Approaches", in *Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, The European Union and NATO*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005.

result, a clear drive emerged to try to build new, collective security policies and instruments for Europe that would take their point of departure not in love for or distrust of the Americans, but in Europe's own well-conceived security interests. The same theme can be seen running through the first overall European Security Strategy document (first presented by EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana in June 2003 and finalized by the European Council in December that year<sup>4</sup>); the more specific new EU Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction<sup>5</sup>; other strategy documents developed in 2003-4 for example on the Western Balkans<sup>6</sup>, and new inter-institutional agreements with the UN<sup>7</sup>; and of course, in the remarkable achievement of the agreement at 25 on the full text of the new Constitution. The same climate fostered the determination to carry through a first 'Big Bang' enlargement of the EU in early 2004<sup>8</sup>, and to open doors for various other states to seek a commencement of formal accession talks, notably including the long outstanding and controversial case of Turkey.

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<sup>4</sup> *A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy*. Solana's first version of June 2003 and the final text adopted at the Brussels European Council on 12 Dec. 2003 can be found respectively at [http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf) and <[http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf)>.

<sup>5</sup> The European Council in June 2003 adopted Guiding Principles and an Action Plan for an EU strategy against WMD, and in December 2003 the text of the strategy itself. For texts see respectively (Guiding Principles) document 10352/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003, URL <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10352en03.pdf>, (Action Plan) document 10354/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003, URL <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st10/st10354en03.pdf>, and (Strategy) URL [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_applications/Applications/newsRoom/LoadDocument.asp?directory=en/misc/&filename=78340.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/newsRoom/LoadDocument.asp?directory=en/misc/&filename=78340.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Council of the European Union, European Council, 17–18 June 2004, European Security Strategy: 'Bosnia and Herzegovina/comprehensive policy', document 10099/04, Brussels, 15 June 2004.

<sup>7</sup> "The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism", EU Commission document COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 Sep. 2003, URL <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/un/docs/com03\\_526en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/un/docs/com03_526en.pdf)>; Council of the European Union, 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management', document 12730/03, Brussels, 19 Sep. 2003, URL <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st12/st12730en03.pdf>; and Council of the European Union, 'Draft EU Paper for submission to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change' (note 35). For further reflections on the 'effective multilateralism' dimension of follow-up see Biscop, S., 'Effective multilateralism—bringing the European Way into practice', Biscop S., ed., *Audit of European Strategy*, Brussels: Royal Institute of International Relations, Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.irri-kiib.be>>.

<sup>8</sup> Ten nations (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) acceded to the Union on May 1, 2004. Treaties have been signed with Bulgaria and Romania providing for their accession in 2007.

The trouble was that this stampede towards new European successes was an essentially élite phenomenon. No serious debate or consultation took place with the majority of the peoples of Europe, notably on the enlargement plans but also on the merits of the Constitution itself. The French and Dutch peoples were among those who were invited to accept the new Treaty essentially because their leaders said they should: and the negative result was as much a vote of non-confidence in the same leaders as anything else. Apart from specific objections they may have had to enlargement and to the feared economic or political effects of the new Constitution, the voters were protesting against what they saw as a failure of the political class to deal with the ‘real’ challenges to their welfare notably in the domain of employment, society and local law and order. It became clear in the process that neither the leaders supporting nor those opposing the Iraq invasion had gained any political credit with their electors on that account, and often the reverse<sup>9</sup>. On this reading, the impact of the failed referendums in at least temporarily stalling Europe’s larger ambitions was no accident, but rather showed the operation of a kind of mass-scale correction mechanism - perhaps proving that the collective European organism is not so undemocratic after all?

Even so, the question of how far the constitutional disaster actually blocked progress in the specific field of security needs much more careful and qualified attention. During the initial European Convention process<sup>10</sup>, the committee dealing with security and defence ('Barnier Committee') came up with a strong package of ideas for developing both the EU's competence and its instruments in these fields. During 2003 and 2004, however, member states repeatedly chose to pull out items from this package for immediate implementation, partly no doubt with the thought of making them immune to the Constitution's eventual fate, but more importantly because they saw them as practically necessary and politically rewarding (i.a. in boosting the EU's post-Iraq image). Thus, the European Defence Agency that the Barnier group had recommended as a means to develop and implement a European defence industrial strategy (particularly geared to the needs of European operations) was given the green light in November 2003 and began its operations in July 2004<sup>11</sup>. The draft Constitution's idea of 'structured cooperation' in the military field, where

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<sup>9</sup> The only EU Prime Minister responsible for contributing troops to Iraq who was re-elected with a bigger majority during this period was Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Denmark; but German Chancellor Schröder, one of the invasion's most prominent opponents, was also displaced from power in Nov. 2005.

<sup>10</sup> For the European Convention documentation see <http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN>.

<sup>11</sup> Additional background on the EDA and its programme is at [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=227&lang=EN&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=227&lang=EN&mode=g).

more advanced groups of states could take the lead in activities not (initially) shared by all, was reflected in practice in the plans first developed during 2003-4 to establish 13 EU ‘Battle Groups’ capable of very rapid and forceful intervention<sup>12</sup>. The Constitution’s proposal for a ‘solidarity commitment’ to be exchanged between all (including non-Allied) EU members) for the purposes of mutual aid against terrorist strikes and analogous natural disasters was hastily implemented in March 2004<sup>13</sup> after the terrorist bombings in Madrid, as part of a general ‘leap forward’ in EU internal security policies (carried further after the London bombings of 7 July 2005).

That is not to say that no ‘plums’ were left unplucked within the Constitution text: but the remaining provisions specific to ESDP are hard to describe as being of any major importance. A section in the text allowing the generic range of ESDP missions to be expanded both downwards (eg., disarmament and other assistance missions) and potentially upwards (against terrorists) was widely popular; but for that very reason, it is hard to think the member states would not approve an *ad hoc* mission in one of these fields should a good chance arise at any time. Conversely, the language inserted in the draft about an intra-EU mutual assistance commitment also in the event of military attacks was so set about with qualifications as to leave few people believing it would make any change to the day-to-day reality of ESDP<sup>14</sup>. The real damage done by the blocking of the Constitution to the EU’s security personality, and the conduct of its external affairs in general, lies more in the loss of the Treaty’s general structural provisions for a longer-term chairmanship of the European Council, for an EU ‘foreign minister’ in Brussels<sup>15</sup>, and for merging the external services of the different institutions - with all the profound impact that this last would have on financing. This set of planned governance reforms were always partial in that they would not have addressed the increasingly key dimensions of pillar two/three and two/one coordination: but they could have materially helped civil-military coordination within the core areas of ESDP and CFSP, allowing more effective EU inputs at all points in the conflict cycle as well as more effective management of all

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<sup>12</sup> The UK and France, main sponsors of the battle groups initiative, initially thought that only a relatively few large EU states would take responsibility for individual groups. As it has turned out, more have been constituted by compiling smaller national contributions, so that few of the 25 have been left out completely (NB that Denmark, Cyprus and Malta do not at present engage in ESDP work). For the linkage with ‘structured cooperation’ see Missiroli, A., ‘Mind the steps: the constitutional treaty and beyond’, in Gnesotto N., ed., *EU Security and Defence Policy: the First Five Years*, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p.149-153.

<sup>13</sup> *Declaration of the European Council on Combating Terrorism*, 25 March 2004, text at [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=632&lang=EN&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=632&lang=EN&mode=g).

<sup>14</sup> The draft specifies that NATO will remain the main means of defence for its members and that the specific character of defence policies in countries like Sweden and Finland will not change.

<sup>15</sup> This post was to be first filled by Javier Solana on promotion.

kinds of external partnerships. It is no wonder that in the discussions that have been going on ever since Spring 2005 about possible general or partial re-launches of the Constitution, the idea of plucking out this particular set of measures for enactment in some other form has been among the most persistent<sup>16</sup>.

Interesting as the fate of the Constitution must remain for all Europeans, it is only a small part of the environment shaping the future course of the ‘Europe of security’. In the past, the theory and practice of the EU’s security dimension have evolved in response to a complex set of pressures that combined internal political and institutional dynamics with shocks, challenges and opportunities coming from the outside. The latter have in turn been triggered not just by changes in the substantive security environment, but by trends and developments in other security-relevant institutions and in major political relationships. There is no reason to think that the factors in this equation are basically different in 2005-6 or will be any different again in future. A better basis for trying to look forward is thus to ask: what is the balance of internal and external factors in the present conjuncture; what specific issues and challenges could it throw up for ESDP and the EU’s security-related policies generally; and – given the focus of this particular study - which angles might be especially important or difficult for the Nordic/Baltic region?

## 1. Internal Drivers

Even if the draft Constitution’s security provisions were not an important reason for its fall, and even if some way is eventually found to reinstate them, the crisis has created more general and indirect challenges for Europe as a power. Most obviously, the energies of Europe’s leaders and élites have been sapped and distracted and will remain so until the Constitution issue is somehow ‘solved’, which many observers suggest cannot happen before 2007 at the earliest (after new elections, notably in France). The shock felt by European élites and their subsequent self-questioning and loss of confidence has brought intense questioning also of recent bold decisions that were *not* at issue in the referendums. Politically, the first impact of the crisis tended to be divisive both in French/British and French/German relations, aggravating the challenge that would have been posed anyway by the delay in reaching agreement on the EU’s next medium-term budget framework. (As things turned out, the UK Presidency in the second semester of 2005 was obliged to down-scale its ambitions

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<sup>16</sup> Internal EU studies have however underlined the legal difficulties of doing this, while there are obvious political difficulties in taking steps that seem designed to circumvent the ‘No’ voters’ democratically expressed opinion.. At the time of writing in January 2006, the incoming Austrian Presidency is again showing a propensity to explore such ‘cherry-picking’ solutions.

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more or less exclusively to solving this budget deadlock, which it did after protracted horse-trading at the Brussels European Council of 15-16 December<sup>17)</sup>). Looking beyond the EU's present frontiers, the exposure of popular concerns has deepened the uncertainty over Turkey's prospects of full EU membership. The EU did manage (with great difficulty) to confirm on 3 October 2005 its intention to start formal talks with Ankara in November, but President Chirac has stated that no eventual Turkish entry will take place without a French national referendum. While concern has been felt in security circles also about the risks of deferring various Western Balkans countries' membership aspirations<sup>18</sup>, the Turkish case has day-to-day ramifications for the progress of ESDP i.a, because of Turkey's habit of holding aspects of EU-NATO cooperation hostage to aspects of EU behaviour that it does not like<sup>19</sup>.

There are three possible factors and more hopeful hypotheses that may be cited on the other side:

- progress in much of the ESDP field should be possible to insulate from the further ramifications of the constitutional crisis, not just because of member states' revealed taste for 'cherry-picking' in this area, but also for more practical reasons. The EU's military activities are now shaped largely by formal, multi-year commitments undertaken to, and with, other international players: such as the peace operations set up with NATO support in the Balkans<sup>20</sup> and new missions (including several predominantly non-military ones) being developed in partnership with the UN and/or OSCE in places like Aceh, Moldova, and the outer border of the Gaza strip. Internal programmes such as the development of Battle Groups and efforts towards the Headline Goal 2010, the new measure of desired military capabilities<sup>21</sup>, cannot now be derailed. There are also some non-operational fields – such as various actions

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<sup>17</sup> Financial Perspective, 2007-2013, at URL  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/financial\\_perspective/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/financial_perspective/index_en.htm).

<sup>18</sup> The point being that the EU seems to have little leverage *other than* the offer of full membership that could be powerful enough to overcome current problems of status, behaviour and attitude in Pristina, Podgorica, Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje.

<sup>19</sup> At the time of writing these problems are linked particularly to the lack of a settlement in Cyprus and Turkey's consequent attitude to the Republic of Cyprus, now a full EU member.

<sup>20</sup> Notably, the EU's large military operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina which succeeded NATO's SFOR.

<sup>21</sup> Adopted on 14 June 2004, see ESDP Presidency Conclusions, Council document 10547/04, Annex 1, 15 June 2004.

- within the EU WMD strategy – where the EU input has become too much of an accepted international division of labour to be hastily withdrawn<sup>22</sup>;
- as happened in 2003-4 and indeed on some earlier occasions, there seems to be a reflex among member states to seek visible external successes (including those of the relatively ‘macho’ security type) as a way of limiting and re-building damage to the EU’s external image following a crisis. For EU internal purposes, relatively risky new joint commitments like that in Gaza may help to rebuild feelings of unity and solidarity that could overspill usefully to more contentious domains of EU business;
  - (perhaps most important:) life itself will push the EU forward in areas where challenges develop that threaten the Union’s own citizens and territory. At the time of writing there are obvious examples on the one hand as regards the fear of an avian influenza epidemic (providing a role for the new EU Centre for Disease Control); and on the other hand in the shock caused by the Russian partial shut-off of gas supplies via Ukraine to EU nations in January 2006, which has boosted discussion of a more strategically informed common EU energy policy.

It should be noted, however, that all these factors would promote progress in *specific* defence and security fields, without necessarily doing anything to tackle or ease the problem of intra-EU coordination.

## 2. External Influences

In the external environment of 2005-6, the USA might be reckoned as a problem precisely because it is no longer so much of a challenge for European diplomacy on a day-to-day basis. The second Administration of George W. Bush has generally toned down both its stated philosophy and its pattern of security action: it is plainly struggling in Iraq (and also in coping with its own internal disasters like the clear-up after Hurricane Katrina), thus opening up more room for EU sympathy and help. This is of course reassuring as regards Atlantic relations generally, and should reinforce the trend to effective US/EU cooperation on homeland security themes, but it removes the pressure for *further* strengthening of European unity and ambitions that was a main driver of EU progress from Spring 2003. At the same time, the new

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<sup>22</sup> An example is the EU’s commitment to try to negotiate a solution to the Iran nuclear proliferation issue. Also important, but with a more uncertain outcome, is the future of the EU’s pledges to help fund the further collection and destruction of WMD materials in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere within the G8’s ‘Global Partnership’ programme: see a recent research report at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euppconfmaterials.html>.

question-marks over enlargement are bound to complicate (as has already been remarked in the case of Turkey) the EU's relations with the neighbouring countries and regions concerned, and must probably weaken at least temporarily its image and influence there. (One point this highlights is that the EU's means of influencing, notably, its South-Eastern neighbours *other* than by enlargement prospects are remarkably thin.) Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union currently represent a particularly complex challenge because of the evident differences of interest, perception and approach among the EU's different members and sub-regions.<sup>23</sup> The short-term atmosphere with NATO has been tricky, *inter alia* because a temptation existed (or was imagined to exist by some Europeans) for the Alliance to exploit the EU's crisis of confidence by seeking new dominance in the inter-institutional relationship and/or burnishing its own relative image. In the larger world, the EU's 'alternative' methods of dealing with key new threats have not been doing very well in Iran, and the EU is still not really engaged in Korea. The Union is looking as impotent as ever in the Middle East, despite the new openings for non-military inputs and broader European engagement that would appear to have been created by changes in both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships. EU interests and priorities in this region suffer also from the continued disproportionate focus on (and sucking of resources into) Iraq. Globally, the EU's new doctrines of 'effective multilateralism'<sup>24</sup>, are looking pretty limp after the failure to make a united, let alone decisive and constructive, European input either to the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Review Conference<sup>25</sup> or to the UN reform process of 2005<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> It is arguable that such differences on *Ostpolitik* between the 'older' and 'newer' Europe (and between the large and small EU states) are set to be a more lasting and stubborn problem for the EU than the old-new division vis-à-vis the USA that was so much publicized during the Iraq controversy.

<sup>24</sup> This was one of the key tenets of the 2003 Security Strategy document and, in terms of practical execution, has been linked particularly to the EU's role in supporting the UN and other treaty-based and norm-creating global processes. Defective EU performance in the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) current Doha round might be mentioned in the same connection.

<sup>25</sup> The seventh 5-yearly review of the NPT was held on 2-27 May 2005 and failed to produce substantive results, mainly because of strong differences of view and priority between different groups of states and of consequent procedural wrangles that ate up more than half the allotted time. The EU went into the Conference with a broad-brush 'common position' but its individual members, including the UK Presidency, played diverging roles at certain key points. For a summary account see the chapter by Kile, S.N. in *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armament, Disarmament and International Security*, OUP London, forthcoming June 2006.

<sup>26</sup> The UN General Assembly in September 2005 included a special 'World Summit' session to adopt a text on current global security challenges and UN responses, drafted in the light notably of a High Level Panel report in Dec. 2004 and the Secretary-General's recommendations of Mar. 2005. As a result of disagreements in which the USA played a prominent role, the final 'Summit outcome' text of 20 Sep. 2005 (URL: <http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>) was able to endorse only a limited (if valuable) selection of the recommendations and notably failed to include any decisions on reform of the UN Security Council or any provisions on arms control and disarmament.

On the other hand, the mere listing of so many national, regional and functional challenges shows just how wide the EU's involvement has become in a short space of time—and how real is the *demand* and *need* for it to do better. There are at least four trends and factors that should stimulate further growth in the EU's security identity and its security-related outputs in the medium to longer term.

First, the very fact of the problems the US has run into in Iraq and elsewhere tends to vindicate those Europeans who have stressed all along that military strength and the exercise of 'hard power' generally is not a panacea. The EU has added cause to insist that its own worth should not be judged exclusively by such a yardstick, while the USA has been forced to recognize once more that it cannot be all that it wants to be without Europe. The effect of the Constitution crisis in re-balancing American feelings about the utility of a *united* Europe has already been mentioned.

Secondly, the enlargement/partnership dynamic on the South East and Eastern borders of the 'EU at 25', including the still unsolved Russian relationship, creates problems precisely because it is a growing challenge increasingly directed *at the EU as such*. There are limits on what the USA or NATO could do in the key non-military dimensions of stabilization and reform for these regions, and there are increasing (mainly political) limitations on what the OSCE will be permitted to do. Whether the EU resolves the pressures it will face in this area by going back to the enlargement track or by using extreme ingenuity to devise other frameworks for interaction, the Europeans will not be able to escape from solving it somehow; not just for security reasons but because of the high and often growing interdependence between core Europe and its neighbours in the energy, migration and soft security spheres.

Thirdly, the global trend in security thinking since the end of 2004 has been to shift attention back from the 'new threats' that were placed at the head of the agenda by the USA after 9/11 towards 'human security' ones like disease, natural disasters, climate change, poverty, under-development and conflict. The EU's competence, interests, public concern, and potential are all strong, if very far from being fully understood and properly applied, across these parts of the spectrum. Last and not least, there is increasingly widespread and far-reaching imitation of the EU 'integration method' in other parts of world such as Latin America, Africa, South-East Asia and the Far East; and it is becoming increasingly clear that the worst security hot-spots are linked with regions that have not succeeded in, or even attempted, the regional integration experiment.

## Conclusions: The Next Set of Issues, and Nordic/Baltic Implications

The clear implication of the above analysis is that, almost irrespective of what happens on the Constitutional Treaty specifically, the drive towards a more conscious and effective European security and defence identity based within the EU will not be halted and may even become more intensive in the next decade or so. If so, what issues or aspects within the ESDP field are likely to pose the main challenges for the Nordic/Baltic region and its constituent states? Three in particular may be picked out here. First, the next stages in ESDP (including a constantly increasing operational burden) seem bound to push towards further national defence restructuring, and multi-national specialization and integration. The policy and resource decisions that various EU members have had to make in order to play their chosen roles in the Battle Groups programme are a clear example. Yet so long as the EU has not become a ‘real’ defence community, how can its members (especially the non-allied ones) be certain that other Europeans would come to their aid in a real crisis with those crucial defence competences that they have abandoned themselves<sup>27</sup>?

Secondly, there seems bound to be continued pressure to develop tough EU-wide internal security policies, especially against terrorism and illegal migration, arising both from those large EU members that are most exposed to such threats and from the USA’s demands for EU cooperation. The possible consequent challenges for Norden (and to some extent the Baltic States) include lack of experience, normative resistance to new disciplines from societies that value their civil (and economic) freedoms, and in several cases a historical reluctance to integrate military and internal security policies and tools too closely.

Third and last comes the broader and abiding question, already raised above, of managing the play of regional and national interest blocs within the enlarged EU. On most major security issues, including the many challenges of ‘Russia-handling’, there is no real dividing line between old and new EU/NATO members in the North – their formal statuses and policy language may be different, but underlying purposes are convergent. There are, on the other hand, significant nuances between the Nordic/Baltic members of both Western institutions and their fellow member states in other European sub-regions, as became clear yet again in the differential reactions to and different degrees of concern felt about Russia’s short-lived (de facto) interruption of gas supplies to EU nations in January 1996. The problem is that in this crisis as in

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<sup>27</sup> For more on the issue of the EU, NATO, and the lead responsibility for Europe’s territorial defence see Bailes, A.J.K., ‘How Collective is our Defence?’, *Sicherheit und Frieden: Journal of the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheit*, Hamburg, (23 Jg.) 2/ 2005, p. 90-95.

earlier ones, it was other European actors—the big Western members and Poland (albeit working with Lithuania in the earlier important case of Ukraine's Orange Revolution) - that typically called the tune: and the power play among them has not necessarily produced the policy balance each time that would best have reflected Nordic and Baltic concerns. Outsiders might and often do draw the conclusion from this that the Northern states should work systematically to create common policies and tactical fronts on such issues, on a Nordic and/or Nordic-plus-Baltic basis. As anyone who knows the region better will realize, however, this approach has never seemed to work very far or for very long - in the security sphere specifically - for all kinds of objective and subjective reasons: and the diverging Nordic/Baltic responses to the Iraq crisis<sup>28</sup> in the latest years give no new grounds for optimism. One may wonder whether there is anything in the likely next phase of development of the EU as a security actor that can change this picture: or might it even *have* to change in order for the EU to get through that next phase successfully?

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<sup>28</sup> The Baltic states and Denmark were troop contributors to the US-led invasion while Iceland gave enthusiastic and Norway more limited political support, Sweden pronounced the US action to be 'illegal' and Finland was also basically negative.

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**Frank Möller\***

*Tampere Peace Research Institute  
University of Tampere*

## Reflections on the Language of the European Security Strategy

Studying security implies studying the language of security and security documents as privileged textual representations of an institution's approach to security. This paper examines selected aspects of the language of the European Security Strategy. This language is indicative, not only of the European Union's approach to security but also of both the degree of saliency currently assigned to security and the normative foundations of security policy. It is argued that the inclusion in the document of power political elements and the increase in securitizing moves expand the social frame within which the European Union claims to have the right to act. In the long term these changes may also affect the European Union's image of a civilian power.

### Introduction: “A secure Europe in a better world”

In the document “A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy” (hereinafter: ESS), adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the member states of the European Union (EU) at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003, the EU understands security as both an end in itself and as a “precondition” and “the first condition” for other aims such as development (ESS).<sup>1</sup> By prioritizing security and by articulating the need to both “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”<sup>2</sup> and to establish a first line of defence outside the territory of the EU, the EU adds new elements to a document that still adheres in large portions to the classical EU approach to security with its characteristic emphasis on civilian means such as “upholding and developing International Law”.<sup>3</sup> In the ESS, insecurity appears to be mortals’ chiefest enemy: the strategy prioritizes security over all other values, makes all other values dependent on security and articulates the occasional need for military interventions. These elements are reminiscent of power political or neorealist thought patterns that are not usually associated with the European Union’s approach to security. The inclusion in the document of some neorealist elements does not mean that the EU has replaced its civilian image with a military

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\* Dr. Frank Möller is Research Fellow at the Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere, Finland

<sup>1</sup> *A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy (ESS)*, Document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003, p.6,19. [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

one but it results in a condition of tension between power political and institutionalist elements that can be observed in parts of the document.

At the same time, the EU has intensified its securitizing practices: in the document numerous threats to the security of Europe and the EU are identified and elevated to the status of “key threats” against which the EU has to develop counter-measures. The combination of these two elements – the inclusion of power political elements and the increase in securitizing moves – may change in the long term the character of the European Union’s security policy. In the short term, it may change both the social frame within which the EU acts and the perception of the EU by non-members. Since “what counts as a security issue is always a result of political and social discourse”<sup>4</sup> this paper takes a closer look at the ESS as a document that is both the result of the EU discourse on security and, as the first strategic document of the EU ever, one of the figures against which the European Union’s approach to security will be evaluated by others. Since the ESS is an example of the articulation of security, the paper analyzes the document in the light of selected language-oriented approaches to the study of security. The paper does not explore the extent to which the language of the document has already been translated into security policy. Neither does it speculate about the extent to which the language of the strategy is likely to be translated into security policy in future.

## 1. Language and the Language of Security

Different languages and different texts give different accounts of the world. If we agree with Ole Wæver that language conditions the social frame within which social action takes place<sup>5</sup> then it can be said that the language of the ESS widens considerably the frame within which the EU claims to have the right – and perhaps the duty – to act and it does so quite regardless of whether or not policy will actually follow language. This is one of the reasons why this paper analyzes language rather than policy. International Relations literature gives several other reasons for the prioritization of language. First, speech acts make validity claims; language articulates knowledge claims. For example, the ESS or the people behind it, first and foremost Javier Solana, claim to know what the global challenges and the key threats are in fact. Analyzing language, therefore, means asking such classical questions of political analysis as: what are the conditions under which knowledge claims are made? What are the conditions under which they are believed and accepted? What are the conditions under which they are not rejected or opposed? Asking these questions while analyzing language means analyzing language and knowledge claims critically rather than dogmatically.<sup>6</sup> Secondly, “language is

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<sup>4</sup> Sheehan, M., *International Security: An Analytical Framework*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Wæver, O., “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory”, in Hansen L. and Wæver O., eds., *European Integration and National identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 20–49.

<sup>6</sup> See Walker, R., “Confronting Terror/Confronting Exceptionalism,”, Featured Lecture, New Directions in Peace and Conflict Research, Center for Peace Studies Research Conference, University of Tromsø, 7–9 September, 2005.

the medium through which discursive stories about us (and them) are produced and reproduced".<sup>7</sup> Security documents can therefore be understood as discursive stories about "us" and "them" and "our" and "their" security. These stories, at the same time, help construct notions of "us" and "them" and these notions are essential for security policy. Thirdly, official security documents are said to be "narrative representations of the way security, threat, defence, war, danger and countermeasures are conceived of".<sup>8</sup> National security documents can be seen as "privileged textual representations of the state's security policy".<sup>9</sup> The ESS can therefore be seen as a privileged textual representation of the European Union's approach to security. Fourthly and more ambitiously and problematically perhaps, language is said to determine the way we act. As alluded to above, Ole Wæver argues that even if we do not believe in what we say we are none the less bound to act within the semantic structures that we have created by speaking. This is so because, according to Wæver, "[s]tructures within discourse condition possible policies."<sup>10</sup> He does not wish to imply that "every single decision fits the pattern to be expected from the structures used in the analysis" but "there is sufficient pressure from the structures that policies do turn within a certain, specified margin onto the tracks to be expected".<sup>11</sup> In other words, semantic structures condition the frame within which social action such as security policy normally takes place. Infringements on and violations of this frame are mainly exceptions confirming the frame. Wæver's use of the word "condition" may be criticized for being too strong a word for the relation between language structures and policy. "Shaping" or "framing" may be less deterministic terms. In any case, the ESS has widened the frame of action considerably within which the EU has authorized itself to act politically. It is equally important in the present context that, fifthly, "[i]n language is codified the *normative* categories through which human relations are constructed".<sup>12</sup> Language, in sum, conditions or at least shapes the frame within which political action takes place and codifies the norms to which political action adheres. Thus, there is a strong relationship between language, norms and security policy.

Finally, language also influences others' perceptions and expectations. As stated above, the ESS is one of the figures against which the European Union's approach to security will be evaluated by non-members. Thus, we have to take language seriously not least because others are likely to do so, too. For example, the then President of the European Commission, Romani Prodi, reportedly said before a Baltic audience in February 2000 that "any attack or aggression

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<sup>7</sup> Paasi, A., Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996, p. 91.

<sup>8</sup> Jæger, Ø., *Securitising Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States*, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Wæver, (note 5) p. 27.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Kobayashi, Audrey/Peake, Linda, "Unnatural Discourse. 'Race' and Gender in Geography," in Barnes T. and Gregory D., eds., *Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of Inquiry*, London: Arnold, 1997, p. 456.

against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against the whole EU.”<sup>13</sup> This statement resembled the words of NATO’s and the WEU’s articles five and raised expectations that the EU was neither willing nor able to come up to at that time. Accordingly, Prodi had to qualify his comments by returning to both the traditional EU security narrative and the language of security community theorizing.<sup>14</sup> He wrote among other things:

In discussions with Lithuanian President Adamkus I affirmed that membership of the Union gave a “sense of belonging” and that this was in a real sense an effective guarantee of security. The use of the word “attack” had no military significance.

There should be no confusion between the sense of security brought by the membership of an enlarging Union and the kind of territorial security commitment provided by articles V in the NATO and WEU treaties, which were not part of the discussions.<sup>15</sup>

Thus it would seem that language matters indeed and it matters quite regardless of whether or not it is or will be translated into policy. The inclusion in the ESS of power political thought patterns is a semantic departure from the European Union’s image and self-image as a “civilian power”<sup>16</sup> according to which the EU functions along lines of thought and promotes policies other than traditional realist ones. In the new strategy, “key threats” to European security – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime – as well as “global challenges” are said to require both the externalization of defence (“the first line of defence will often be abroad”<sup>17</sup>) and conflict and threat prevention at an early stage. According to the document, the disappearance of distance requires that equal attention be devoted to distant and near threats (ESS, p. 11). The role of the EU in contributing to these “key threats” is not discussed in the document. As always, it is other states and cultures which are a threat. “State failure” is basically seen as a result of “bad governance” (ESS, p. 8) and not as a reflection of, for example, unequal trade patterns or the obvious difficulties resulting from superimposing the essentially European concept of the nation-state on other parts of the world. “Religious extremism” is said to follow from the invisible hand of modernization (ESS, p. 7). Organized crime including trafficking of drugs is decoupled from the demand situation in the EU and assigned to some obscure “Balkan criminal networks” that are said to be also responsible for a significant part of the women victims of the sex trade world wide (ESS, p. 9), thus cultivating the image of the Balkan as Europe’s internal Other. Again, the demand situation in the EU is not mentioned.

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<sup>13</sup> Stratfor.com, *Global Intelligence Update*, 11 February 2000.

<sup>14</sup> See Möller F., “Cognition, Representation and Security Community Building in the Baltic Sea Region,” *NORDEUROPAforum*, 13:2, 2003, p. 82.

<sup>15</sup> Prodi R., personal letter to the author, 27 April 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Orbis J., “Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates,” forthcoming in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2006, 41(1).

<sup>17</sup> ESS (note 1) p. 11.

The message is that outside the EU, anarchy reigns<sup>18</sup> and that it is precisely this state of anarchy from which “Europe” in general – depicted as “prosperous”, “secure” and “free” (ESS, p. 3) – and the EU in particular have to be protected. If anarchy reigns, neorealists in the train of Kenneth Waltz tell us, then the importance assigned to security is natural and obvious – it would be irresponsible not to prioritize security – because “[i]n anarchy, security is the highest end.” We can search for such “other goals as tranquility, profit, and power”<sup>19</sup> only if we are secure. In this conceptual edifice, the articulation of anarchy and the prioritization of security join hands.

Now it can be argued that it is only natural that a security strategy emphasizes security rather than, say, economic development or freedom but this ignores to some extent the security history of the EU with its close intellectual ties to what scholars refer to as security communities – i.e. groups of people that base their mutual interactions on the belief that common problems must, can and will be solved by means of peaceful change; this belief being based on a variety of social interactions that in themselves need not have anything to do with security but that nevertheless result in dependable expectations of peaceful change.<sup>20</sup> Here, a feeling of security is the result of a variety of forms of social interactions including, but not limited to, security. Even if security is emphasized it does not automatically have to result in inclusion in the strategy of power political thought patterns, an increase in securitizing moves and the representation of security as “a precondition of development” (ESS, p. 6). The latter certainly is an incantation that works equally well the other way round. Indeed, an excess approach to security can suffocate development (and, for that matter, everything else) in the sense, articulated in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, that developing countries might face obstacles “in mobilizing the resources needed to finance their sustained development” if they are made to allocate substantial resources to the largely unproductive security sector. Linking two different issue areas is not always helpful. The UN Millennium Declaration, for example, does not explicitly link security and development: Section II on peace, security and disarmament does not refer to development (except in the sense that adverse effects of UN economic sanctions on innocent populations are to be avoided) and Section III on development and poverty eradication does not refer to security. Rather, both values are included in the fundamental value of freedom, including the rights to live free from hunger and free from violence but neither one is seen as the precondition of the other. Furthermore, it is but a small step from a strategy promoting development through security to a strategy sacrificing “their” development for the benefit of “our” security. A telling example is the rapid evaporation of the Live8 enthusiasm after the attacks on London’s transport

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<sup>18</sup> This impression is supported in such publications as *Foreign Policy* and its “Failed State Index,” published in July 2005. According to this index, about two billion people live in countries that are in danger of collapse.

<sup>19</sup> Waltz K. N., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1976, p. 126.

<sup>20</sup> Deutsch K. W., et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

system, supporting the view that a “better world” could be sacrificed for the benefit of a “secure Europe.”

A security document could also consist of desecuritizing moves by, for example, not elevating many trends and developments to the status of security but rather treating them as political issues. Indeed, the UN Millennium Declaration does not include security explicitly in its list of fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the 21st century. However, it could be argued that the elevation of certain issues to the status of security issues increases the attention devoted and the resources allocated to these issues. There are indeed several scholars who “welcome these developments without reservation” because “to get an issue on a state’s security agenda is to give it priority.”<sup>21</sup> This assessment is opposed to those scholars who argue against security because securitization is said to carry with it an authoritarian flavour favouring depoliticization<sup>22</sup>: by referring to an issue in terms of security, this issue may be given priority but it may simultaneously be located outside the realm of public debate. Some scholars argue therefore for desecuritization as “the optimal long-range option” because it moves political issues, formerly referred to as threats and tackled with extraordinary means, back “into the ordinary public sphere.”<sup>23</sup> As always, what happens when the word security is used in a political context should be an object of empirical analysis rather than a part of the definition. Thus, whether or not the European Union’s securitizing moves in the ESS help give priority to the issues referred to as threats has to be empirically analyzed just as whether securitization results in politicization or depoliticization.<sup>24</sup> Referring to an issue in terms of security may also help legitimize the use of extraordinary means in order to deal with the issue<sup>25</sup> with the “war on terror” exemplifying this in abundance. However, it may also serve as a mobilization reserve for those policies that are possible in the framework of normal politics but that would not have been mobilized had security not been articulated.<sup>26</sup> As a result of processes of habituation, the articulation of security may also become ineffective and useless. From the point of view of securitizing actors, this is one of the dangers inherent in the current excess approach to security: the word security may simply wear off. Again, what happens when the word security is used in a political context should be the object of empirical analysis.

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<sup>21</sup> Booth K., “Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,” in Krause K., and Williams M. C., eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 111.

<sup>22</sup> Neocleous M., “Against Security,” *Radical Philosophy*, 2000, 100: p. 12-14.

<sup>23</sup> Buzan B., Wæver O., Wilde J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup> Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde acknowledge that securitization can be both an extreme form of politicization and its opposite, (note 23), p. 29.

<sup>25</sup> Buzan B., Wæver, O., Wilde, J., (note 23) p. 24

<sup>26</sup> Möller F., Ehrhardt H., “Sicherheit als Sprechakt. Legitimation von Gewalt durch die Artikulation von Sicherheit,” in Schultze M., Meyer J., Kraus B. and Fricke D., eds., *Diskurse der Gewalt – Gewalt der Diskurse*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005, p. 53.

## 2. “I like your words ‘national security’”

It can also be said that parts of the ESS can be explained as a reflection of the wish not to deepen the current rift between parts of the EU and the United States by adapting the EU approach to some extent to the current US approach. However, the emphasis on security has deeper intellectual roots that are independent of post 9/11-policies. One should therefore avoid explaining the current interest in security exclusively in terms of the “war on terror” and its ramifications. Regarding the EU, an equally important event seems to have been the failure of the European security policies to successfully intervene in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s but it is noteworthy that the terrorist attacks of 2001 triggered the European Union’s first strategic document while the European Union’s failure in former Yugoslavia did not. Among scholars, however, there could be observed a preoccupation with security already during the 1990s, starting perhaps with the revised edition of Barry Buzan’s *People, States and Fear*, written early 1990<sup>27</sup> and thus before the end of the Cold War, marked by the dissolution of both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This very end seemed to invite a more relaxed and less securitized approach to international affairs. However, since Ole Wæver’s articulation of embarrassment while “once again” discussing security<sup>28</sup> the number of academic publications on security has increased rather than decreased. Meanwhile, security studies is said to have become “one of the most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations.”<sup>29</sup> For example, the human security paradigm with its focus on “human” rather than “national” and on “individual” rather than “state” security has introduced a new referent object of security but it still supports the notion of security-as-highest-end. Even those scholars who, in the mid-1990s, started challenging realism from a social constructivist perspective often did so on realism’s home turf, namely, national security, arguing that if they “can establish plausibility here, it should be relatively easy to apply [this] analytical perspective to broader conceptions of security that are not restricted to military issues or to the state.”<sup>30</sup> While this may be so it also means implicitly confirming both the importance of the study of national security in international affairs and realism’s hegemony in defining the research agenda of the discipline of International Relations.

In a historical perspective, however, the meaning of the word security is ambiguous. In *Macbeth* (III.5) Shakespeare has Hecate declare that “security is mortals’ chiefest enemy” and that this is so is said to be common knowledge. Here, security is linked with carelessness,

<sup>27</sup> Buzan B., *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-War Cold Era*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 171.

<sup>28</sup> Wæver O., “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Lipschutz R.D., ed., *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 46–86.

<sup>29</sup> Williams M. C., “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47:4, 2003, p.511; Smith S., “The Contested Concept of Security,” in, Booth K., ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, p. 27–62.

<sup>30</sup> Katzenstein P. J., “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in Katzenstein P. J., ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 11.

complacency and over-confidence and thus given a meaning that seems to be almost the opposite of what it is today<sup>31</sup>. Thus, the meaning of the word has changed considerably over time and one should probably avoid its reification by, for example, claiming that security “carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape”<sup>32</sup>. Meaning assigned to language is context dependent, discursively constructed and historically contingent. In the US context, for example, the word security is said to have gained its current meaning and importance only in 1945–47 with Joseph E. Johnson, chief of International Security Affairs in the US State Department, discovering “a very concrete significance for us” in the formerly “abstract noun ‘security’”<sup>33</sup> especially in combination with the word “national”. As one Senator commented on the rhetorical move from “defence” to “national security” legitimizing the state’s involvement in a growing number of areas formerly off limits to the state: “I like your words ‘national security’”<sup>34</sup>. Both the subsequent creation of the US National Security Council and the embodiment of national security in the National Security Act of 1947 are indicative of the increase in meaning, “appear[ing] to place the state at the heart of the security question: it was the state which was to be secured and the state’s security which was to be prioritized”<sup>35</sup>.

Likewise, the degree of saliency assigned to security in academic writings has changed over time. Many scholars have challenged the idea that security is, has ever been and will ever be the highest end. In the seventh edition of Hans Morgenthau’s classic realist statement, *Politics among Nations*, for example, security is included in the index only in combination with the word “collective” but neither on its own nor in combination with the word “national.” Here, emphasis clearly is on “national power” and on “national interest.” Arnold Wolfers challenged the idea that all other values are normally subordinated to the maximization of national security. He also argued that security “may be an intermediate rather than an ultimate goal”<sup>36</sup>. Raymond Aron supposed that, in a world of autonomous political units “security is the final goal of state policy” but then added power and glory as equally final goals of state policy. Charles Glaser, while depicting as one of realism’s basic assumptions that “states give priority to insuring their security” acknowledged that states may “have important motives in addition to security”<sup>37</sup>. Such theorists of integration as Karl Deutsch also problematized the security-as-highest-end assumption by showing that groups of people sometimes act in ways and for purposes that make peaceful change appear to be of only secondary importance<sup>38</sup>. For

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<sup>31</sup> McSweeney B., *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 16-17.

<sup>32</sup> Wæver, (note 28) p. 47.

<sup>33</sup> Neocleous (note 22) p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Wolfers A., *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 152, 157.

<sup>37</sup> Glaser Ch. L., “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security* 19:3, 1994/95, p. 54-55.

<sup>38</sup> Deutsch, (note 20) p. 31.

some people, security does not seem to be the highest end. Thus, the degree of importance assigned to security is also context dependent, discursively constructed and historically contingent.

That the articulation of security currently serves as an attention-gaining signifier should therefore not lead one to naturalize these dynamics. Thus, not only everyday language should be “unnaturalized”<sup>39</sup> but also the elite language of security. In their speech act approach to security, Buzan and associates tend to essentialize the saliency of security rather than seeing the degree of importance assigned to it at any given moment as a result of discursive practices, reflecting among other things power relations in society. For example, they maintain that by saying “security” or “defence” or other words that may have the same function “we are by definition in the area of urgency”<sup>40</sup> but this is the authors’ definition and not some unalterable and essential meaning of security. Indeed, “if national security issues are *defined* as important, attempts to compare them with other issues will be prejudiced from the start”<sup>41</sup>. Borrowing the words used by John Gerard Ruggie to comment on deficiencies in some constructivist approaches, Buzan and associates may be criticized for “not [...] begin[ning] with the actual social construction of meanings and significance from the ground up, showing how they came to be ‘historically so and not otherwise’”. Thus, referring to an issue in terms of security means assigning utmost importance to this issue *only* if it is inter-subjectively established through discursive practice prior to the articulation of security that security is indeed more important than are other issues.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, rather than representing research as purely analytical and disinterested, scholars should be aware of the normative character of prioritizing the study of security rather than, say, development, equality or justice: the decision that *scholarly* preference be given to the analysis of national security policy is as normative in character as is the decision that *political* preference be given to national security issues. As Steve Smith put it in his 2003 Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, “there is no ‘purely’ academic perspective, secured, isolated, and protected from ethics and power”<sup>43</sup>.

Priority assigned to security always follows from a decision between alternatives and this is true of both practitioners and scholars. As Wolfers argued, “[t]he demand for a policy of national security is primarily normative in character”<sup>44</sup>. Furthermore, “no policy, or human act in general, which calls for the sacrifice of other values, as security policy is bound to do,

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<sup>39</sup> Kobayashi, (note 12) p. 456.

<sup>40</sup> Busan, (note 23) p. 27.

<sup>41</sup> Baldwin D. A., “The concept of security,” *Review of International Studies* 23:1, 1997, p. 25.

<sup>42</sup> By linking “security” with “existential threats,” Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde ( note 23, p. 23–27) offer an explanation for the saliency attached to security. By so doing, however, they also offer a very narrow understanding of security that arguably is unable to grasp the bureaucratized and routinized elements of security policy.

<sup>43</sup> Smith S., “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48:3, 2004, p. 500.

<sup>44</sup> Wolfers, (note 36) p. 149.

can escape being made a subject of moral judgment”<sup>45</sup>. For example, security is said to necessarily compete with freedom. The state promises security but demands obedience; violence is not abolished but monopolized and occasionally used against those who refuse to obey<sup>46</sup>. Thus, if security is wanted, restrictions on freedom often follow<sup>47</sup>. The intricate relationship between freedom and security is obscured in political parlance by pretending to be aiming at both simultaneously but the willingness to subordinate freedom to security is often fairly obvious: although appearing to address both issues, priority is assigned to security, and freedom is effectively suppressed (with the US Patriot Act serving as a current example). As many scholars representing different political orientations and academic approaches have argued, security’s relationship with democracy and transparency is also quite problematic. Security policy is characterized by, among other things, privileged access of specific interest groups to the political system’s monopoly of power<sup>48</sup>, limited public access to relevant information<sup>49</sup> and deeply ingrained patterns of thought and behaviour perpetuating the traditional elitism in security policy rather than promoting democratic participation<sup>50</sup>.

Although the importance assigned to security changes over time, it is quite obvious that the post-9/11 world is one in which security is indeed prioritized by many decision-makers and scholars. Today, the articulation of security – i.e. referring to a person, an object or a development in terms of, and usually as a threat to, security – is at least an attention-gaining signifier. It helps assign importance to an issue and place it above others on the political agenda, topped perhaps only by the articulation of the word “terrorism” (or, in the US Gulf region, “hurricane” and, in New Orleans, “levee”). However, the articulation of the word security does not necessarily facilitate conflict resolution. It may narrow the range of possibilities and the political imagination as to how to deal with this very issue. If the word security carries with it a specific set of connotations in any given situation, then the intimate relationship between security and the military, established during the Cold War and not completely abandoned with its end, does not seem to facilitate non-military solutions to problems designated as threats to security, and the extent to which new threats can successfully be dealt with by military means is far from obvious.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>46</sup> Krippendorff E., *Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985.

<sup>47</sup> Waltz, (note19) p. 112.

<sup>48</sup> Czempiel E.-O., “Kants Theorem. Oder: Warum sind die Demokratien (noch immer) nicht friedlich?” *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3:1, 1996, p. 86.

<sup>49</sup> Nye, J. S./Lynn-Jones, Sean M. (1988), “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” *International Security* 12:4, 1988, p. 27.

<sup>50</sup> Mouritzen H., “Thule and Theory: Democracy vs. Elitism in Danish Foreign Policy,” in *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998*, eds. Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 79–101.

## Conclusion

The more global, the more active and the more preventive the EU aspires to become, the more often its understanding and its policy of security are likely to make others feel nervous and insecure. Deviating from its formerly rather introverted foreign and security policy by linking an increasing quantity of securitized actors and issues with a more active and a more “robust” role – whatever this is supposed to mean – may not be the best strategy because others may reciprocate or at least lose faith in the EU as both a partner and a reliable alternative to the power-based foreign and security policy of the United States. Indeed, how others are likely to perceive and to respond to a European Union establishing “the first line of defence” abroad (ESS, p. 11) and “develop[ing] a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (ESS, p. 17) is not discussed in the ESS. It is here where the European Union’s image as a security community may become one of an insecurity community precisely by those non-members that fear that they may become the objects of the European Union’s securitizing and intervening practices and that feel that their development may be sacrificed for the benefit of the security of the EU member-states.



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**Patrick Mayerchak\***  
Virginia Military Institute, USA

## Comparing U.S. Policy towards Europe and Asia

### Introduction

In September 2002, the Bush Administration released The National Security Strategy of the United States<sup>1</sup>. This document outlined a "grand strategy," which identifies the challenges facing America, and the means by which they are to be addressed. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross have outlined the defining characteristics of four grand strategies: isolationism, selective engagement, multilateralism, and primacy<sup>2</sup>. The perceived unilateralist character of Bush Administration policy, especially with reference to Iraq, and the language of the NSS which speaks of preemption and unilateralism, has led many to conclude that Washington's preferred strategy is primacy<sup>3</sup>. Without prejudicing the merits of this characterization, or Washington's actions, the Bush Administration has clearly demonstrated the conviction to shoulder the responsibility of bringing stability and democracy to Iraq, with a sizable coalition of the willing, but which does not include all major allies.

However, some scholars have pointed out the inherent tensions between a grand strategy such as primacy, and the regional context in which the strategy must be operationalized. While strategies may be global, theaters of operation in the post-cold war era (may be) stubbornly regional"<sup>4</sup>.

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\* Patrick Mayerchak is Professor of Virginia Military Institute, Department of International Studies and Political Science, USA.

<sup>1</sup>The National Security Strategy of the United States, U.S. National Security Council, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Posen B. R. and Ross A. L., "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21 (3), winter 1996/97, p. 5-53.

<sup>3</sup> Other defining characteristics of this realist based grand strategy include; a hegemonic world order, a broad conception of national interest, regional priorities which include industrial Eurasia & the home of any potential peer competitor, indiscriminate prevention of nuclear proliferation, support for an expanded NATO, discriminate intervention in regional conflicts (includes ethnic based) with a goal of containment, discriminate humanitarian intervention, commitment to the use of force at will, and a two-power standard force posture.

<sup>4</sup> Hentz J., ed., *The Obligation of Empire*, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004, p. 2.

Unfortunately, the transatlantic partnership is being affected today by an overattention to the rhetoric of primacy. Those concerned about America's direction in world affairs need to be more discerning in distinguishing actions from rhetoric, and grand strategy as inspiration from policy executed with regional realities in mind. Furthermore, we must not allow disagreement on such issues to color other more substantial changes in the nature of the transatlantic partnership such as the decision to redeploy U.S. forces to high threat regions. Washington is reordering regional priorities. And, as we will see, there is good reason to do so

However, there are no issues on the table today which need to threaten the viability of the transatlantic partnership. It remains the cornerstone of the liberal democratic alliance, which has provided stability for the modern industrial world for over fifty years.

To understand the reordering of America's regional priorities, it is useful to compare the issues which define and drive United States policy toward Europe and Asia. It is also productive to compare the regions in terms of what I will call sub-global multi-polar systems, or structures. This comparison suggests why there is a need for a fundamental shift from Europe to Asia. For the latter presents a far more significant series of immediate and long term challenges that threaten American interests. This shift can be managed with our friends if we do not become fixated on the idea that grand strategy is synonymous with foreign policy especially in the regional context.

It is common for scholars and diplomats to distinguish between at least three levels of national interest<sup>5</sup>. Vital interests involve issues directly related to U.S. national security such as protection of the homeland and key allies; Critical interests which do not affect America's survival but include such issues as regional stability, free trade and the fostering and preservation of democracy; And serious interests which do not pose a serious threat to U.S. security or require significant resources. It can be argued that the United States has multiple vital interests in both Europe and Asia. However, at present, and this is the key point, threats to these interests are more pronounced, and immediate in Asia, owing to the nature of the prevailing multi-polar system in that region (defined below).

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<sup>5</sup> Lansford T. and Tashev B., *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post 9/11 Era*, Burlington VT:Ashgate, 2005, p. xii. Lansford's categorization is similar to that offered by many political scientists.

## 1. The United States and Europe: Disagreements among Friends

Europe has been a central component of United States foreign and security policy since the 1930's. The rhetoric of the Bush Administration notwithstanding, the future of Europe is of vital interest to the United States. American hegemony requires both the economic and political support of its longstanding allies.

In order to understand the dynamics of the transatlantic partnership it is helpful to view the community as a traditional multi-polar structure. Such a structure usually exhibits the following characteristics; multiple goal conflicts, several major actors, at least the potential for several concentrations of influence, variable stability and a variable range of interdependence among system members<sup>6</sup>.

Applying these criteria to the transatlantic community yields the following observations. Goal conflicts between the U.S. and its major European partners, France, Germany and Great Britain are relatively low in intensity. For example, differences over Iraq could not lead to a total rupture of relations let alone conflict. Economic interdependence is high with equal payoffs for participants, while the security relationship tends to be unidirectional and dependent on the U.S. International relations within the transatlantic community are executed in a highly stable environment. Competition among major actors has been significantly muted with the maturation of the European Union. Nevertheless, with the end of the Soviet Union, and the decline in the level of extra-regional threats, the necessity of maintaining a highly cooperative multi-polar environment within the transatlantic community may have declined. It is all the more important therefore that specific issues confronting the transatlantic partnership be addressed with care and commitment. It should be reassuring to all participants that these issues are between friends and, even more importantly, between allies.

American Unilateralism: A top policy priority for Washington is to reaffirm the transatlantic partnership which has been strained over the initiation and conduct of war in Iraq. Perceived American unilateralism raises questions in Europe about the United States' commitment to the partnership. American primacy as expressed by neo-conservative rhetoric in Washington is not viewed as compatible with true partnership. At the same time, political realists in the EU cannot deny America's role as the global hegemon. America needs Europe as a partner in the struggle against terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and in the search for peace in the Middle

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<sup>6</sup> An early and excellent conceptualization of international system models appears in Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, *Structure and Process in International Politics*, New York:Harper & Roe, 1973, p. 124-128.

East<sup>7</sup>. Washington also needs Europe's cooperation in executing its security and foreign policy in Asia. It would be a major blow to the United States if the EU decides, for example, to lift the arms embargo on China. Time heals everything but there is too much at stake to leave things to chance. Secretary Rice signaled a desire for better relations in her inaugural visit to Europe.

As the second Bush Administration progresses, Europe must be prepared to respond positively to Washington's efforts to revitalize the transatlantic partnership. In fact, Europe may have to take the lead in restoring the partnership. At the beginning of 2006, Washington was increasingly consumed by a series of emerging issues which could easily divert the attention of both the White House and Congress from the international to the domestic arena.

**EU cohesion:** Improving the transatlantic partnership is also important for EU cohesion. It is no secret that there continues to be disagreement between at least one of the EU's major actors and the new eastern democracies over the issue of support for and participation in the U.S. led coalition in Iraq. For example, Lithuania, a small emerging democratic state precariously perched at the eastern edge of the EU, was torn between siding with France or joining the U.S. led coalition<sup>8</sup>. Restoring trust between Washington and Europe's major actors will make it much easier for new community member states to be more confident about their own very justifiable security concerns and their future in the community. In some ways, EU cohesion and enlargement is as vital for the United States as it is for Europe.

**Burden Sharing:** As noted above U.S.-European relationship has undergone a substantial change. As Colin Gray has stated, "With the formal demise of the USSR in 1991...the United States...was suddenly, even shockingly, deprived of the authoritative organizing vision that had yielded the context for high policy and strategy for forty years"<sup>9</sup>. Washington no longer expects to set the transatlantic agenda. Europe is now more secure than ever with its own political and economic priorities. A reduced American military presence in Europe should be welcomed on the continent as a sign of confidence on Washington's part. It is also a reality borne of necessity. At the same time, a more equitable distribution of responsibility is essential for the partnership as it confronts security challenges in other regions as well as those of global proportions. NATO's commitment to use its capabilities out of region is welcomed by Americans. It is also essential if the United States is to maintain its

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<sup>7</sup> Drozdiak W., "The North Atlantic Drift," *Foreign Affairs*, V84, No. 1, 2005, p. 88-89.

<sup>8</sup> Budryte D., "The Dilemma of Dual Loyalty," in (note 5), p. 151-172.

<sup>9</sup> Gray C.S., *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004, p. 41-42.

global agenda<sup>10</sup>. Washington needs to be patient but firm in communicating the need for Europe to increase the number of troops available for out of region duties<sup>11</sup>. And, a more assertive Europe will dispel internal concerns about American unilateralism.

## 2. The United States and Asia: Friends and Foes in a More Complex Regional System

Asia presents a number of immediate and serious challenges which, if unresolved, could reshape global affairs and profoundly effect American vital interests in the region. Vital interests include maintaining treaty commitments and/or economic relations with a number of key allies: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the ASEAN states (Association of Southeast Asian nations). Several very important and volatile issues also complicate U.S. relations with Asia. These include: the specter of terrorism primarily in Southeast Asia, the economic and military rise of China, the future of Taiwan, and nuclear proliferation especially in North Korea.

Applying the multi-polar structure to Asia with the United States as a system actor presents a far different reality from that of the transatlantic region. Goal conflicts among major and secondary actors are both more numerous and intense. To mention but a few, China vies with the United States for regional leadership, Taiwan seeks to maintain defacto independence while China seeks to reconstruct the Middle Kingdom, and the United States presses for swift and strong action against terrorists while the ASEAN member states confronts terrorism with one eye on their own need to maintain internal stability. Second, the region has both major actors, China, Japan, and the United States, as well as mid-level actors, Taiwan, the Koreas, and ASEAN (collectively) all capable of influencing the course of regional events. Third, regional spheres of influence are more pronounced and contested than in Europe so that serious ruptures in relations or even conflict in some cases cannot be ruled out. Fourth, stability is far more variable and perhaps even volatile especially with regards to North Korea, and the China-Taiwan relationship. Finally, the high level of interdependence evident among the vast majority of transatlantic community member states does not exist in Asia. Economic integration continues to be hampered by nationalistic interests in Asia, even within the ASEAN region, which has worked toward this goal since 1967.

The multi-polar Asian structure is complicated by the presence of other characteristics, which suggest another international system structure predicted by

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<sup>10</sup> Grey does not recognize NATO's potential as an out of region partner. Whether the Bush Administration commits to the need for a strong deputy as a result of the Iraq experience remains to be seen.

<sup>11</sup> Drozdiak, (note 7) p. 96.

Hopkins and Mansbach in the early seventies. They refer to this as a “unit veto system”<sup>12</sup>. In such a structure, one or more small states may possess nuclear weapons sufficient to blackmail or threaten their neighbors or even a major power. It can easily be argued that North Korea’s nuclear capability is affecting the dynamics of a more traditional multi-polar structure. In fact, North Korea’s antics greatly complicate the interactions of both major and lesser actors in the region.

Of the substantive issues mentioned above, none is more important than the rise of China and the U.S. response. Unlike the competition between Washington and its European partners, the China-U.S. relationship cannot be defined as a competition among friends. One problem is that both the policy and academic communities in the United States are not of one mind on the meaning of China’s economic rise<sup>13</sup>, and military ambitions. The U.S. Defense department presents a very detailed picture of the growth of Chinese military capabilities. However, many China scholars, such as June Dreyer take the view that it will be some time before the PRC can challenge the military pre-eminence of the United States in Asia<sup>14</sup>. Lasting cooperation between Beijing and Washington on the issue of terrorism is also in doubt<sup>15</sup>. And, it may be telling that China, not the United States, has taken the lead on dealing with the North Koreans on the issue of nuclear weapons. Even acknowledging Washington’s wisdom in handing off to Beijing on this issue, appearances can create their own reality intended or otherwise.

From the perspective of the United States one thing is certain. China’s rise as an economic and military power can in no way be compared to the growing economic strength and expanding military capabilities of the EU. Increasing prosperity in the EU could actually strengthen the American economy, while China’s economic growth is already beginning to hollow-out the American manufacturing sector. While the increased robustness of NATO and the eventual emergence of an independent

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<sup>12</sup> Hopkins and Mansbach, (note 6) p. 127.

<sup>13</sup> Two recent and well researched books which present China’s emerging economic power as less than benign are: Ted Fishman, *China Inc. How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World*, (New York: Scribner, 2005, and Oded Shenkar, *The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> China’s increasing military capabilities are well documented in U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress, “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,”* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005. Also see June Dreyer, “The Limits to China’s Growth,” *Orbis*, spring, 2004, p.233-245, and David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, Chapter 8 (“Policy Implications for the United States.”).

<sup>15</sup> Roy D., "A Late Honeymoon for Bush and China: Enjoy It While It Lasts," *Asian Affairs*, V30, No. 2, summer 2003, p. 79-87.

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European defense force enhances American capabilities, China's increasing military strength may constitute a serious challenge.

Washington's policy of "strategic ambiguity" with reference to Taiwan illustrates the difficulty of using diplomacy in Asia. While Washington supports a one China policy, successive Administrations maintain that reunification can only occur when Taiwan accepts this as a viable option. The mainland has shown increasing impatience with Taiwan and the Bush Administration. Again, this is not a disagreement among friends and it could lead to conflict as a result of the slightest miscalculation, or as a result of a deliberate decision<sup>16</sup>.

The United States has long had a friendly and productive relationship with most of the Southeast Asian states. While not to be overblown, U.S. cooperation with the region on combating terrorism has presented a challenge. On the whole, cooperation has been very good though there is variation from state to state. It is essential for Washington to demonstrate its willingness to take a multilateral approach to this regional problem, and it has done just that<sup>17</sup>. This relationship was originally strained over what was perceived as American unilateralism with respect to Iraq<sup>18</sup>. Collectively, the ASEAN region is a major trading partner for the United States. Member states also provide places not bases for U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific. As China emerges, America must show its resolve and commitment to its friends in order to prevent slippage in this very important relationship. Quietly, ASEAN officials will admit their concerns about China but they need to know that Washington can be counted on<sup>19</sup>. A "soft" military presence and a policy which does not demand client states to choose sides between Washington and Beijing is called for.

Japan remains the wild card yet to be turned. Washington has long desired Japanese re-emergence as a regional actor. Tokyo is seen both as an economic and military counter weight to emerging China. However, old memories die hard. While the rest of Asia may have apprehensions about an increasingly powerful Middle Kingdom this may be preferred to a re-emergent Japan. The idea of Japanese naval vessels patrolling Asian waters is not palatable to the Koreans, Taiwanese or the ASEAN states let alone to Beijing.

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<sup>16</sup> Campbell K. M., Derek M. F., "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2001, and Lawrence E. G., "Chinese Military Scenarios Against Taiwan: Premises, Options, Implications", Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, Counterproliferation Center, 2002, *The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 19*.

<sup>17</sup> Abuza Z., *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003, Chapter 5, "State Responses to the War on Terror."

<sup>18</sup> High-ranking Thai military officers and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed their strong displeasure to the author at a talk at the National Defense College in Bangkok in June 2003.

<sup>19</sup> China's diplomatic offensive to win friends in Southeast Asia is well described in Ronald N. Montaperto, "China Shows its Sensitivity to SE Asia," *Asia Times* ([www.atimes.com](http://www.atimes.com)) April 27, 2005.

## Conclusion

Washington is not turning away from Europe, it is turning toward Asia. This should come as no surprise and must not be interpreted as taking one's friends for granted. Indeed, America has little choice. The challenges emanating from greater East Asia are of a greater magnitude and intensity than those confronting the transatlantic partnership. This partnership has proven to be one of the strongest and most successful alliances in history. There is no reason to believe that this relationship cannot continue. Cooperation on economic and security issues as well as skillful use of multilateral diplomacy will be required to fashion a suitable response to China's rising, whether by peaceful means or via traditional great power use of force. EU integration may have been thwarted for the time being. However, failure to complete this great integrative experiment must not stand in the way of the community's emergence as a major actor in international affairs. For should this be the case, America's flank will be exposed.

Too much has been made of American primacy. Some would argue that it may apply in the case of Iraq. It is arguably less applicable for Afghanistan. Grand strategies provide lofty visions but they are always confronted by regional realities.

No major power in the history of international affairs has ever attained one hundred percent acceptance from its allies for its actions. I would strongly argue that with patience, dialogue, prodding, and understanding, the transatlantic partnership will endure and that the level of acceptance among friends will remain relatively high. America understands that even a hegemon needs the support of strong allies. And, the international community may have to accept the reality that a benevolent hegemon is the best hope for the world in which we live.

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**Algirdas V. Kanauka\***  
Military Academy of Lithuania

## Apparent Dichotomy in United States— European Union Relations

The article deals with the perceptions of a rift between Europe and the United States of America. It examines the divergence of the American and the European political, economic and political trajectories. This divergence is attributed to the new cultural environment that was encountered by the newly arriving Europeans in America, which became conducive for the development of new ways of governance and economic and socio-cultural patterns, no longer bound by the constraints that existed in Europe. However, a sense of physical and spiritual kinship remained extant between the two continents, although not always fully recognized. Americans and Europeans assisted each other in times of need and danger. Nevertheless, after WWII the emerging European Union led to problems stimulating resentment and mutual accusations. Europeans thought Americans were seeking hegemony over world affairs, while Americans saw Europeans as naive and irresponsible about the dilemmas facing the multilateral world. Solutions are sought through argument and discussions. Some American power elites show inclination to abandon Europe to whatever destiny is coming to them. Others maintain the view that Europe is indispensable to the American political, economic and social interests. The Europeans seem to seek solutions more through negotiations, while Americans want to see more action. The article ends with an optimistic note that Europe and the USA are bound to find a way to get along for mutual benefit.

### Introduction

Today considerable disagreements are apparent between the United States of America and the countries of European Union and others in, so now called, multinational world. The disagreements focus on respective foreign policy issues, economic interests and attitudes about optimum solutions for world's socio-cultural problems. This short paper is an attempt to provide a quick look at the origins of how this attitude developed and where it may lead. In addition to his own views the author relied on Oswald Spengler's "Decline of the West", Robert Kagan's "Of Paradise and Power" and on current periodic literature, particularly Foreign Affairs, and the internet as a data base for his findings.

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\* Dr. Algirdas V. Kanauka is Visiting Professor of the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania.

## 1. The nature of the problem

A quick survey of contemporary literature and media on US –EU relations causes the reader perceive a certain antipathy between Europe and America, which can be interpreted as a widening rift of ominous consequences for Western culture and civilization. I want to take a look at this to see if it's only appearance of a temporary nature, or something more serious, perhaps irreversible. I will look at a spectrum of alternative viewpoints and some possible outcomes from this development. Let me regress in order to reflect on how all this came about.

### 1.1. Historical Background

Europeans overwhelmed American continent, soon after Columbus discovered it in the year 1492. The local power structures that existed in the Americas then simply could not withstand the European military, technical, cultural and religious onslaught. The Aztec, Mayan, and Inca civilizations collapsed quickly, when confronted by a handful of European warriors on horseback, firing guns and cannon at them. Back home, European culture was in its spring time, its Gothic cathedrals reaching for the heavens above and its ships propelled not only by wind but also by a drive and travel lust in the European soul that reached into the unknown beyond the horizon. Settlers, European rejects and outcasts, as well as entrepreneurs of the wildest kind overwhelmed North America, driven by a vectored energy what Oswald Spengler<sup>1</sup> called The Faustian spirit – a mark of distinction for the Western culture and civilization. It was a reach out for the infinite, the unconfined, to hitherto undiscovered boundless space.

The America's were an outlet for the outburst of European pent up energy and new ideas that could no longer be confined by the constraints of traditions, class distinctions, and the tyranny of kings and emperors with their palaces, and courts of Inquisition. People leaving Europe were not aristocrats, nor the rich and well entrenched. They were the poor, the disenfranchised, but adventurous, and people of awakened spirits that would no longer take the tyrants' hell. They did not leave to create new empires, but wanted to take down such empires, destroy them, and are still doing it today. They took the ideas of freedom to America ...Locke, Hobbes,

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<sup>1</sup> Spengler O., *The Decline of the West*, An abridged edition by Helmut Werner. English abridged edition prepared by Arthur Helps from the translation by Charles Francis Atkinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926.

Montesquieu, Rousseau..., which blended with those of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison, who extolled the inalienable human rights to liberty, freedom and the pursuit of happiness, with particular emphasis on individual freedom. They placed the state at the service of the people as individuals, while old Europe was left with Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx, to name but a few, who were not in harmony with the American spirit of free capitalism and government by the people. Philosophies that appealed to the Europeans favored the state over the individual. That was perhaps the philosophical foundation that caused the beginning of the rift between America and Europe that we are talking about, which fermented first in the best minds of Europe and America, before it jelled into words and arguable ideas, from which finally actions evolved that “caused” the rift.

### **1.2. Historical Developments**

The new arrivals in America, particularly the North Americans had a clean slate to begin implementing their ideas into reality hitherto unseen by the world. The American culture, democratic ideas, patterns of behavior and free ways of doing business and creating technology spread all over the world, imitation being the greatest of compliments. Americans joined the Europeans in two world wars, helping Europe to fight tyranny just as the Europeans did participate in the War of American Independence more than a century before, or the Boxer Rebellion in China, later in Korean War and other places. One can easily observe a great stream of immigrants flowing to the Americas from Europe and from other countries. Particularly visible is the stream to North America that is obvious even in this century. They assimilate quickly... doesn't that tell you something?

## **2. Possible viewpoints**

What then did go wrong? Why this talk about a rift between Europe and America? Are Robert Kagan's words “Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars”<sup>2</sup> justified? Aside from the philosophies that show a certain dichotomy of values and views among the economic, political, and intellectual elites of Europe and America, there are definite signs of split throughout all social levels. If uncorrected,

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<sup>2</sup> Kagan R., *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York , Alfred Knopf Pub, 2003, p. 1.

this may cause serious problems for what we call the Western civilization as we know it.

### **2.1. Is this a decline?**

Is Western civilization now at the threshold of death as Oswald Spengler predicted in his “Decline of The West”? According to Spengler this is because we stopped growing in spirit and consciousness of our worth and are slowly getting ready to hand the baton of leadership to other cultures that are on the ascent just above the horizon? Europeans see the Americans as too militaristic, dogmatic, too undiplomatic, interested primarily in oil, too self-righteous, and self-appointed policemen of the world, while the Americans see the Europeans oblivious to the dangers arising from world wide power structures that do not share Western values and may threaten them with unthinkable violence, using the very same technology introduced to them by US and Europe, if given an opportunity to do so. Europeans do not seem to share the sense of global moral responsibility that is implied in the American credo, but attempt to resolve problems through diplomacy and endless discussions alone, when there is no common framework for interactive negotiation that diplomacy requires.

### **2.2. Some key problems**

To put it more concretely the Americans supported the European unification and expansion on one hand, but resented it when the Europeans began to use it not as cooperation, but rather a counterweight against the so called American influence in the world. But, then, how can the EU show cooperation with US, when they do not cooperate among themselves? What will happen if Ukraine, Turkey or Russia gets admitted to EU? There is a built in paradox - the more integrated and federated the EU becomes the more it seems to lead to bureaucracy, lack of transparency in decision making, and rule by power elites whose decisions are neither equitable, nor useful for people of different nations, thus causing a drift into an authoritarianism of a new kind. On the other hand if there is less integration in the governance of the EU, then there is less order and things may get divergent and later chaotic on the economic, political and socio –cultural levels. This creates perceptions, which cause a drop in confidence about Europe in the US. 25 or more different languages that need translation are a hurricane of paperwork in itself. Oswald Spengler said that the West is approaching its End Game phase. However, he did not say that it is inevitable and did not urge any kind of resignation to faith, or acceptance of coming defeat and death of our culture.

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We are not done as long as we struggle to create our destiny because those who have the strength of will to do the right thing affect destiny.

### 3. What then should be done?

What then is the right thing to do? Potentially, EU and USA is a powerhouse for the future. They are the most developed democracies in the world, greatest market economies, and have some most competent people. Many Americans can understand that very well, and not only because every fifth American has relatives in Europe. America is genuinely concerned about the European security because the interconnectedness with America in many ways, one of them being what is called Western culture or civilization. Therefore, there is a collective interest, which ties us to each other. By “interest” is not meant a narrow selfish interest, but the kind based on consideration for the needs of others and aimed at a common good. Besides an immense cultural kinship exists between the EU and USA, who are also the drivers of the global economy. Together they generate more than half of trade and investment flows in the world. The business with each other exceeds \$2.5 trillion a year and provides jobs for some 12 million workers. American business invests 60 percent more in Eastern Europe than in China, while Europe provides 75 percent of all foreign investment in the US. It makes no sense to ruin all that, and the sensible people of Europe and America will not let it happen.<sup>3</sup>

Is America and Europe are drifting apart because of irreconcilable differences? Don't believe appearances! America is a free country and the political opposition to the present leadership as well as the press and media do like to fan their views as far as their money and credibility lasts in order to improve their position for the next election.

There is also another group - the incumbent leadership and a very large group called the silent majority, which is much more positive and favorably inclined toward Europe, who are not as vocal, but whose views and votes will be decisive for the future of American – European relations. However, it can be argued that: some vocal people, who are a minority, propagate a very negative view, such as: US should end its support for EU integration because the EU constitution (if it ever passes) will ruin the transatlantic alliance and would be damaging for US influence in Europe. Europe now is too weak, too introspective and lacks willpower and sense of responsible, doable worldview. It is full of ambition to become a counterweight to US power, although it really lacks the wherewithal to do that. Since trust has eroded on both sides, US

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<sup>3</sup> See Drozdiak W., “The North Atlantic Drift”, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2005.

should support only its overt friends and divide and rule ... Europe is spent, unserious, and weak.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, Europe sees the United States as high-handed, unilateralists, unnecessarily belligerent.

## Concluding Remarks: The Good News

Now, the good news are: US shall carry out the will and values of those who can be called Republican internationalists who really are the drivers of US policy creation today, which is based on the conviction that US needs a strong and confident Europe as an ally and partner to solve the political, economic and military threats to common interests in Europe and outside of it, and so to provide legitimacy and sustainability which is hard to do even with European support, and impossible without it.<sup>5</sup> (Drozdiak<sup>3</sup>). How can this be achieved?- It should do so in the same spirit as the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations did in the 1950s and 1960s: to create a strong and coherent Europe capable of working with the United States as a more equal and more effective partner.<sup>6</sup> So that is what can be perceived as the US intent today.

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<sup>4</sup> See Cimbalo, J. L., "Saving NATO From Europe". *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Drozdiak W. (note 3).

<sup>6</sup> Asmus R., D., Blinken D., Anthony J., Gordon Philip H., "Nothing to Fear", *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2005.

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**Jyri Raitasalo\***

National Defence College, Finland

## From *Pax Americana* to *Bellum Americanum* – A Framework for Analysis Concerning European Foreign and Security Policy in the post-Cold War Era

During the decade and a half after the end of the Cold War shared western understandings of war have undergone a change. The changing nature of war can be analysed on several levels. Concerning faced military threats, non-state agents with irregular war fighting methods have raised in importance as traditional large-scale wars between states have become more and more improbable – at least on western soil. In addition, the defence of national or alliance territory has become increasingly challenged by expeditionary warfare scenarios – under the labels of military crisis management, peace operations, humanitarian interventions etc. The constitutive elements of military power have also transformed after the demise of the Cold War. Traditional focus on mass and terrain have recently received less attention as networked information-based precise capabilities have become Two American dominated strategic discourses have been highly influential in shaping the direction of the transformation of shared western understandings of war. The discourse of global War on Terror – with its new rules of pre-emption, unilateral military action and the expression of clear and present danger – has expressed the transformed US take on the reality of post-9/11 global security environment and has also shaped the security context within which US allies in Europe – within NATO and the European Union – have had to align themselves vis-à-vis the American led new war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With the active and assertive use of military force in the post-9/11 era, the US definition of the contemporary security environment has transformed from the Cold War era *Pax Americana* towards *Bellum Americanum*. This shift has also left its mark on European security and defence policy and European militaries – whether one analyses national European militaries, NATO or the European Union.

The second American dominated post-Cold War era strategic discourse with global implications is connected to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – a proposed change in the nature of warfare caused by the rapid development of information technologies and the adjoining increases in military capabilities. The US has been in the position to practically solely define the ‘content’ of the RMA and has also led the way in implementing it through the process of military transformation ever since the 1991 Gulf War. American allies in Europe have also started the process of military transformation according to the US tenets of the Revolution in Military Af-

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\* Jyri Raitasalo is Research officer at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of National Defence College, Helsinki, Finland.

fairs. NATO has retained the defence of alliance territory at the core of its missions, but preparations for and execution of expeditionary military crisis management operations by well-trained and well-equipped information age mobile forces describes best the focus of NATO military planning and operations. Also the European Union has begun to develop its military capabilities according to the American RMA-tenets – although in small scale if compared to the US.

## Introduction

This article focuses on the institution of war during the post-Cold War era, and particularly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 from a western perspective.<sup>1</sup> The starting point for the analysis of war in this article is the sedimented Cold War era institution of war – a rather stable set of shared understandings of 1) what constituted the *threat* necessitating the preparations for waging war; 2) what was the ‘*nature*’ of war – i.e. the legitimate goals and means in war; and 3) what constituted *military power* among agents.<sup>2</sup> This set of shared understandings was rather uniform among the ‘main’ belligerents of the Cold War – the American-led west and the Soviet Union dominated east – but also more generally throughout the international system. However, this Cold War era institution of war was challenged and thus not totally shared. The most articulate challenge to the leading east-west shared conceptualisations of war was expressed under the titles of revolutionary war, low intensity conflict, or asymmetric war. They all provided an alternative and a ‘competing’ model for understanding war vis-à-vis the force and terrain oriented shared conceptualisations of war that matured during the ‘tight’ superpower confrontation.

After the Second World War – during the threat-penetrated years of the Cold War – *Pax Americana* described the western take concerning the security situation in the international system. Under the cover of American nuclear umbrella and its overwhelming military power, the west had rather uniform shared understandings concerning the nature of war and the constitutive elements of military power. On both sides of the Atlantic, western governments conceptualized war mainly within the framework of

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<sup>1</sup> This article was presented as a working paper at the Lithuanian Military Academy, International Conference “Contemporary European Foreign and Security Policy and the Baltic Sea Region”, Vilnius, 23 September 2005. The analysis of the institution of war and the adjoining discourses of war in this article are based on Raitasalo J., Sipilä J., “Reconstructing War after the Cold War”, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2004, p. 239-261. and Raitasalo J., *Constructing War and Military Power after the Cold War – The Role of the United States in the Shared Western Understandings of War and Military Power in the Post-Cold War Era*, Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2005. Note that ‘The west’ is conceptualised as a historical – not a geographical – construction, which is connected to ‘attributes’ like secularity, modernity, capitalism, and democracy. One equivalent of ‘the west’ is ‘developed states’.

<sup>2</sup> Raitasalo and Sipilä (note1).

massive mechanized forces clashing in a demarcated battlefield. The possibility of a nuclear war loomed over this view of conventional war, although its consequences would have been unimaginable. The threatening enemy was the Soviet Union and its politico-military instrument – the Warsaw Pact.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world order, (western) states were faced with a challenge: what were the constitutive rules of the international system *à la* post-Cold War era? With the old Soviet threat gone, the shared western conceptualisations of war and military power became challenged. Furthermore, the ‘emergence’ of new wars and the subsequent ‘need’ for humanitarian interventions added to the challenge faced by the warriors of the Cold War.

This article takes a constructivist approach to war and asks, how have the post-Cold War era discourses of war influenced the post-Cold War era redefinition of war within the west. The aim is, then, to arrive at a ‘definition’ of war – a shared western understanding of war – rather than to begin from a stipulated definition. Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt, war is what states – and other agents – make of it.<sup>3</sup> The article suggests that the post-Cold War era change in the shared western understandings of war and military power can be accessed through the analysis of the several discourses of war. These discourses have touched upon ‘the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’, ‘new wars’, humanitarian interventions’, ‘the privatization of war’, and ‘the War on Terror’.

The proposed constructivist understanding of war conceptualises the ‘essence’ of war being ‘negotiated’ constantly in the interaction of states and other agents related to the use of physical violence. The prevailing shared understanding of war is thus path-dependent and contingent – not controllable by any single agent, although some agents are better positioned in the process of giving meaning to war. Today the United States holds such a privileged position. Path dependence implies that in order to analyse the effects of the American-declared global War on terror upon the shared western understandings of war – the theme of this article – one has to also analyse the larger process of post-Cold War era redefinition of war, and indeed the Cold War era institution of war, out of which today’s shared understandings of war have grown out. The Cold War institution of war thus casts a shadow of history on today’s ‘reality’ of war.<sup>4</sup> But as time progresses, the influence of the Cold War can be assumed to wane.

Two of the above-mentioned post-Cold War era discourses of war have been explicitly formulated within the United States – those concerning the Revolution in

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<sup>3</sup> See Wendt A., “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organisation*, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, p. 391-425.

<sup>4</sup> Humans thus pursue practical activity (e.g. formulate security policies) within *material* and *social* contexts, which constrict and enable these activities. See Deudney D., “Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2000, p. 84.

Military Affairs and the Global War on Terror – and they have been used to redefine the shared western understandings of war and military power in the post-Cold War era on US terms. The American discourse concerning the Revolution in Military Affairs picked up speed in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war. At the core of this discourse has been the idea of revolutionary change in the nature of war with the use of advanced military technologies combined with new military organisations and operational concepts. Within five years of its inception, RMA provided new momentum and guidelines for the development of US Armed Forces in a situation where the Soviet threat had evaporated and the ‘essence’ of traditional military confrontations had become questionable. During the late 1990s the US started to ‘export’ its RMA conceptualisations, particularly within the framework of NATO. Also the lessons-learned from the military operations of the 1990s supported the view that modern technology is changing the nature of western warfare. Particularly Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) showcased the American preponderance in the field of techno-warfare.

The other particularly American discourse of war during the post-Cold War era has been that of War on Terror. It has built upon the foundation of RMA – changing the way America conceptualizes war in the post-Cold War era – but has gone ‘deeper’. It has rewritten the threats necessitating the preparations for war. Terrorist organisations and even individual terrorists have become adversaries in war on the side of states. In addition, the American discourse of War on Terror has proposed new rules of war – unilateral and pre-emptive military action if necessary. Thus, while the RMA discourse has focused mostly on the new requirements and capabilities of the armed forces, the discourse of War on Terror has embraced the institution of war more broadly. In a way the Cold War era maintenance and development of armed force in order to deter aggression – Pax Americana – has thus mutated into a more assertive use of military force in order to prevent threats from emanating and in order to arrive at valued outcomes – *Bellum Americanum*.

The article analyses the effects of the two above-mentioned American dominated discourses upon the shared western understandings of war and military power. In addition to the American promulgated visions of RMA and the post-9/11 declared War on Terror, this is done through the analysis of defence strategies within the context of NATO and the progressive framing of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. This article conceptualizes *the transformation of the shared western understandings of war and military power during the post-Cold War era to form the framework for the progressive development of the European Security and Defence Policy* [and the transformation of NATO].

## 1. The Shadow of the Cold War – Pax Americana

During the Cold War, the ideological rivalry between the two super-power blocs armed with nuclear weapons ‘produced’ a two-fold shared conceptualisation of war. On the one hand, the existence of nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear deterrence theorising kept the idea of a nuclear war possible. Its consequences would have been unimaginable and beyond the calculations of interests sought by war. On the other hand, the view of conventional war – more tangible and imaginable than a nuclear war – was based on large-scale clashes of mechanised armed forces on the battlefield. This view was force-oriented, accentuating mass (quantity) and terrain, and was based on the hypothetical possibility to separate the battlefield from the civil society. The Cold War era shared conceptualisations of war had their genesis in Clausewitz, focusing on war via armed forces trying to win decisive battles on a demarcated battlefield.<sup>5</sup>

“When thinking about war, we usually conjure up the image of two countries arraying their military forces against each other, followed by combat between distinctively designated, organized, and marked armed forces. The purpose of fighting is to destroy the adversary’s capacity to resist and then to impose both military and political terms on the defeated party.”<sup>6</sup>

This two-fold characterisation of western Cold War era conceptualisations of war – nuclear and conventional – does not argue that the ‘reality’ of guerrilla warfare or unconventional warfare did not have any effects on the shared conceptualisations of war and the related thinking of how to prepare for future wars. Rather, it means that the Cold War era nuclear threat environment, super-power rivalry, and the intra-alliance dynamics overshadowed the significance of smaller-scale, ‘peripheral’, and unconventional warfighting scenarios.<sup>7</sup> Still in 1987 the Western European Union

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<sup>5</sup> Franzen H.-A., ”‘Proper War’ and ‘War In Reality’” – The Changing Concept of War, *IFS Info 6/02*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, p. 5-9; Ralston J., “Keeping NATO’s Military Edge Intact in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, *Luncheon Address at the NATO/GMFUS Conference*, Brussels, October 3, 2002, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm), 14 01 2004. See also *The Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 1991*, Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. v; Cassidy R., “Prophets or Praetorians? The Utopian Paradox and the Powell Corollary”, *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, p. 135-136.

<sup>6</sup> Holsti K., *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Owens M., “Technology, the RMA, and Future War”, *Strategic Review*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1998, p. 63-70; Lock-Pullan R., “Learning the Limits of Virtue: Clinton, the Army and the Criteria for the Use of Military Force”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2003, p. 133-156; Jablonsky D., “US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs”, *Parameters*, autumn 1994, p. 18-36,

(WEU) described the security situation in Europe and the threats facing Western Europe in the Cold War fashion:

“We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact’s superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.”<sup>8</sup>

Similarly – after the end of the Cold War – the 1994 (US) *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* by Secretary of Defence Les Aspin explained:

“During the Cold War, American military planning was dominated by the need to confront numerically superior Soviet forces in Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia.”<sup>9</sup>

The Cold War era was particularly fertile ground for the ‘emergence’, consolidation, and sedimentation of a force-oriented and terrain-emphasising view of war. The ‘tight’ atmosphere of the superpower confrontation and the clear and present danger posed by the opposing ideological-military bloc ‘necessitated’ a clear-cut and simplified view of the enemy and the way to contain or battle its hostile intentions. According to the language of the constructivist perspective of war as an institution of the international system, at least three discourses had a major impact on the shared western understandings of war during the Cold War:

- 1) the discourse of an *all-penetrating multifaceted ideological threat* posed by the opposing hostile Soviet-dominated bloc,
- 2) the discourse of *nuclear war and nuclear deterrence*,

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<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/jablonsk.htm>, 22 10 2003. See also Kaldor M., “Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control”, *Essay for the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium*, Dec 6-8, 2001, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kaldor.htm>, 11 06 2004. About the ‘mismatch’ between developed states’ (the ‘East’ and the ‘West’) conceptualisations of war and the reality of war, see van Creveld M., *The Transformation of War*, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. ix-x, 25-32.

<sup>8</sup> Western European Union, *Platform on European Security Interests*, <http://www.weu.int/documents/871027ed.pdf>, 22 12 2004.

<sup>9</sup> *The Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 1994*, Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 5; Concerning the Cold War era shared understandings of the international system and war related to the nuclear realm, see *ibid.*, p. 7-8.

3) the discourse of a *large-scale conventional war* (in Europe).

The second framework-setting factor is related to the general process understood as *the end of the Cold War and its effects on the international system in general*. From the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s the discourse concerning the end of the Cold War started to become widely accepted. With the demise of the super-power confrontation and the quick erosion of the bipolar international system – features that were characterising the Cold War era rules of the international system – states and other international agents found themselves in a situation where the old rules of the international system became questioned and ‘new’ or ‘altered’ rules of the system had to be figured out.<sup>10</sup> *The immediate post-Cold War era was a generally acknowledged time of transition, while the end point of this process of transition was not in sight.* As the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe declared:

“The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past.”<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, the 1994 US Annual Report to the President and Congress by Secretary of Defense explicitly stated that:

“This is a period comparable to the end of World War II. It was clear that profound change had taken place, but it was unclear what kind of world would replace the old one. *Today, it is not clear what new paradigm will replace East-West rivalry and a bipolar world*, but one can see clear threats to America and its interests. ... *Defining the post-Soviet security environment is the critical first step* in sizing and shaping a new defense, right for the times.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> ‘Rules of the system’ refer here to constitutive norms of the system. With the transformation of these rules, the nature of the system changes. See e.g. Koslowski R., Kratochwil F., “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System” in Lebow R., and Risso-Kappen T. (eds.) *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 127, 134-139, 144-159. See also Nye J., Owens W., “America’s Information Edge”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 26; Shalikashvili J., “Grand Challenges for the Post-Cold War World”, *Remarks as Delivered at the Naval War College Graduation*, Newport, 16 June 1995, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19950616-shali.html>, 27 05 2004.

<sup>11</sup> *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990 Summit, 19-21 November 1990, <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm>, 01 12 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (note 9) p. 1 (my italics).

In addition to leading to the redefinition of the logic of the international system, the celebrated end of the Cold War was thus also a beginning for a process – both implicit and explicit – of reconceptualising the ‘logic’ of the nature of war in the international system and the determinants of military power. Concerning the latter, the simultaneously occurring 1991 Gulf War also challenged the Cold War era understandings of military power – at least in part. Especially the increasing role of advanced information technology became the focal point in estimations of future determinants of military power, although the war in the Gulf was conceptualised and waged in a rather familiar Cold War era way: large scale mechanised armed forces in decisive battles. Thus, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent events of the 1990s posed a challenge to states operating in the international system.<sup>13</sup> The end of the Cold War in itself started a process of change that called into question the traditional missions and resources allocated to national armed forces.

## 2. Prologue to the Global War on Terror – The post-Cold War era Discourses of War

The *end of the Cold War* – itself a discourse – thus challenged the matured and cemented Cold War institution of war. With the Cold War over, how relevant were the shared conceptualisations of the threat of a massive military invasion in Europe? As government after another recognised the rapidly declining military threat of the Soviet Union/Russia in the beginning of the 1990s, the utility of the Cold War era nuclear and conventional military forces became questionable. The ‘immediate’ result of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union was the increased significance of regional conflicts and the focus on regional aggressors. With the global superpower confrontation gone, the west shifted its security focus towards rogue and failing/failed states. With the unfolding of the 1990s, several new security themes rose in standing vis-à-vis the use of military force within the international system.

The second post-Cold War era western discourse of war was related to the 1991 Gulf War and the lessons inferred from the conflict. Precision weapons – in connection with sophisticated sensors and control and communications systems – promised effective military operations against ‘traditionally’ equipped and trained Cold War era armed forces. The mainstream western interpretation of Iraq’s quick and total collapse in Operation Desert Storm was based on the understanding about the rising importance of high-tech weapons, new operational concepts, and innovative military organisa-

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<sup>13</sup> Koslowski and Kratochwil (note 10).

tions. The catchword “*Revolution in Military Affairs*” (RMA) was embraced by the US defence community and by the mid-1990s the US DoD had included RMA into its official vocabulary. In 1997 RMA was turned into an official American defence initiative to *transform* the Cold War era armed forces into a more effective fighting force.<sup>14</sup> Not only has inspiration for the RMA thesis been flowing from the 1991 Gulf War, but also other American-led military campaigns of the 1990s have been interpreted through the RMA lenses: Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) being the most obvious examples.<sup>15</sup>

In 1999 NATO launched its project – The Defence Capabilities Initiative, DCI – to keep the American allies capable of cooperating with the sole remaining superpower, which had realised its RMA implementation strategy implicitly and explicitly for almost a decade. After all, the European inability to wield military power had become apparent during the wars of Yugoslavian succession. Later, in 2002, NATO started its transformation process and started ‘creating’ the NRF – NATO Response Force – equipped, organised, and trained in the American RMA model for high-tech expeditionary warfare. As president George W. Bush noted in May 2002 – few months before NATO launched its transformation-project:

“[W]e need to work within NATO to make sure that NATO has got the capacities to - to better use capabilities, define capabilities and strategies ... *We're transforming our [US] military or trying to transform our military rapidly. ... And NATO must transform as well in order to meet the true threats.* ... I'm optimistic about NATO changing.”<sup>16</sup>

Similarly, the process of defining, creating, and making operational the required European Union capabilities has followed the main tenets of American RMA discourse once the European Union decided – in 1999 – to augment its military capa-

<sup>14</sup> *The Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense William Perry 1995*, part IV, Department of Defense, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr95/index.html>, 10 12 2004; *The Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense William Cohen (1997)*, ch. 8, Department of Defense, April 1997. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr97/index.html>, 10 12 2004.

See also Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 1997*, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/>, 30 08 2004; The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 1997*, Washington, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Cohen W., *Remarks as Delivered for the International Institute for Strategic Studies*, San Diego, California, 9 September 1999, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990909-secdef.html>, 10 06 2003.

<sup>16</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 2001-2005*, p. 869 (my italics), <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>

bility. Small, mobile, well-trained, and rapidly deployable professional forces with technologically advanced military systems engaged in out-of-area operations captures this emerging European ‘RMA logic’.<sup>17</sup> The 2003 accepted European Security Strategy articulated that:

“To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.”<sup>18</sup>

The discourse of asymmetric warfare – the third post-Cold War era discourse of war – has challenged the proposition that advanced technology, especially in the field of information, in combination with subsequent changes in doctrines, organisations, and training of the armed forces will lead to a new mode of warfare. From this perspective, RMA does not provide any future belligerent with unambiguous advantages in warfare, when at least one party chooses not to conceptualise war according to the RMA thesis’ requirements.<sup>19</sup> Asymmetric response to RMA means a denial to accept the rules of war that have been set by those actors that master RMA.<sup>20</sup> To counter an RMA adversary asymmetrically means to use unconventional methods of warfare from the actor’s own perspective. After all, for an actor unable to utilise revolutionary technologies, doctrines, and organisations; to wage war from RMA perspective would mean abiding to rules of war that would almost surely be suicidal. Examples of asymmetric responses to RMA have been conceptualised as terrorist attacks, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and non-compliance with the international humanitarian law.<sup>21</sup> Also traditional methods of guerrilla warfare within a long timeframe has been conceptualised as an asymmetric response to the RMA exploitation strategy of the

<sup>17</sup> The ‘emerging European RMA logic’ refers to the increasingly accepted shared European notion that usable and credible military power today is based on advanced technologies related to information.

<sup>18</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 12 (my italics), <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 30 11 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Peters argues that “[n]o matter how hard we try to take our world with us, we will find *we sometimes must fight the enemy on his ground, by his rules.*” Peters R., “The Culture of Future Conflict”, *Parameters*, winter 1995-1996, p. 18-27 (my italics)., <http://carlslie-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/peters.htm>, 22 10 2003.

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. Krepinevich A., “The Clinton Defence Program: Assessing the Bottom-Up Review”, *Strategic Review*, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 20.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. Chandler R., *The New Face of War – Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Revitalization of America’s Transoceanic Military Strategy*, McLean: Amcoda Press Chandler, 1998, p. 225-227; Schoomaker P. *Remarks Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*, Second session, 108<sup>th</sup> Congress, January 28, 2004, <http://www.armedservices.houses.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-01-28schoomaker.pdf>, 16 02 2005.

developed west (particularly the US). Operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Chechnya have been conceptualised as asymmetric conflicts where RMA – or at least a gap in the technology of war between the belligerents in the case of Chechnya – has not led to the outcome that the post-Gulf War RMA theorising has in many cases presumed.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the recent wars in Afghanistan (2001->) and Iraq (2003->) have cast a shadow over the optimistic RMA propositions of the possibilities to reach a quick victory by relying on high-technology military systems and equivalent forces.

The fourth post-Cold War era discourse of war has been that of *new wars*. The manifestation of wars as ‘new wars’,<sup>23</sup> during the 1980s and 1990s has been very problematic for many developed states in their attempts to comprehend the post-Cold War international order. These mainly ethnic-religious conflicts have not fitted the Cold War era lenses of conceptualising wars particularly well. The emphasis on non-state agents in the discourse on new wars has not been new. Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) were part of the Cold War period understandings of warfare. LICs were understood to be located in the non-developed world. They involved irregular fighters – such as guerrillas and terrorists – and did not rely on high technology for pursuing the goals of war.<sup>24</sup>

As Martin van Creveld argued in 1991:

“We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocs, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place. Already today the military power fielded by the principal developed societies in both ‘West’ and ‘East’ is hardly relevant to the task at hand;”<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> About the ‘Counterrevolution in Military Affairs’, see McCabe T., *The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs*, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/McCabe2.html>, 16 12 2003; See also Paul T., *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 20.

<sup>23</sup> Kaldor (note 7). See e.g. p. 1-2.

<sup>24</sup> See van Creveld (note 7) p. 18-32, 57-62; Olson WM. J., “Low-Intensity Conflict: The Challenge to the National Interest”, *Terrorism*, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 75; Cohen E., “Distant Battles – Modern War in the Third World”, *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 143-171. Also the concepts of ‘privatised wars’, ‘informal wars’, ‘post-modern wars’ and ‘degenerate warfare’ have been used to describe ‘new wars’. See Kaldor (note 7) p. 2-3.

<sup>25</sup> van Creveld (note 7) p. ix, 20; About the changing nature of wars in the post-Cold War era, see also Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations* 1995, A/50/60-S1995/1, paragraphs 10-22, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>, 28 15 2004.

The fifth post-Cold War era discourse of war is related to *humanitarian interventions*. It has been connected to the ‘emergence’ of new wars during the 1980s and 1990s. A key feature of this discourse has been the emphasis on the humanitarian justifications for intervening militarily on the territory and affairs of other states. The rules of the international system have been reinterpreted within this discourse – mainly touching on the institution of sovereignty and norms concerning universal human rights. Humanitarian operations have mostly been multinational in character – despite the fact that the United States has been the lead-agent in most of those operations in which offensive military capabilities have been called for. Simplifying somewhat the complex issue of defining and categorising different manifestations of war, and the reasons that different agents have for using physical violence, it can be argued that as the frequency of ‘new’ large-scale violence raised to or stayed on a high level after the Cold War, the conventional threats faced by developed states dissolved, and the effects of modern communications technology brought global affairs into the living rooms of average people, humanitarian use of military force became a real possibility – or even a ‘necessity’. As the 1994 (US) Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of Defence Les Aspin explained:

“The current debate over whether, when, or how the United States should use force in the post-Cold War era has taken place largely in the context of ongoing crises in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti.”<sup>26</sup>

The discourse of humanitarian interventions was ‘ignited’ by the follow-on operation to Operation Desert Storm. Subsequently humanitarian crises throughout the world (e.g. Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and East-Timor) have directed the evolution of the discourse. Although humanitarian reasons have not been sufficient for the promulgation of a general western strategy of military interventions, the western states have become under severe pressures to do something militarily in order to stop or contain large-scale human rights violations. The case of Darfur (Sudan) is the most recent example of this.

The sixth post-Cold War era discourse of war is related to the process of the *privatisation of war*. While the discourses of new wars and asymmetric wars have mostly been focusing on the ‘other’ side of war – i.e. non-state actors as belligerents and non-traditional means of war – the growth of the privatised military industry in the wake of the Cold War has been mostly a western phenomenon.<sup>27</sup> This despite the fact

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<sup>26</sup> Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of defense Les Aspin (note 9) p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> E.g. Singer P., “Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services?”, *Humanitarian Affairs Review*, Summer 2004, p. 14-7, <http://www.brookings.org/view/articles/fellows/singer20040628.pdf>, 31 08 2004.

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that a large fraction of the ‘services’ of private military firms related to providing security and even waging war have been executed in the third world.

“The global confrontation of the Cold War and its massive military establishments have been winding down; instead we find ourselves in a world of small wars and weak states. ... At the same time, *in developed countries, the private sector is becoming increasingly involved in military and security activity*. States and international organisations are turning to the private sector as a cost effective way of procuring services which would once have been the exclusive preserve of the military.”<sup>28</sup>

The post-Cold War outsourcing of traditional military missions for improved effectiveness and lower costs have been connected to the culmination of declining defence budgets and the increased need to harness high technology systems as modernisation has been deemed essential. In addition, related to the end of the Cold War, the rising frequency and destruction caused by new wars, and the equivalent change in the ‘nature’ of civil wars have increased the business possibilities of privately operated military companies. This development has been connected to the publicly expressed ‘need’ for humanitarian interventions in ‘difficult’ locations and situations that have been only vaguely – if at all – connected to the security interests of the intervening parties. Together these developments have caused a shift – partial, but still a shift – in focus of war from the traditional referent object of state-operated military establishment toward the private sector. Thus the processes of privatisation, outsourcing, and competition have been linked to the proposals concerning modernisation and transformation of the defence establishments on the one hand, and the rewriting of the post-Cold War era western definitions of war on the other hand.

“[N]ew technologies are now emerging that will dramatically increase the capabilities of our forces. In the coming years, therefore, the department [of Defence] must increase funding for procurement to ensure our continued technological superiority in the future. ... Outsourcing, privatisation and business re-engineering offer significant opportunities to generate much of the savings necessary for modernization and readiness.”<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> *Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation*, Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 12<sup>th</sup> February 2002 for a Paper, HC 577, London; The Stationery Office, p. 4 (my italics).

<sup>29</sup> “Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing” *Defense Issues*, vol. 11, no. 30, 1996, (my italics), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/s19960301-report.html>, 28 10 2004.

See also Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense William Perry (note 14).

While the trend of shifting supporting military missions to the private sector has been under way at least for a decade, it has been during the recent US-led campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that have publicly surfaced the *increased scope and domain* of the privatisation of war. This means that ‘new’ mission-types have been ‘transferred’ to the private sector – among others military training, logistical support, protection duties, and ultimately actual fighting – while at the same time increasing the share of privately executed missions vis-à-vis the missions carried out by the ‘actual’ militaries. As *The Guardian* reported in December 2003, “Private corporations have penetrated western warfare so deeply that they are now the second biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq after the Pentagon … the proportion of contracted security personnel in the firing line is 10 times greater than during the first Gulf War [1991].”<sup>30</sup> Similarly, a 2002 concluded study revealed “the existence of at least 90 private military companies that have operated in 110 countries worldwide.”<sup>31</sup>

Thus, by the turn of the millennium, six ‘new’ discourses of war had started to redefine the Cold War era institution of war – tacitly as during the 1990s western governments started cautiously to adjust to the emerging reality of the post-Cold War era warfare. These six discourses were:

- 1) the discourse of the end of the Cold War,
- 2) the discourse of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),
- 3) the discourse of asymmetric war – a counter argument to the strengthening RMA thesis,
- 4) the discourse of new wars – ethnic-religious conflicts by mostly non-state actors,
- 5) the discourse of humanitarian interventions – as a western ‘necessity’ in order to dam the rising tide of new wars and to curtail their brutal effects,
- 6) the discourse of the privatisation of war – the outsourcing of traditional military tasks to privately managed companies in order to streamline national defence establishments.

By September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, then, the shared western definition of war had already undergone some transformation – at least if the Cold War era institution of war is conceptualised as the reference point for the ‘emergence’ and ‘development’ of the six post-Cold War era discourses of war. This transformation had occurred on at least

<sup>30</sup> Traynor I., “The Privatization of War”, *The Guardian*, December 10, 2003,  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/1210privatization.htm>, 08 10 2004.

<sup>31</sup> The Center for Public Integrity, *Making a Killing: The Business of War* 2002,  
<http://www.publicintegrity.org/bow/default.aspx>, 08 10 2004.

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three areas of shared understandings related to war within the west. First, *threats* to be encountered with physical violence – war – shifted from traditional state-organised mechanized armed forces towards ‘new’ non-state actors using asymmetric means. Warlords, clans, ethnic groups, and criminal organisations were all included in the list of potential adversaries in the post-Cold War era new wars and humanitarian interventions.

Second, the shared western conceptualisations related to the *nature of the post-Cold War era war* shifted from defence of territory-missions towards humanitarian interventions and military crisis management operations. With the Soviet threat gone, the west could and indeed had to start contemplating a new rationale for the maintenance and development of armed forces. The possibilities of emerging military (RMA) technologies and the increasing need for humanitarian military missions led to the western emphasis on the precise application of military force, minimal collateral damage, and zero friendly casualties. In addition, private contractors have started to rise in standing in the western war fighting force. The ‘renegotiated’ new legitimate goals and means of war mean that today an individual soldier can more ‘easily’ cause strategic-level outcomes. Similarly, potential adversaries of the west have gained new strategic-level ‘tools’ as mounting collateral damage and civilian casualties strain any western war effort. And as the American experience in Somalia showed, few friendly casualties may be enough to abort an ongoing military mission.

Third, concerning the shared western understandings related to the *constitutive elements of military power*, the American sponsored RMA logic best describes the ‘new’ means through which actors can ameliorate or sustain their relative power positions within the international ‘ranking’ of military power. Small, professional forces ready for expeditionary warfare is highlighted in the estimations of post-Cold War era military power. This has not only been ‘caused’ by the emergence of the American dominated RMA discourse, but also by the changing nature of military threats and the nature of western military engagements throughout the 1990s and after.

### 3. Bellum Americanum – The Global War on Terror

By the time of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Cold War era institution of war had already gone through a process of incremental change. This became apparent in the brief analysis of western security and defence strategies after the demise of the Cold War. The conduct of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent response to them has been described in similar terms than the tectonic shift from

the Cold War era into the post-Cold War epoch – at least in the United States. As the 9/11 Commission Report stated,

“In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by territorial boundaries between them. ... National security *used to be* considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place.”<sup>32</sup>

The US Senate and House of Representatives responded quickly to the 9/11 attacks by passing a joint resolution concerning the “Authorisation for Use of Military Force” on 14<sup>th</sup> September, 2001. In the name of self-defence and in order to protect US citizens home and abroad, the resolution noted that:

“[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, *organizations, or persons* he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”<sup>33</sup>

President George W. Bush declared the War on Terror on September 20<sup>th</sup> 2001 in his address before a joint session of the Congress:

“On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. ... Our *war on terror* begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It *will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.*”<sup>34</sup>

As a response to the 9/11 attacks, the first military phase of the War on Terror commenced in Afghanistan. This took place in the beginning of October 2001 – with

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<sup>32</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report – Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 22 July 2004, p. 361-362, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11\\_commission/9-11\\_commission-report.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/9-11_commission-report.htm), 28 10 2004. Note also that still in June 2001 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asserted that in the post-Cold War era “the new and different threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have not yet fully emerged, but they are there.” After three months the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century emerged. See Rumsfeld D., *Prepared Remarks at the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D)*, Brussels, Belgium, 7 June 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010607c.htm> / 18.3.2004.

<sup>33</sup> *Senate Joint Resolution 23 (2001)*, <http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/blsjres23.htm>, 23 03 2005.  
<sup>34</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (note 16) p.1347-1351.

UN Security Council approval. Although the attack on Afghanistan was claimed to be justified on the grounds of finding Osama bin Laden and getting rid of the Taliban regime – the agents responsible for the training of international terrorists – the first battle of the War on Terror was rather traditional in nature: military campaign against a state-agent. After this immediate reaction to the 9/11 attacks started to lose momentum on the ground – because of the ‘victory’ achieved by the end of 2001 – the longer term American strategy for waging the War on Terror started to emerge.

Already in January 2002 president Bush coined the “axis of evil” consisting of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Terrorism was connected to weapons of mass destruction, and moreover to traditional state agents. The rogue states of the 1990s became transferred to the discourse of War on Terror:

“*Weapons of mass destruction* pose a grave danger. … Some *rogue states*, including several that support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities as tools of coercion. … For *terrorists*, WMD would provide the ability to kill large numbers of our people without warning. They would give them the power to murder without conscience on a scale to match their hatred for our country and our values. … The threat is real and the stakes are high. Success against this threat is a requirement of history--one that the United States will meet with confidence and determination.”<sup>35</sup>

Another forceful argument in favour of taking the terrorist threat seriously – and acting unwaveringly – has been connected to the American national trauma of losing the Vietnam war. Accordingly, faced with catastrophic terrorism, the War on Terror as a new kind of war should rely on the ‘lessons of Vietnam’. These lessons were not drawn – or if they were drawn, they were not espoused ‘properly’ – in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.<sup>36</sup> Now, thirty years later the lessons of Vietnam operate as a stark reminder how old-fashioned conceptualisations of war may lead to defeat – even when a superpower is confronted with a third-world opponent. As president Bush framed it:

“We learned some very important *lessons in Vietnam*. Perhaps the most important lesson that I learned is that *you cannot fight guerrilla war with conventional weapons*. That’s why I’ve explained to the American people that *we’re engaged in a different type of war*.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 2150-2151.

<sup>36</sup> Cassidy (note 5) p. 131 “...after the Vietnam war... refocused the Army exclusively on the big-war paradigm, eschewed several studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam, ...”

<sup>37</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (note 16) p. 1456 (my italics).

Advocating in favour of attacking Iraq in the fall of 2002, president Bush relied on the ‘logic’ related to the risk of catastrophic international terrorism, but presented his preferred policy option in a rather traditional way: military offensive against an old state-level adversary: Iraq.

“America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, *we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud*. ... Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, *we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring.*”<sup>38</sup>

Within a year of the 9/11 attacks, the far-reaching influences of the American promulgated War on Terror were beginning to emerge. These were explicitly codified in the National Security Strategy-document, made public in September 2002. At the core of the American War on Terror were the following four points:

- 1) Terrorism is a military threat [although not solely a military threat],
- 2) It is acceptable and even necessary to use military force against rogue states in order to defeat terrorists and to prevent terrorists from gaining access to WMDs,
- 3) As the stakes are high, pre-emptive military action is acceptable and in certain circumstances even preferable,
- 4) Unilateral use of military force is acceptable if others are not willing/capable of neutralising the US-defined threat.

The American defined global War on Terror has thus been presented in an ambivalent manner: on the one hand, terrorism is the gravest threat requiring states to reconfigure their doctrines on the use of military force and to transform their armed forces. Terrorist organisations and even individual terrorists have been added to the list of military threats in addition to states – nowadays mainly under the labels of failed (failing) states and rogue states. Similarly, there has been a convergence in the conceptualisations of war and crime – the internal and external realms of security.<sup>39</sup> Subsequently, the very nature of war is purported to change. On the other hand, the use of military force ‘within’ the global War on Terror have been conceptualised according to the traditional – Cold War era – formula of states combating each other on the battlefield. *The abstract risk of terrorism has thus facilitated the attempt to rewrite*

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 1718.

<sup>39</sup> Lutterbeck D., “Between Police and Military – The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 63.

*the rules for the use of military force, but this rewriting has still reverted to the traditional state-centric formula.* The ‘new’ US-proposed rules for the use of military force in the post-9/11 era – according to the American discourse of War on Terror – could be crystallised in the following manner: *pre-emptive use of military force against rogue states in order to access the scourge of terrorism – unilaterally if necessary – is legitimate after the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.*

There are at least two compelling reasons why the practical execution of American War on Terror has reverted to rather traditional state-centric scheme. First, although the discourse of War on Terror proposes a ‘new’ kind of war – an indefinitely ongoing war against terrorists – the legacy of the past still has a firm grip on today’s organising principle of the international system’s structure. The globe is still territorially divided among states and any war against non-state agents is bound to undermine the sovereignty of one or several states. Second, by focusing on state agents, the declared War on Terror is easier to comprehend – particularly by the domestic general publics. A state-centric War on Terror can rely upon centuries long tradition of war – states battling each other in the battlefield. At the same time, *focusing upon states directly and on non-state agents in a more indirect way, enables the US to define war in a way that offers a promise of victory:* the collapse of the formally organised opposing armed forces and the toppling of a hostile regime can be interpreted as signs of victory. Defining victory in a war against non-state actors that most of the time cannot be seen or even properly identified is an insurmountable task. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that War on Terror against a traditional state agent can turn into an asymmetric conflict or a ‘quagmire’ – making the definition of a victory difficult. As the United States has recently found out in Iraq, defeating opposing formally organised armed forces and toppling the adversary’s regime is not enough to qualify for a victory. Senator Harry Reid stated this bluntly, commenting the prolonging war in Iraq in 2005:

“Most of all, we need an exit strategy so that we know what victory is and how we can get there.”<sup>40</sup>

Thus, what in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 started as the promulgation of a “new war of the 21st century”, has since then become more closely associated with the traditional state-centric conceptualisations of war. This does not mean that the US-defined War on Terror is a reproduced ‘version’ of the Cold War institution of war. Rather, it is the latest manifestation of [incremental] transformation in the institution

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<sup>40</sup> Reid H., “Reid Rebuttal To State of the Union Address”, January 31, 2005,  
<http://reid.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=231159>, 04 04 2005.

of war. The ‘nature’ of the post-Cold War era institution of war had already been transformed by the identified six discourses of war. War on Terror has been build upon the ‘foundation’ of these overlapping and partially contradictory discourses of war – all challenging the Cold War institution of war to a certain degree.

From the perspective of the armed forces, the American discourse on War on Terror is explicitly linked to the leading military power discourse of the 1990s – the Revolution in Military Affairs. Accordingly, this new kind of war requires a revolution in the military as war becomes protracted; conducted within the territory of many states; and directed against targets that need to be engaged rapidly, precisely, and effectively by means of new weapons and related innovative means of using them. According to President Bush, the need to transform the US Armed Forces was obvious before the “dividing line” of September the 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Already in 1999 he noted – concerning the possibilities of rewriting the essence of war through the exploitation of advanced military technology:

“My third goal is to take advantage of *a tremendous opportunity* – given few nations in history – to extend the current peace into the far realm of the future. *A Chance to project America’s peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years. This opportunity is created by a revolution in the technology of war.* ... This revolution perfectly matches the strengths of our country – the skill of our people and the superiority of our technology. *The best way to keep peace is to redefine war on our terms.*”<sup>41</sup>

In order to succeed in the new kind of war after 9/11 – the War on Terror – new thinking and new modes of warfare seemed even more pressing than before. And according to President Bush, this could be delivered by the Revolution in Military Affairs.

“We are a nation at war. America must understand we’re at war. ... This generation of Armed Forces has been given two difficult tasks, fighting and winning a war and, at the same time, *transforming our military to win the new kind of war.* ... *Defeating this enemy [terrorism] requires fighting a different kind of war*, what we call the first war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. ... a war we are going to win.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Bush G. W., “A Period of Consequences”, *Speech at the Citadel*, September 23, 1999, [http://www.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres\\_bush.html](http://www.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html), 07 11 2003. See also Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents (note 16) p. 226 “we will begin creating the military of the future, one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies. We will promote the peace by redefining the way wars will be fought.”

<sup>42</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (note 16) p. 2112-2113 (my italics).

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"America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights. ... Yet we are finding new tactics and new weapons to attack and defeat them. This *revolution in our military is only beginning, and it promises to change the face of battle.* ... an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict."<sup>43</sup>

The explicit American definition of war within the discourse on War on Terror departs radically from the Cold War era conceptualisations. Waging war against terrorist organisations and even individual terrorists like Osama bin Laden is very different from the Cold War era military preparations against Soviet invasion. The changing nature of war within the discourse of War on Terror is also implicitly expressed in a shift from a threat-based conceptualisation of international system towards a risk-based set of possible future scenarios. In order for the threat not to materialise, pre-emptive wars against 'observed' risks need to be waged within the general framework of War on Terror: "[W]e must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries"<sup>44</sup> In addition, the War on Terror is global in nature. As president Bush has explained, "[n]o nation can be neutral in this conflict".<sup>45</sup>

From the perspective of the shared western understandings of war, the American promulgated War on Terror has been problematic. What had matured under the pressures of the Cold War, and 'survived' even the 'external' challenges of the post-Cold war era – particularly how to react to the new wars after the demise of the Cold War – became challenged from 'within' as the Europeans have been struggling to balance between the abstract risks related to international terrorism on the one hand and the militarised American response to it on the other.

Europe has supported and been actively engaged in the process of operating against the threat of catastrophic terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. However, with lacking military resources and different strategic imperatives vis-à-vis the US, the explicitly stated European responses against terrorism have focused upon 'internal' – not external – security instruments: cooperation in the fields of law enforcement and judicial affairs. This is not to say that the American response to 9/11 would have neglected the internal dimension of fighting terrorism. Rather, with its vast military resources, global strategic interests, and the long tradition of offensive and expeditionary warfare, the American military response to terrorism has been much more 'visible' and

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 1776-1777.

<sup>44</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, p. 15 (quote). See also p. 6 "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists". On President's preface: "America will act against such [radicals seeking to get weapons of mass destruction] emerging threats before they are fully formed."

<sup>45</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (note 16) p. 1605.

tangible than its non-military means. In the case of Europe – with almost no usable military instruments under its<sup>46</sup> control – the focus has ‘naturally’ been on the non-military side, although the European Union and NATO have taken international terrorism into their agenda also as a military threat. But as military capabilities take years and even decades to develop, the manifest European focus has for the most part been on the non-military side.

#### 4. The Global War on Terror and NATO

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused a quick NATO response: within 24 hours of the attacks, the Alliance invoked article 5 of the Washington treaty – declaring that the attacks against the United States were attacks against all the 19 member states.<sup>47</sup> Subsequently, terrorism and the connected threats related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the existence and emergence of failed states within the international system became the defining threats and risks in NATO assessments. With the becoming of these new threats – ‘creating’ a new post-9/11 security environment – the logic of recreating NATO became of primary importance.

“Terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery currently pose key threats and challenges to Alliance and international security.”<sup>48</sup>

“In a strategic environment that is marked by terrorism, failed states and proliferation, projecting stability is a precondition for ensuing our security. *If we do not tackle the problems where they emerge, they will end on our doorstep.* … NATO is finally turning into a framework for transatlantic *action wherever our security interests demand it*. This is a sea change in the way we think about – and employ – this Alliance.”<sup>49</sup>

One of the raging debates within the Alliance throughout the 1990s – the one concerning the out-of-area operations – became tamed as the post-9/11 ‘reality’

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<sup>46</sup> This refers to national governments, NATO, and the EU.

<sup>47</sup> NATO Press Release, *Statement by the North Atlantic Council*, Press Release (2001) 124, 12 September 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>, 12 11 2004.

<sup>48</sup> NATO Press Release, Istanbul Summit Communiqué – Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2004) 096, 28 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.html>, 16 08 2004.

<sup>49</sup> de Hoop Scheffer J., “A New Atlanticism for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”. Speech at the Conference of the German Marshall Fund, 27 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040627a.htm>, 12 11 2004.

showed the dangerousness and the novelty of the threats of terrorism, WMDs, and failed/rogue states. While NATO had been engaged in out-of-area operations in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, moving beyond the continent of Europe was facilitated by the newly surfaced strategic imperative of countering terrorism in a globalised world. As threats and risks have become global in nature, the ‘logical’ response has been to move beyond the geographically defined regional approach to security.<sup>50</sup> This new perspective of international security and NATO’s role in the world facilitated a reinterpretation of the Alliance’s needed military capabilities and the timeframe for acquiring lacking capabilities. While this reinterpretation was deemed necessary already before 9/11, the impetus provided by the rapid reinterpretation of the post-Cold War era due to the terrorist attacks of 2001 has been clearly visible.<sup>51</sup> This momentum for change within NATO has been expressed most explicitly through the process of transforming NATO.

When the explicit reinterpretation of the international strategic environment and the role of NATO in it were called for in the aftermath of the 9/11, there were already two ongoing American discursive ‘projects’ that the NATO had and could take into account in moulding its own perspective upon the post-9/11 world. First of these American projects was the exploitation of RMA for transforming the US military establishment. This project had been embraced for several years within the US. In addition, the US had pressed for a more intensive RMA exploitation strategy within NATO – appealing to the lessons of the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The second project – still in its very formative ‘phase’ – was the War on Terror, declared on 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 by George W. Bush. This project was maturing and advancing rapidly as president Bush promulgated almost daily the new nature of this new war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and prepared the American public for this war – first in Afghanistan and after its ‘successful completion’ in Iraq. The rapid and determined response of the George W. Bush administration concerning the War on Terror was affected by the fact that the destructive attacks took place on US soil. This was conceptualised through the precedent of Pearl Harbour and turning the territory of the United States into a battlefield.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> de Hoop Scheffer J., “Global NATO?”, Remarks at the Clingendael Institute, 29 October 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041029a.htm>, 12 11 2004.

<sup>51</sup> See e.g. *NATO Press Release* “NATO’s Response to Terrorism - Statement Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, Press Release M-NAC-2 (2001) 159, 6 December 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm>, 02 03 2004; *NATO Press Release* “Final Communiqué – Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group”, press Release (2001) 170, 18 December 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-170e.htm>, 02 03 2004.

<sup>52</sup> E.g. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (note 16) p. 1776.

The combined effect of the American declaration of the War on Terror and the NATO invocation of article 5 of the Washington treaty placed some of the American allies into an uneasy position. As was promulgated by George W. Bush, the declared War on Terror would last indefinitely and those not on the American side would be against it. This meant, in political terms, that the post-9/11 need for showing solidarity and support for the US administration in its efforts to undermine future terrorist capabilities, NATO allies were ‘tying’ themselves to the process of waging war against the terrorists. This despite the reluctance of some of the member-states of the Alliance in committing military troops to the War on Terror. The secondary role of NATO in the Afghanistan campaign did not totally erase this logical connection of the NATO members to the American-led militarised response to terrorism. Anyhow, after being declared, the American global War on Terror became something that all NATO members had to align themselves to. While the American approach to global terrorism has been through the concept of ‘war’ – though also noting the multidimensional character of this war by emphasising political, economic, military and diplomatic means – in Europe this has been more through the concepts of ‘fight’, ‘campaign’, or ‘struggle’. The secretary general of NATO did espouse the characterisation of War on Terror at the North Atlantic Council meeting at the end of 2001. He did, however, couch this military outlook to terrorism by accentuating the political and economical aspect of this war:

“*NATO is one player in the war against terrorism.* It is a multi-faceted war which involves legal and political and economic aspects as well and they have achieved much less attention than the military ones in recent months...”<sup>53</sup>

When the initial military responses to 9/11 were formulated and begun to be implemented – attacking the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 – the Bush administration had received wide-ranging political support and expressions of solidarity throughout the world. Within and without NATO, many states<sup>54</sup> were willing to send military forces to the war in Afghanistan – a war of self-defence according to UN Security Council resolution.<sup>55</sup> Based on the Bush administration’s decision to allow for maximum freedom of manoeuvre and to avoid the Kosovo-war type of ‘war

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<sup>53</sup> Robertson G., *Press Statement at the Press Conference after the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 6 December 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011206d.htm>, 18 03 2004 (my italics).

<sup>54</sup> E.g. the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, Canada, and Australia. See Lansford T., *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States*, Burlington: Ashgate, 2003, p. 83-107.

<sup>55</sup> See UN Security Council resolution 1368 (2001); UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

by committee', NATO as a transatlantic military alliance was not participating in the war against the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, while individual NATO member-states offered to commit troops to the operations. Taking into consideration the lessons of the Kosovo war – highlighting the capability gap between the US and the rest of NATO members, and the American expressed difficulties in waging war with the associated political bargaining concerning targeting and operational matters – and the obviously limited role of NATO in Afghanistan, the possibility of NATO derailment as the post-9/11 western security framework became voiced as a threat to the future significance of the Alliance.

In Prague 2002, NATO launched its process of transforming the alliance in order to meet the new security environment. Particularly this meant reinvigorating the process of creating European military capabilities for expeditionary operations. NRF and Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) were both directed to fulfil this objective. And both of them may also be construed to facilitate the creation of European military capabilities to counter the post-9/11 terrorist threat.

## 5. The Global War on Terror and the European Union

Shortly after the decision to develop the EU's assets in the field of military crisis management was taken, the effects of 9/11 – and the subsequent American declared War on Terror – were felt also in Europe. When the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2001 was held in order to evaluate the effects of the terrorist attacks on the international security environment, President Bush had already declared the global War on Terror. In addition to expressing full solidarity to the United States, the European Council raised fight against terrorism into a priority of the Union. The 'external' dimension of this fight fell into the domain of CFSP:

“The Common Foreign and Security Policy will have to integrate further the fight against terrorism.”<sup>56</sup>

With a new threat of destructive terrorism facing the “open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural” western societies, the international role of the Union was to be heightened. And the means to do so were conceptualised to lie within CFSP in general and ESDP particularly:

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<sup>56</sup> *Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting*, Brussels, 21 September 2001, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf), 21 12 2004.

“The fight against terrorism requires of the Union that it play a greater part in the efforts of international community to prevent and stabilise regional conflicts. ... It is by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational at the earliest opportunity that the Union will be most effective.”<sup>57</sup>

“[T]he ESDP must take fuller account of the capabilities that may be required, in accordance with the Petersberg tasks and the provisions of the Treaty, to combat terrorism.”<sup>58</sup>

Also the *European Security Strategy* – adopted in December 2003 – emphasised the priority assigned to the threat of terrorism. Putting aside the threat of large-scale military aggression against any Union members, the strategy raised the threat of terrorism to a pivotal place. Of the five named threats facing the Union in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, terrorism was the one that had links with all the other threats – WMDs, failing states, regional conflicts and organised crime. In the document terrorism is conceptualised as the new determinant of early 21<sup>st</sup> century threats facing Europe. In order to counter the terrorist threat – and the other non-traditional threats – new modes of operations are called for: “the first line of defence will often be abroad.” With the adoption of the *European Security Strategy*, the member states of the Union accepted the general notion of transforming national militaries in order to address new threats and included new feasible Union missions on the side of Petersberg tasks. Concerning the threat of terrorism, support for third countries in combating terrorism reflected this “wider spectrum of missions”.<sup>59</sup>

After the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attack, the member states of the Union declared solidarity to each other faced with the terrorist threat. In the spirit of the draft Treaty of the Constitution of Europe, the member states agreed to:

“[M]obilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources to:

- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State or an acceding State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack.”<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> *Presidency Conclusions – Seville European Council Meeting* 21 and 22 June 2002, Annex V, paragraph 6, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf), 21 12 2004.

<sup>59</sup> A Secure Europe In a Better World – European Security Strategy (note 18) p. 7, 12.

<sup>60</sup> *Declaration on Solidarity Against Terrorism*, Brussels, 25 March 2004, [http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/document\\_file.asp?id=10762](http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/document_file.asp?id=10762), 29 03 2004 (my italics).

The boost of 9/11 to the development of ESDP has not meant that the European response to terrorism would have been dominated by military action. While the EU has increased the sense of urgency related to the development of ESDP after the 9/11, the European response to the threat of international terrorism has been centred within the frameworks of police and judicial cooperation.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, within the framework of the developing defence dimension of the Union – the ESDP – the attacks of 9/11 and then Madrid provided at least a two-fold new momentum within the Union. First, it was acknowledged that the Union should play a more active role within the entire international community. Second, the already agreed-upon provisions of Helsinki, with the subsequent modification and rearticulation of them, were conceptualised to need rapid implementation and development.<sup>62</sup>

In the aftermath of Madrid bomb attacks, the Union declared its position “on combating terrorism”. While retaining a primary position on the non-military aspects of counter-terrorism or anti-terrorism, the member states agreed to “do everything within their power to combat all forms of terrorism”, taking into account the UN Charter and particularly the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which was adopted before the American-led attack on Afghanistan 2001.<sup>63</sup> The resolution reaffirmed that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 – and all acts of international terrorism – “constitute a threat to international peace and security” and that terrorism needs to be combated by all means.<sup>64</sup>

It had been the lessons of Bosnia – particularly IFOR and SFOR – and Kosovo – the implementation of KFOR – that affected mostly the framing of the 1999 promulgated Helsinki Headline Goal and the related capability goals.<sup>65</sup> More generally the west had been confronted throughout the 1990s with a multitude of potential crisis management operations and humanitarian military missions. In order to deal with the increasing post-Cold War demand for military crisis management capabilities, the EU progressively moved towards common policies concerning defence and related capabilities, first defined on the Union level at the Helsinki European Council.

The Helsinki Headline Goal – with its implementation mechanisms – provided practical tools for the Union in the process of developing European military capabilities from the national military assets that were inherited from the Cold War. The developed European capabilities have been defined to serve the Petersberg tasks, thus

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 3-17.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>64</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

<sup>65</sup> E.g. Haine J-Y., “An Historical Perspective” in Gnesotto N., (ed.) *EU Security and Defence Policy - The First Five Years (1999-2004)*, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p. 46.

making them most useful in military crisis management missions. With the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent American launched War on Terror – and the European fight against terrorism – the new military requirements of the post-9/11 era have been somewhat different from the accumulating lessons of the 1990s crisis management operations. Rapidly deployable effective military force has become even more highlighted during the post-9/11 era. Similarly increasing emphasis on quality instead of quantity has marked the recent efforts to develop European military capability. However, these trends of the post-9/11 era have not compromised the Union's project to generate military capabilities according to the Helsinki goals. Rather, the 2004 promulgated Headline Goal 2010 continues the development of existing and projected military capabilities and thus builds upon the preceding half-a-decade of defining and constructing European military capability.

The battlegroup concept is the most telling example of the new momentum provided by the Headline Goal 2010. Although the Helsinki formulations already contained the notion of “smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness”<sup>66</sup>, it was not until the Franco-British initiative in early 2004 – with the adoption and development of this initiative during the first half of the same year – that quickly brought into fruition a concrete project of developing effective multinational European rapid response forces. Already in November 2004 – less than a year after the official acceptance of the European Security Strategy – it was agreed that 13 battlegroups would be committed by the member states, nine of which will be of multinational quality. Initial operational capability was set to be reached in 2005, paving the way for full operational capability in 2007.

## 6. Bellum Americanum – Implications for the West

The declaration of a global War on Terror by the Bush administration can be construed as an attempt to redefine the institution of war – particularly within the west, but also more generally throughout the international system. While the ‘nature’ of war has been changing after the demise of the Cold War – this change being expressed by the six ‘new’ discourses of war – the immediately post-9/11 US-defined War on Terror made an explicit and fundamental break with the traditional conceptualisations of war. This proposed change in the institution of war was equivalent to

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<sup>66</sup> *Presidency Conclusions – Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999*, Annex I to Annex IV, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ACFA4C.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ACFA4C.htm), 25 11 2004.

Thomas Kuhn's notion of a paradigm change within science.<sup>67</sup> At the time when preparations for invading Afghanistan were made in the autumn of 2001, the American discourse of War on Terror fundamentally redefined the threat to be countered with war, the legitimate goals and means of contemporary war, as well as the constitutive elements of military power. All of these themes had become subject to redefinition with the emergence of the post-Cold War era discourses of war. However, none of these discourses has challenged the traditional conceptualisations of war to the extent that was the case with the 'first phase' of War on Terror.

The revolutionary – or paradigm changing – character related to the declaration of War on Terror was able to build upon the post-Cold War era discourses of war. Thus, *while proposing a fundamental redefinition of shared conceptualisations of war within the international system, it did so by explicitly articulating those themes related to war that had already been implicated implicitly or had explicitly been discussed in more 'moderate' fashion.* For example, moving 'below' the state in the construction of the threats necessitating the preparation for and waging of war, the discourse of War on Terror was preceded by the post-Cold War discourses of new wars, asymmetric wars, and humanitarian interventions. They had all brought non-state agents into the post-Cold War era 'reality' of large-scale physical violence – although they had not moved the primary focus away from state agents and their formally organised armed forces.

What the discourse of War on Terror offered during the first six months after being declared, was to direct state-organised warfare to confront primarily non-state agents. With the fall of the Taliban regime the process of focusing on non-state agents took a turn back towards states – the process being explicitly articulated by the 'axis of evil' State of the Union-address in the beginning of 2002. By that time, it seems, the US administration had come to terms with the difficulties of concentrating mostly on non-state agents. Thus, the focus on terrorist organisations and even individual terrorists as most pressing threats and risks to western/American security gave way to more traditional agents – states. However, while invading Iraq became the next phase in the American War on Terror – first in the diplomatic and then in the military field – the motivating force behind this war still remained in the abstract risk of catastrophic terrorism. It just had to be put into a context that statesmen and the general public had

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<sup>67</sup> Kuhn T., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 111 "Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before." For a criticism of Kuhn's paradigm conceptualisation see for example Masterman M., "The Nature of a Paradigm" in Lakatos I., and Musgrave A., Alan (eds.) *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 61 – 65. "On my counting, he [Kuhn] uses 'paradigm' in not less than twenty-one different senses...", p. 61.

become accustomed to – the state-centric international system. And this is where the rogue states – Iraq, Iran and North Korea – became connected to the agenda of the global War on Terror. *Rogue states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction was a ‘cocktail’ that facilitated the traditional state-centric focus, while at the same time offered a ‘new’ outlook to international affairs and war.* In other words, the more concrete threat of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction made the abstract risk of terrorism meaningful and controllable. This way, *the potential dangers inherent in the rather ambiguous risk of catastrophic terrorism were turned into a recognisable threat that could be eliminated with war.* The combining of terrorism with rogue states and WMDs facilitates a particular definition of victory in the War on Terror. Without this move, one could not under any circumstances know whether we are winning or losing the global War on Terror.<sup>68</sup> Now we have some – though still very ambiguous – signifiers of victory in the new war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the elimination of rogue states, and recovering WMDs from the hands of rogue states and terrorist organisations.

The discourse of global War on Terror has turned the traditional distinction between war and peace – although never completely clear – into a more confused one as the ‘grey area’ of no-war and no-peace has widened between the conventional boundaries of war and peace. This has happened despite the tendency of waging war in the rather traditional state-centric terms within the broader political framework of War on Terror. Similarly, the mostly American-led definition of global War on Terror has strained the shared western understandings of war between the US and many European Countries. European member-states of NATO and the EU have acknowledged the increased threat related to catastrophic international terrorism, but their practice-related warfighting doctrines, forces, and operations have remained at a practically ‘modest’ level vis-à-vis the United States, which has invaded Afghanistan and Iraq within the framework of War on Terror. The United Kingdom has been the most prominent and active European ally to the US in the global War on Terror – taking part in the ‘operations’ in Afghanistan and Iraq – and has tried to bridge the gap between the American and the [continental] European diverging conceptualisations of how, when, and where to use military force in the name of War on Terror.

There are not so much divergences between the European and the American understanding of threats requiring the preparations for war at the general level. Both conceptualise terrorism as the main threat to security in the globalising post-Cold War and post-9/11 world – although the connection between war and anti-terrorist operations is clearly looser in Europe. At the level of threats, the different interpretations

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<sup>68</sup> With the sole focus on terrorist incidents, the lack of such incidents could not represent ‘victory’ since one can never know for certain why something has not happened – although during the Cold War deterrence theorising purported to have the answer to why a nuclear war did not break out.

become visible when analysing the understandings concerning threats and the ‘required’ practical policies needed to tackle this threat – terrorism – on both sides of the Atlantic. This means that the *shared conceptualisations of the nature of war – legitimate goals and means of war – have become contested*. The post-9/11 American declared policy of assertive use of military force pre-emptively, and if necessary unilaterally, has not been accepted in Europe generally. This became painstakingly clear between autumn of 2002 and spring of 2003, when the west was contemplating and debating the case for attacking Iraq. With diverging conceptualisations about for what purposes to use military force and when, the Europeans and Americans share understandings of what constitutes military power among agents – still mostly states. Although there has never been a RMA frenzy in Europe, the military capabilities ‘needed’ for today’s and potential future military missions are conceptualised according to the American dominated discourse of the Revolution in Military Affairs. And both within NATO and the EU, national armed forces have been assigned with transformation tasks accordingly. Smaller, interoperable, and more mobile forces with information technology-intensive equipment is the way for any state to increase its power position in the international ranking of military power. Large and static military formations à la Cold War have been losing their significance in the wake of the Cold War – and after the first ‘techno war’ fought in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

From the perspective of this article, the War on Terror is thus ‘only’ one discourse among many in the post-Cold war era process of redefining war. It has been an ‘influential’ discourse, however. In its name hundreds of thousands of soldiers have been sent to the battlefield and post-war stabilisation and reconstruction duties from dozens of countries. For the many states that have not ‘accepted’ the American defined terms of War on Terror, the reality of this new war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has still been something that has had to be taken into account. The reluctance of many [western] states to ‘accept’ War on Terror on the terms provided by the George W. Bush administration has meant that *so far* the American War on Terror has not constituted a Kuhnian revolution in the ‘reality’ of war. Rather, War on Terror is best understood as one influential discourse of War, in a wider body of overlapping and at least partially contradictory discourses that define war in a manner that is never totally unambiguous or unproblematic. Moreover, War on Terror is an American promulgated definition of war in the aftermath of 9/11 – in a situation where the end of the Cold War had already a decade earlier ‘opened up’ the sedimented shared western understanding of war.

## Concluding remarks: Bellum Americanum – Implications for the European Union

In the process of defining and articulating the projected military missions of the Union, there are several factors, which have had the combined influence upon the route taken. The end of the Cold War has facilitated the process of the EU becoming an actor with regional and lately global military agenda. The multitude of post-Cold War humanitarian catastrophes due to new wars or civil wars have prompted the desire to manage and prevent these conflicts for humanitarian reasons and in order to preserve and bolster international stability. Particularly the wars of Yugoslavian succession have pushed the European military dimension forward. Also NATO's intra-alliance dynamics have added to the pressure for Europe to create usable military capabilities. The gap in military technologies and capabilities between the US and its European allies has been showcased consecutively in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan. The resulting pressure from this widening gap does not only originate from the US efforts to get Europe to build more and better capabilities, but also from the European understanding that it should keep up with the US to such an extent that military cooperation between Europe and the US remains a viable possibility also in the future. While NATO is the main framework for US-Europe military consultation and cooperation, there clearly has been a link between the US and the EU, and NATO and the EU also in military matters after the decision to take security and defence issues to the Union's agenda was made.

The effects of 9/11 have also touched upon the framing of the Union's projected military missions. First, taking into account the lessons of Kosovo – concerning the poor ability of the Europeans to operate militarily alongside the US – the post-9/11 US response of choosing to cooperate militarily with those countries that have operational offensive military capabilities has further highlighted the capability gap between the US and Europe. As a result, the Union has faced pressures to take more vigorous steps in its capability improvement process. Second, the declaration of American War on Terror and the raising of terrorism to the top of threats facing the EU have meant the surfacing of a need to reappraise projected missions in the post-9/11 world. The 1992 declared Petersberg tasks do not provide basis for the use of military means against terrorism. And after the Union decided to use all possible means against terrorism – including the military ones – the need to redefine the tasks or at least to add some new tasks to the already existing Petersberg tasks surfaced. Thus the notion that the Union *might* decide to support third countries in combating terrorism was accepted.

The guiding principle of constructing an autonomous European military capability for crisis management operations has not meant departing from the general notions within NATO concerning contemporary western military tasks or constitutive elements of today's military power. This is not that surprising, as a vast majority of NATO members are also member of the European Union. Thus the European Union's military project has been built upon practically the same foundations with NATO, but taking into account the possibility of 'purely' European military operations – with or without NATO assets. Taking into account the different nature of NATO and the EU – the former is a military alliance and the latter a more wide ranging political union with a defence dimension – it is to be expected that within NATO the shared military provisions and tasks are more encompassing and 'demanding' than within the EU. Also the very recent launching of the European military project mean that within the institutional structures of the EU the shared conceptualisations of a European defence dimension – the 'proper' role of the EU in global security affairs and the resulting defence policies and military capabilities needed – are under articulation for the first time.

In the post-Cold War era European project of developing military capabilities the link between the European Union and NATO has been strong. From the very first formulations of a European Security and Defence Identity to the articulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defence Policy, and the practical ways to implement these policies have been connected to the pre-existing structures and procedures of NATO. Although NATO itself has been undergoing several processes of transformation in the post-Cold War era, it has been a reference point for the EU's military crisis management capability development and the articulation of European defence policies. This has been so for several reasons. First, while it has been acknowledged across the Atlantic that the Europeans need to develop their military capabilities in the new security environment of the post-Cold War era, any attempts to develop autonomous European military capabilities outside the traditional transatlantic forum – NATO – have been watched with caution and scepticism in the US. Second, the already existing structures of military cooperation within NATO have provided familiar and sedimented channels for the development of allies' military capabilities. In addition, with the declining defence budgets of the 1990s, any unnecessary duplication in defence matters has been avoided on both sides of the Atlantic.

The shared understandings concerning the constitutive elements of military power within the EU are based on the shared ideas of what is threatening the member states in a way that requires military preparations and for what purposes the Union must be prepared to use armed force. In respect to the faced threats within the EU, the explicit and implicit articulations of threats and risks are practically identical to those of NATO. The nature of potential EU military missions deviate, however, somewhat

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from those of NATO. This feature derives from the different, though converging, nature of these two institutions: while NATO is transforming from a defence alliance towards international crisis management actor, the European Union has started to develop its military dimension particularly for crisis management operations.

Looking at the constitutive elements of military power within the framework of the EU, it becomes obvious that the trend within NATO of accentuating rapidly usable expeditionary capabilities and the exploitation of advanced technologies, is also guiding the construction of EU's autonomous military capability. Naturally the very close contacts between NATO and the EU, as well as the dual membership in both organisations by a vast majority of the member states, has led to the rather identical conceptualisations of military power. It is noteworthy that the accentuation of usable military capabilities within European NATO members, and the transformation of NATO coincide with the rapid development of autonomous military capability within the European Union. Both of these highly intermingled processes build on the end of the Cold War and the subsequent changes in the nature of contemporary warfare and the related western possibilities to respond rapidly by relying upon smaller, better-trained forces with better high-tech equipment.

With the injection of catastrophic terrorism to the top security threats or risks with the surprise attacks of 9/11, the 'logic' of creating rapidly usable autonomous European military capabilities was strengthened. In addition, the calls for increased European contributions within the transatlantic alliance in order to narrow the existing technology gap – or capabilities gap – between the US and the European members of NATO were strengthened as the dangerousness of the 'new' terrorist threat was revealed. One possible avenue for the military response to catastrophic terrorism was 'within' the RMA discourse. Most of the momentum for developing post-Cold War era RMA forces emanate from the United States. Analysing the EU framework, the role of the United States in the European conceptualisations of military power through RMA is most clearly exported through NATO. After all, the US has been pressing vigorously for the development of European military capabilities within NATO according to RMA requirements. In addition, the military capability dimension of the EU has been developed in tandem with NATO as cost-effectiveness and (alliance-) political reasons have demanded 'caution' in this field. Furthermore, the member state of the EU – even those not members of NATO – have witnessed the supremacy of American military capabilities in the interstate wars of the 1990s and the new millennium. These capabilities also provide possibilities to engage troops and apply military force in the kind of operations that the Union has been planning – peace operations of different kinds – although they do not totally replace the need to have the 'traditional' peacekeeping troops, the soldiers on the ground. Rapid reaction forces with high technology intelligence and communications systems and precision weapons thus provide

possibilities for traditional large-scale military operations, military crisis management, and counter-terrorist operations. This ‘quality’ of the RMA discourse – its offer of effective military solutions to practically all envisioned post-Cold War and post-9/11 western military engagements – has facilitated its ‘rise’ into the shared western understandings of the constitutive elements of military power.



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**Clive Archer\***

*Manchester Metropolitan University, UK*

## The ESDP and the Nordic and Baltic States

This article will consider why we should pay attention to the ESDP and the Nordic and Baltic states. First, the ESDP is of some importance because it is one of the policies of the EU that is likely to flourish in the coming decade. It is a policy on which the United Kingdom and France agree and which has support from all the member states, including the smaller ones. During a period when disagreement between member states has been to the fore, the ESDP has made considerable progress.

### 1. Why the Nordic-Baltic region?

The ESDP has been active in the Balkans and in Africa. It therefore might be strange to place some emphasis on one of the most peaceful regions of Europe. Nevertheless the network that I have convened has paid special attention to Northern Europe and the ESDP. The Baltic–Nordic region has been chosen for a number of reasons.

#### 1. 1. The Russia Factor

It is the only area on the borders of the EU and NATO with a sizeable military and nuclear power, Russia, sitting on its doorstep. The significance of the Russian presence depends on the condition of Russia itself – its economic, environmental, social and political well-being – and on the perception of Russia by the states under consideration<sup>1</sup>. Alexander Sergounin has written that ‘the mainstream of Russian political thought no longer perceives Northern Europe as a zone of military confrontation with the West...’<sup>2</sup>. However, there are those in the Baltic states in particular who have a less sanguine view of Russia’s relations with its Baltic

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\* Professor Clive Archer is the Director of the Manchester European Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University.

<sup>1</sup> Joenniemi P., Sergounin A., *Russia and the European Union's Northern Dimension. Encounter of Clash of Civilisations?*, Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Press, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Sergounin, A., “Russia and the Challenges of Regional Cooperation” in Browning Chr., ed., *Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern Europe after the Enlargements*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 117.

neighbours and, for them, the US and NATO have been seen as their main guarantors of security. Should the US and NATO not be immediately available, then the EU and the ESDP is seen as a substitute, albeit a poor one.

The ESDP has another importance with relationship to Russia. It is possible that Russia may be able to join a future ESDP operation, meaning that the policy could act as a link rather than being divisive.

## **1. 2. New Security Concerns**

The region has seen a considerable shift of security issues from the traditional ones to the variety of ‘new’ security concerns. As well as experiencing a re-adjustment of traditional military power from the divisions of the Cold War, there has been a growing concern by the governments around the Baltic Sea about the security of their economies and societies. Issues such as people and drug smuggling, as well as environmental threats have climbed up the security agenda. In this, the area is typical of many other in Europe, though these ‘new’ security concerns are probably more marked in this region compared with the larger EU states where the issue of international terrorism is more dominant.

The ESDP has not been crafted to meet these new concerns, though the European Security Concept contains reference to them. However, the EU as a whole does address environmental and disease-related issues, as well questions of immigration and smuggling. Given that the ESDP is meant to include low-level operations under the Petersberg tasks, it is not unthinkable that it may be involved in dealing with such issues. Indeed, its operations in the Balkans have already had a taste of this.

## **1. 3. The Small State Syndrome**

All the states selected are comparatively small and it is now these small states that constitute a majority of the EU member states. Investigating the ESDP policies of the Northern European small states should therefore provide insights into the development potential of the ESDP as a whole.

The ESDP is very much an intergovernmentally-based policy and, as such, depends on the input of the EU member states. As mentioned France and the United Kingdom have very much been the driving force behind the development of the ESDP. However, two small states in particular pushed the policy along at a key stage: Finland and Sweden were responsible for the initiative whereby the EU adopted the Petersberg tasks of the WEU as the basis for the development of the ESDP. It is

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therefore not unreasonable to consider the input of small states into EU policy more generally – given their predominance – and to the ESDP in particular.

#### **1. 4. Large Power Interest**

It is also a region where four larger powers – the US, Russia, Germany and the United Kingdom – have distinct interests. I will deal with the US and Russia separately. Germany has a presence in the region by virtue of being a Baltic Sea state and its trade and investment engagement in the Baltic and Nordic states. It was also active in the creation of some of the institutions in the region in the 1990s, most notably the Council for Baltic Sea States. The United Kingdom has been strongly involved in filling the security vacuum in the Nordic-Baltic region in the post-Cold War period and has worked closely with the military of the Baltic states. Rather like the US, both Germany and the UK have preferred to support action by the other smaller states in the region rather than take initiatives themselves.

#### **1. 5. The US Role**

Since 1991 the United States has played an active, though sometimes understated, role in the region<sup>3</sup>. Clearly, as the ‘last superpower’ the United States is going to be an important player even in this part of the world. Its presence there is justified by its lead position in NATO, but it has been the view of successive administrations that the US presence in the area should be low-key. A main reason for this was a willingness not to upset or provoke Russia by a large military presence. Furthermore there was a realisation in Washington DC that US aims could be pursued by non-military means and through allies in the region. US ‘soft power’ was, nevertheless, power, an ability to get things done.

What were US aims? I would suggest that the main aim was the survival of the three Baltic states as independent countries and their development as democracies and market economies.

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<sup>3</sup> See Park D., Kornfehl M., eds., *Baltic Sea Region Brief: Advancing Baltic Sea Region Cooperation 1998-1999*, Stockholm: Embassy of the United States, 1999.

## 1. 6. A Testing Ground for Theory

The Nordic and Baltic states provide a good testing-ground for a number of theoretical approaches to security. One may wonder why we should pay any attention to these theoretical considerations. After all, what do they have to do with the reality of what is happening with the ESDP? The answer is ‘a lot’. If indeed the ESDP is merely a reflection of national interests and of the interests of the larger EU states, we might expect it to develop in a particular form. There would be more of a reflection of NATO in its organization and any development would have to come out of the capitals of the member states. If it reflects a more liberal institutionalist understanding, there is likely to greater autonomy for the institutions in Brussels and the logic of neo-functionalism will be followed. This will mean that integration in one area spills over to another and as this happens, interest groups, such as the arms industry, the military and political groups, will start to transfer more of their attention to Brussels. We could also be seeing the construction of a European identity through the ESDP. This will see more emphasis placed on symbols and on the language of integration. (For more on theory, see below).

## 2. Three Sets of Questions

In general, any consideration of the Nordic/Baltic states and the ESDP involves three sets of broad research questions. The first concerns *politics*, both external and internal to the region.. The second set of questions concerns the *resource and military* aspect. It examines the expected input and expected output of the ESDP. The third set concerns *ideas* and investigates the understanding of the role of the EU, especially the ESDP, in security matters. It will test the extent to which the discourse in the Baltic/Nordic countries reflects the wider theoretical interpretations of the development of the ESDP. To what extent might it supplement or rival NATO? Will it become an instrument for EU interests or a way of underpinning particular values? In these answers, to what extent do understandings of the ESDP in the Nordic/Baltic countries deviate from those in other EU member states?

### 2. 1. The political context

The first set concerns *politics*, the external political framework and the domestic sources of understanding of the ESDP. Any understanding of a European Union policy must consider politics at three levels. The first is the international framework that provides the wider context for the policy. In the case of the ESDP, the international

conditions are indeed of crucial importance. A security and defence policy must consider the current, and expected, global security issues, such as the general distribution of power, security threats, risks and opportunities.

The second level is that of the European Union. An EU policy has to be seen in the context of the relevant treaties and agreements that created it, the institutions provided and its relationship to other policies and EU institutions. These elements provide the limits and opportunities for the policy within the EU, though it should be noted that they themselves are open to change by the member states.

The third level is that of the member states. In considering the stages of policy-formulation, policy-making, policy-taking and policy implementation, recognition should be given to the elements of government, and of civil society, active in security and defence policy. In considering the politics of the ESDP, it will not be enough to glue together the relevant factors for the above three levels. All three interact and therefore produce a momentum of their own, not always apparent by examining only one element.

## **2. 2. Resources and military issues**

A second set of issues reflects the potential of the ESDP for action and its impact. Consideration will be given to the tools available and the extent to which the countries covered have contributed to these and may benefit from them. What resources – economic, military, diplomatic and political – will each state put into the ESDP? Is there military personnel and hardware available? How have the diplomatic activities of the seven countries contributed to EU security and defence policies? How will the ESDP activities be formulated in terms of output, such as policy statements, exercises and activities, and how might these affect the seven countries? What will be available when and where and what elements will be missing?

It is not possible to see this aspect in isolation. The military and other resources available to the ESDP reflect the security policies of the countries more generally, not least whether they are members of an alliance or not. What is ring-fenced and what is earmarked and for what purpose? What national constraints are placed on the use of resources for the ESDP?

## **2. 3. Theoretical considerations**

Depending on the books consulted, theoretical approaches to the study of European integration can be divided in a number of ways. One distinction is between a

“top-down” or a “bottom-up” approach<sup>4</sup>. The former sees European integration more in international relations terms with the main determinants or independent variables existing at the international level. The relations between states are key here, with governments the main players and power (whether economic or military) the main currency. The latter approach stresses the requirements of political, social and economic actors within states and portrays European integration more as a result of the preferences of groups at the national and sub-national (and, indeed, transnational) levels.

Another distinction is between approaches based on the assumptions about both the actors involved and the nature of the system. Here three such broad approaches which will also have implications for starting a study from the “top-down” or the “bottom-up”. The three approaches are, broadly, those of Realism, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism.

The first approach, the Realists, see states as the central actors in the international system and as the moving force in European integration. They are engaged in what Stanley Hoffmann (1965) identified as ‘the logic of anarchy’ in a system where there is no central authority and where each state has to fend for itself<sup>5</sup>. To protect its very existence, the state would either have to have sufficient defence capability against expected threats or would have to ally with other powers. Whether in military or economic terms, today’s allies could be tomorrow’s enemies, so any arrangement with other states had to be calculated in terms of relative gains. If the other state gained more from an alliance, a disarmament agreement or a trade pact than one’s own country, then such a deal was merely building up tomorrow’s rival.

In the case of the Nordic-Baltic region and the ESDP, a Realist view will mean that governments will consider their security policy to be induced or constrained by economic self-interest, relative power and strategic commitments. Decision-makers will give a major consideration to geopolitical factors<sup>6</sup>. A major consideration for the Baltic states, and indeed Norway and Finland, will be the continued presence in the region of Russian power, with the EU and its ESDP being seen as a possible balancer should the US become less interested in the region.

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<sup>4</sup> Archer C., *The European Union. Structure and Process*, London and New York: Continuum, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed., 2000, p. 22-38.

<sup>5</sup> Hoffmann, S., “Rousseau on War and Peace”, in Hoffmann S., *The States of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1965.

<sup>6</sup> Mouritzen, H., “Introduction” in Mouritzen H., ed., *Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. x-xx.

The second approach is that of Liberal Institutionalism whereby decision-makers place greater emphasis on both international societal values and institutions *per se*. They will note the importance of democratic values in international relations and place store in the role of international institutions<sup>7</sup>. Decision-makers recognise that increased interdependence and common institutions can substantially improve relations between societies by breaking away from what Mitrany called ‘the traditional link between authority and a definite territory’<sup>8</sup>. There is thus a positive benefit to the general relations between states and societies of increased social and economic intercourse.

The third approach is Constructivist, whereby decision-makers concern themselves with questions of identities (elites and, where appropriate more general) that are shaped by the interactions between the national and European level. The decision-makers themselves may be shifting their own identity from exclusively national to one with a ‘European’ hue. Also in their external policies they may reflect wider views of identity attributed to others. There is a certain amount of overlap in these approaches and some authors have noted a move from one to another.

All in all, a consideration of the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP can give us some insight into the workings of the EU and European integration, defence and security policy within states and within the EU, and can also test and provide some aspects of theory.

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<sup>7</sup> Archer C., “Still Nordic After All This Time: Nordic Security in the Post-Cold War Period”, paper for the Nordic Round Table at the ISA 46<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention Hawaii, 5 March 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Mitrany D., *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, p. 125.



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**Henrik Larsen\***

*Copenhagen University, Denmark*

## Denmark and the ESDP: Why the Opt-out?

While Denmark has not been inactive within EU foreign policy in general, Denmark has been an extremely reluctant participant in the development of the EU defence dimension since its launch with the Maastricht Treaty. This has also been the case with regard to EU decisions or operations which have been close to Danish preferences in other contexts. The fundamental question examined in this article is why there is this difference between the extensive military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU. The argument is that the main lines in the Danish policy towards the ESDP can be explained with reference to the domestic framework of meaning within which Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor takes place.

### Introduction

In the post Cold War period Danish foreign policy has widely been seen as different from the Cold War period before. Danish foreign policy has become more active in most areas. A primary expression of this higher level of activity is an increased use of military means in Danish foreign policy. While Danish forces' participation in peacekeeping was high compared to the size of the country during the Cold War, the level has further increased in the Post Cold War period. While the use of military means in the Cold War period was restricted to peacekeeping, the Post Cold War period has seen a deployment of Danish forces in chapter VII operations in the former Yugoslavia in the mid 1990s and in actual war fighting in Kosovo, Afghanistan<sup>1</sup> and Iraq. In the two latter cases Danish forces were part of a relatively narrow group of countries.

The perception in official accounts of Denmark's international environment is that Denmark has in a historical perspective never been as safe as today<sup>2</sup>. The Post Cold War has seen a considerable increase in the resources allocated to military forces which

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\* Henrik Larsen is Professor of the University of Copenhagen, the Department of Political Science.

<sup>1</sup> Although official reports say that the Danish special forces have not been engaged in actual shooting in Afghanistan!

<sup>2</sup> See Forsvarsministeriet, *Fremtidens Forsvar*. Beretning fra Forsvarscommissionen af 1997.

Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 1998; Forsvarsministeriet, *Forsvarsforliget 2004-2009*, 2004.

could be deployed abroad rather than to territorial defence. In the latest Danish 5 year defence budget (2004-2009), a very considerable transfer of resources from conscription to international operations will take place. The special forces deployed in Afghanistan have received extra financial means in 2005. The 2004-2009 budget also contained a general reference to the preparation for the possibility that the EU defence exemption would be lifted. But this has not had any concrete effects on defence structures or acquisitions yet.

While Denmark has not been inactive within EU foreign policy in general, Denmark has been an extremely reluctant participant in the development of the EU defence dimension since its launch with the Maastricht Treaty. This has also been the case with regard to EU decisions or operations which have been close to Danish preferences in other contexts. The fundamental question examined in this chapter is why there is this difference between the extensive military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU

The idea in this chapter is that the main lines in the Danish policy towards the ESDP can be explained with reference to the domestic framework of meaning within which Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor takes place. The meaning dimension is here conceptualised as discourse and competing meaning systems as competing discourses<sup>3</sup>. The way in which the dominant discourse and the competing discourses read the international developments in this fields contributes to shaping and constraining Danish policy towards the ESDP. In the following section the chapter will present the central Danish political discourses with regard to the EU as a security actor. Subsequently, the Danish policy towards the EU defence dimension from 1991 is outlined followed by a section which attempts to explicate Danish policy towards the ESDP in the light of the competing discourses on the EU as a security actor. I finally offer some concluding remarks.

## 1. The Background: The National Frameworks of Meaning and the ESDP

In the following I describe the two main political discourses within the Danish debate about the EU as an external actor after the cold war<sup>4</sup>. The first perspective can be

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<sup>3</sup> For a presentation of the use of discourse analysis for the analysis of foreign policy see Larsen H., *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*. London: Routledge, 1997.

<sup>4</sup> This draws heavily on Græger N., Larsen H. & Ojanen H., *The Nordic Countries and the European Defence Dimension. The CFSP Nordic Dimension Programme*. Helsingfors: UPI. 2002, p. 95-100.

called the 'non-privileged cooperation discourse' and the second the 'essential cooperation discourse'. These discourses cut across parties, organisations and the population, although the second discourse outlined is increasingly drawn on by the political elite. While political understandings differed along the lines of these two discourses, there were also important similarities on which both were based: The EU was in both discourses understood in instrumental terms. It was legitimised with reference to its beneficial effects for Denmark or Europe rather than in mythical terms which saw a European project as the embodiment of a natural and desirable destiny.

According to the *non-privileged cooperation* discourse, the EU does not play a beneficial political or security role, although it has taken on competence in these areas. Danish foreign policy should therefore not build on the EU as an essential forum. According to this discourse, the EU does not strengthen European security, it is not a 'project of peace'. The EU structures are seen as imposing undue restrictions on member states. It is the 'federal European super-state' complete with a defence capacity that poses a threat to Denmark and its foreign policy. The defence exemption is not only seen as a way of preventing Denmark from contributing to a super-state but also a way of showing that Denmark has established clear limits to EU influence on national affairs. While the EU's access to military means is seen as a general problem within this discourse, the Left Wing adherents to this discourse focus on the military means as part of illegitimate power politics conducted by an illegitimate unit and adherents on the Right Wing fear for the detrimental effects on NATO. For them Danish military engagement should be with NATO or the US. Adherents to this discourse can be found across the political spectrum, in the June Movement and in the People's Movement against the EU, although it is strongest on the political extremes (the Unity Party and the Danish People's Party). There are signs that important parts of the population adheres to elements of this understanding at least judging from their attitudes towards the EU in general<sup>5</sup>.

Adherents to discourse often draw on elements of the four *cornerstone* understanding of Danish foreign policy which had been dominant during the Cold War. Danish foreign policy was seen as based on participation in four fora (NATO, UN, Nordic Cooperation and the EC/EU) or cornerstones. Each cornerstone was ascribed equal weight and there was a functional compartmentalization between the cornerstones, limiting the functions that each individual cornerstone could take on.

According to the *essential cooperation* discourse, the EU is a central economic and political actor with a role to play in the field of security and a role in the defence of the liberal values. The EU is seen as an anchor for European security and hence the EU is an essential forum for Danish security policy. In this discourse, the functions which

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 97-100.

had during the Cold War been attributed to other cornerstones in Danish foreign policy are after the Cold War also attributed to EU - and the EU cornerstone is presented as being the most important cornerstone in Danish foreign policy. The functions of the other cornerstones meet in the EU which therefore plays a central political and security role in Danish foreign policy. At the same time, within this discourse there are limits as to the degree to which the EU can assume functions from the other cornerstones. NATO is still seen as the cornerstone concerning the safeguarding of Denmark's territorial integrity, and major military activities in Europe. Within this discourse, cooperation involving defence guarantees should not take place in the EU but in NATO. Even so there is openness towards EU cooperation on Petersberg operations which are seen as beneficial to European security and to the wider world<sup>6</sup>. The ESDP is a positive process even if Denmark cannot participate in the military parts.

Until the year 2000, adherents to the essential cooperation discourse would understand the essential role of the EU as naturally being played out *within* a world with the US as the only superpower. This characterised the dominant discourse in the Social Democrat/Radical Liberal Government as well as the Liberal/ Conservative opposition. However from 2000 a new articulation and variant could be discerned which claimed that the EU was also essential in order to counter what was seen as the excesses of US power and even furthering a multipolar world. The basic understanding of the ESDP as beneficial was therefore within this variant of the discourse placed in the context of a new understanding of the role of the EU with regard to the US. It was not a break with the central link to and positive identification with the US in the field of security, but the EU was now conceived as playing both with *and* against the US in the field of security. This change within the essential cooperation discourse could be discerned during the office of the Social Democrat foreign Minister Lykketoft 2000-2001. But it became clearer after the departure of the Social Democrat/Radical Liberal Government in 2001 and was expressed in the Social Democrats' new foreign policy program in 2003 in which the aim of the EU was to play both with and against the US furthering a global multipolarity. The unipolar world order was in other words not naturalised as the context for the EU. This change could also be found in the parts of the Socialist People's Party (SF) which drew on elements of this discourse. Amongst the adherents to this discourse within the SF, the essential role of the EU was strongly linked to the idea that the EU was the only unit through which Denmark could go against the strong US at present.

The dominant discourse within the government with regard to the EU as a security actor after 2001 remained the old version of the essential cooperation. The EU was presented as an essential security actor *within* unipolarity as expressed in the 2003

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 95-97.

Government White Paper on priorities in Danish foreign policy . But within this understanding, the role of the US and NATO in safeguarding Danish sovereignty have been upgraded at the expense of the EU in some contexts (see for example the Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen´s article in the Daily *Berlingske Tidende*, 2003). The EU is still articulated as an essential security actor *within unipolarity* including in the field of the ESDP. But the ultimate role of the US and NATO as the guarantors of Danish security and the central partners in Denmark´s hard security endeavours are emphasised more strongly than before 2001. And in this sense the role of the ESDP is placed in a somewhat different context than before 2001.

While there was agreement within the two variants of the essential cooperation discourse that the EU should be an essential security actor, there were therefore disagreements about *what* the EU was essential for. These disagreements were based on more fundamental disagreements about the desirability of the present unipolar system. Proponents of the old version of the essential cooperation discourse stressed the importance of Denmark taking part in front line battle with the US in the new main line of global conflict today: the war against terrorism<sup>7</sup>. The adherents to the new version of the essential cooperation discourse, on the contrary, were sceptical towards Danish partaking in this battle. They did not find that a close relationship to the US would always be of value in itself and that it always served substantial Danish interests.

## 2. A Danish ESDP Policy?

During the Cold War, European defence outside the context of NATO was that it was not an aim in Danish foreign policy. The sceptical Danish approach was representative of the general Transatlantic view during the Cold War. In this section I will outline the main features of the Danish policy towards the ESDP since 1991.

During the 1990-1991 intergovernmental conference the Danish Government had opposed both a common defence policy and defence in the EU. The Maastricht Treaty included both concepts with a common defence as a possible future aim. After the Danish 'No' to TEU in 1992 referendum a so-called National Compromise based on agreement between the Radical Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Socialist People´s Party stated that Denmark should stay outside the so-called defence policy dimension which implies membership of the WEU and a common defence policy or common defence. A decision by the European Council in Edinburgh, in December 1992 (the so-called Edinburgh Decision), based on the Danish National Compromise

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<sup>7</sup> And this was a new emphasis in the stressing of the necessity of Denmark placing itself firmly as part of the main line of conflict (where previous emphases had often been on mitigate this line of conflict).

became the basis of a new Danish referendum in May 1993 which produced a yes to the TEU. The Edinburgh decision stated that

The Heads of State and Government note that...Accordingly Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area (Edinburgh Decision, section C)

It was crucial that Denmark could not, through the Edinburgh Decision, stop the other member states from developing a defence dimension. Just as importantly, the Danish government would itself decide (as in the other exempted areas) whether to lift the Edinburgh Decision and take part as a normal member state. This meant that the concrete implications of the defence exemption largely rested on the Danish Government's interpretation of it as long as this did not prevent the development of this policy area for the other member states.

The Danish Government subsequently interpreted the Danish defence exemption to mean that Denmark should not participate in decisions and actions which had defence implications and were made with reference to TEU art J.4.2 (later to become the Amsterdam Treaty art J.13 and J.17) irrespective of the substance of the particular decision. This was due to the wording in this article which closely resembled the language of the Edinburgh Decision. In the 1990s Denmark opted-out of 8 EU decisions made with reference to this article. This meant that there was no Danish participation in (J.4.2 part of) the actions, but no Danish veto of the decisions either. All 8 decisions were areas where Copenhagen had few problems with the actual substance of the decisions. The problem was the legal base and its reference to defence.

Danish policy in the EU in this area became very passive and low-key. While this is the most appropriate general characterisation of Danish policy, from the mid-1990s a gap or bifurcation could be discerned in Danish policy with regard to the defence dimension within the EU - a gap that exists to the present day. The gap was between the Government's policy towards the EU defence dimension in general (the framework), on the one hand, and on the other hand the concrete policies within this field that Denmark was (not) able to take part in, given the terms set by the defence exemption. From 1995 the Danish Government increasingly supported a defence role for the EU with regard to Petersberg military tasks. This support was very low-key but the trend increasingly noticeable and clear. While Denmark opted out of concrete decisions and actions in this area due to the exemption, it was the Government's interpretation that it could take part in general political discussions in this field and support the setting up of a defence dimension in general terms.

The Danish defence exemption arguably had a very limited impact in the 1990s as the concrete development within this area was very modest. With the St. Malo dynamism from 1998, the Danish defence exemption acquired greater significance as it prevented Denmark from participation in the substantial aspects of the build-up of the ESDP. A motion of 8 December 1999 in the Folketing urged the Government to take part in the creation of the new ESDP structures while fully respecting the defence exemption. This further widened the above-mentioned gap between what Denmark supported in general (although low-key) terms and the concrete decisions and actions in which it could (not) take part and opted out.

However, in October 2001 a year before the Danish presidency the Danish Government presented a report on the consequences of the Danish defence exemption in the light of the coming Danish presidency to the EU Foreign Ministers' meeting 8-9 October 2001<sup>8</sup>. In the report the scope of the Danish defence exemption was defined in more precise terms with reference to military decisions. It was now made clear that the exemption applied to situations where the measures considered had concrete defence implications (Udenrigsministeriet 2003:20) where the opt-outs had previously mainly been applied to the use of particular articles in the TEU. The background for this was the expectation that future decisions about the ESDP within the Nice Treaty would be taken with reference to art. 14 on joint actions rather than art 13/17 which made explicit reference to both defence policy and defence. This new interpretation of the scope of the exemption made possible a judgement by the Government about whether the substance of the individual decisions related to defence issues where the defence exemption would apply. The consequence of this was that Denmark could now take part in the non-military aspects of the ESDP (such as policing) when these were decided according to article 14. The report thus broadened Copenhagen's possibilities to take part in the ESDP on non-military issues if these were not decided by art. 13/17. The 2001 report was not controversial domestically where proponents seemed satisfied with the new possibilities to take part in civilian tasks.

In spite of the Government's general support for the Saint Malo process, the concrete contribution as far as the military substance of the ESDP is concerned has been very limited. As the most material indication of the defence exemption, Denmark has not registered forces to the EU's capabilities catalogue which was set up in 2000. There has been no Danish participation in the first three EU military operations in Macedonia (2003), Congo (2003) and Bosnia (2004). In fact in the cases of Macedonia and Bosnia, Danish forces which were part of preceding NATO's forces, were withdrawn when the EU took over from NATO in order to comply with the exemption in spite of the

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<sup>8</sup> The concrete background was the upcoming Danish presidency for which a clarification of where Denmark could carry out its presidency function was necessary and the case about the vote about the chairman of the EU Military Committee (see Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, (note 4) p. 118-125).

similarities of the tasks at hand. Moreover, Denmark opted out of the decision establishing a satellite centre in July 2001, although it participated in setting up the civilian parts of the center. Copenhagen did not participate in the EU Council decision on the so-called Athena-mechanism on 23 February 2003 on the principles governing common expenditures for EU operation which have implications in the military field. It also opted out of the joint action setting-up of a Defence Agency on 12 July 2004. Taken together the Danish defence exemption has at the time of writing been applied in relation to 12 EU decisions since 1993.

Generally speaking, the more general political the context in which the ESDP is discussed in the EU, the larger the room of manoeuvre the Danish government perceives itself as having within the government's interpretation of the defence exemption. The opposite is the case for concrete elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. Denmark thus participates in more general political discussions about security in the EU and the drafting of documents such as for example *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (2003), but Copenhagen has a very low political profile in the military field. The Danish defence minister- although present- does not participate in discussions about military issues in the EU. In the EU Military Committee (EUMC) the Danish representative rarely takes the floor on military issues and does not take part in votes<sup>9</sup>. The Danish representative in the Military Staff is responsible for the coordination between the civilian and the military crisis management instruments - an area that Denmark has prioritised. At the setting up the EUMS in March-April 2000 Denmark made an arrangement with the Council which ensured that the seconded Danish officer could function in his work while respecting the Danish defence exemption. This was confirmed in an exchange of letters between the High Representative Solana and the Danish Foreign Minister<sup>10</sup>.

The implication is that Copenhagen is not able to participate concretely in the development of the military dimension of the ESDP that has been going on especially since St. Malo in 1998. However, Denmark has taken part in the civilian part of the ESDP with a relatively high profile. It has put forward several proposals in this field. Copenhagen has strongly supported close coordination between the military and civilian aspects of the ESDP. Danish representatives have taken part in all the civilian operations under the ESDP so far apart from operations in Congo (Monitoring mission in Aceh, help to legal build up in Iraq, Georgia, Macedonia and Bosnia). A significant reason for the Danish participation here is also diplomatic - a way of compensating for the lack of military engagement.

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<sup>9</sup> Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, (note 4) p. 118-125.

<sup>10</sup> Udenrigsministeriet Notat til Udenrigspolitisk Nævn, 13 June 2005.

The concrete development of the ESDP in the first years of the new millennium increases the tension between the general Danish support of the EU's role in the field of security including the ESDP and the Danish ability to take part in this development concretely. Firstly, the ESDP now has a tangible military content. Secondly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate civilian parts of the ESDP from the military parts - a development that is very much in line with the preferences of Copenhagen. The aim of integrated crisis management, central in the EU's approach, makes it, paradoxically, more difficult for Denmark to participate, unless practical solutions distinguishing between civil and military elements can be found. The integrated approach might in the future make it difficult for Copenhagen to insulate military decisions from civilian ones. The 2005 reorganisation of the EUMS which includes a civilian-military cell with an operation centre has made it impossible for the seconded Danish officer to work with the civilian-military link in the ESDP, as the officer in charge of this area may now be sent out on operations. HR Solana has not been willing to reconfirm the original 2000 agreement. So Denmark will have to go for a more technical post in the EUMS - if any<sup>11</sup>. Fourthly, the anti-terror dimension in the EU will increasingly draw on a mix of civilian and military components making it difficult for Copenhagen to participate as mentioned above. This is not only due to the defence exemption but also to the exemption in justice and home affairs. Thirdly, as NATO and EU procedures in for example the field of defence acquisitions are moving closer, there are signs that the defence exemption now also affects Denmark's possibilities in NATO, as Denmark cannot participate on the EU side. While this had long been expected to happen, there are now more firm indications to this effect<sup>12</sup>.

Thus while the ESDP is becoming more and operational and based on firmer administrative and political structures with open Danish support.<sup>13</sup> Danish possibilities to participate in central areas are becoming more and more firmly ruled out or circumscribed. The lack of a perspective for this to change after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty together with other reasons (see below), has contributed to an ever lower profile for the Danish endeavours in Brussels in this field. Denmark's status in this field in the foreseeable future is then as a member with semi-permanent opt-out.

In the next section we will try to explain the forces that have shaped and constrained Danish policy towards the ESDP as outlined above.

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<sup>11</sup> Note 10.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Udenrigsministeriet *Notat til Udenrigspolitisk Nævn*, 17 May 2005.

### 3. Discourses on the EU as a security actor and Danish policy towards the ESDP

These two main discourses outlined in section II (from around 2000 the essential cooperation contained two variants) constitute the competing frameworks of meaning for Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor and hence also the ESDP<sup>14</sup>. They framed and shaped Danish policy as outlined above. In the following we will show how: The Danish policy line towards the ESDP can be considered as split: There has been a split between what the Governments, since at least 1995, have supported in general terms (the development of an EU defence dimension) and what Denmark can (not) take part in due to the defence exemption. This is due to the existence of two discourses in Danish policy-making towards the EU defence dimension where one dominates the general EU policy line and the other constrains the policy line in relation to the defence dimension (and the areas of the other exemptions): the essential cooperation discourse and the non-privileged cooperation discourse.

The split policy line emanates from the now well-established Danish political convention to the effect that major changes in Denmark's formal relationship to the EU should be decided by referenda, which is based on art. 20 in the constitution. The referenda have contributed to the continued politicisation of EU issues in Denmark. Broadly speaking this has opened up for influence for discourses other than the ones that dominate the Government and the Folketing and has meant that there is a link between public debate and the general Danish EU policy line.<sup>15</sup> In the 1990s, two referenda led to the four Danish exemption and in 2000 a referendum confirmed the EURO opt-out. This has meant that the non-privileged cooperation discourse has played a political role in Danish ESDP policy, although it is not dominant in the Folketing or the Government: directly through the voting of the population at the referenda as it is the non-privileged cooperation discourse that frames the logic behind the exemption. Indirectly through the attention being paid by the Government to its adherents in the Folketing, The stances of the latter towards the day to day Government interpretations of the exemption are of importance for the shape of the debate in future referenda. The Government must therefore pay attention to the arguments within the non-privileged cooperation discourse<sup>16</sup>.

The essential cooperation discourse, on the other hand, has framed the overall

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<sup>14</sup> Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, (note 4) p. 95-100.

<sup>15</sup> See Larsen, H. "British and Danish Policies towards Europe in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach", *European Journal of International Relations* 5(4), 1999, p. 451–483; Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, (note 4).

<sup>16</sup> Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, (note 4) p. 100.

Government approach to the EU as a security actor. The background of the general support for the EU's development in this field is based on this discourse including the general support for concrete developments within the ESDP - even though Denmark could not take part in many of the concrete decisions and operations. It is also the logic behind the support for an integrated crisis management approach which may increasingly make Danish ESDP participation difficult.

The background of the bifurcated line is thus the presence of two competing political discourses in Denmark with regard to the ESDP (and the other areas where there are Danish exemptions). This is the basic reason why Danish policy in this field has been different from other areas where Denmark's military engagement has been high profile compared with the Cold War. There is broad support for military contributions in all international fora (if not bilaterally with the US)- but not for military contributions to making the EU a military actor.

However, the divisions within the essential cooperation discourse from around 2000 have arguably also shaped Danish ESDP policy - if in a somewhat airy way. Danish ESDP policy in the new Millennium has been the same as the policy since the start of the St. Malo process - a bifurcated line. The policy output looks similar. The post 2001 Liberal/Conservative government draws on the variant of the essential cooperation discourse which places the EU and the ESDP very firmly within the US unipolarity. In the context of the Iraq debacle and its aftermath, where Denmark has firmly sited with the US, it seems fair to assume that visions for the ESDP are more confined and the role of the US upgraded . There is arguably less trust in the EU as an actor in the post 2001 dominant discourse. From 2005 Danish attempts to get a seat on the important ESDP fora (still without being able to take part in much surrounding the military aspects) seem to have been replaced by less political zeal and a degree of resignation amongst civil servants (interviews Ministry of Defence; Prime Minister's Office). Although the Government in autumn 2003 floated the idea of putting the defence exemption to a referendum in relation the Constitutional Treaty, very little has been said about this since then. The simple reason might be that the insecurity surrounding the status of the Constitutional Treaty does not make a very good basis for another referendum on the exemptions. From this point of view the Constitutional Treaty has to be finally declared dead and buried before any Danish Government would dare to put the exemptions to another referendum.

A broader interpretation (which may supplement the former) is that the bilateral security relationship with the US has become so important for the present Government that considerations about possible Danish participation in the ESDP have been downgraded as reflected in a lesser interest within the ESDP. Although the ESDP is gaining momentum by the standards of history in this area, this may loom less significant than the increased intensity in the Danish-American bilateral relationship.

So although the ESDP policy looks the same as before 2001, the background is different in that the balance in Danish foreign and security foreign policy between the US and the EU has shifted towards the US. If this is correct, the implication must also be that if adherents of the other variant of the essential cooperation discourse came to dominate, this may again change the discursive foundation of Danish ESDP policy, as the balance between the EU and the US may again be shifted.<sup>17</sup> While it has been widely assumed that the defence exemption contributes to pushing Denmark closer to the US politically, it does, of course not follow that the affiliation with the US in itself keeps Denmark away from the ESDP (as the case of the UK shows). So the question of which discourse dominates is of fundamental importance for the emphasis on the ESDP. However, changes at this very fundamental discursive level may not have very visible effects on the ESDP due to Denmark's low-key role in this area based on the defence exemption.

## Concluding Remarks

The fundamental question examined in the article was why there is a difference between the extensive Danish military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU. The article has shown that this is due to the presence of two competing discourses in the Danish political environment which leads to a split, low-key policy line. It is not a question of Denmark rejecting the ESDP *en tout*, but rather that the Government has supported the general ESDP process since 1995 and would like to join it fully but is prevented from doing so due to the defence exemption which is based on a different logic from its own. Diverging views on the role of the EU vis-à-vis the US since 2000 may give rise to different emphases in relation to the ESDP, which will, however only have noticeable policy effects if the defence exemption is lifted.

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<sup>17</sup> In this I have presented it as if one or the other was dominant within the Government. However, these two variants of the essential cooperation discourse both have their strongholds. While the 'original' Essential cooperation discourse is dominant within the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defence, the new variant appears stronger in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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**Carl-Einar Stålvant\***

Swedish National Defence College

## Widening the Circle: Shifting Mentors and Partners

### Introduction

Contemporary European security and defence policy is shaped by a number of different but also contradictory forces. Many contributions to this volume underscore the strategic significance of three perspectives: the rise of global threats, an altered security environment after the dual enlargements of NATO and EU, and prolonged tension in transatlantic relations. They impact on the unfolding menu of national choices. To this I would also like to add a fourth principal element: the enhanced importance of societal security. Modern societies are accompanied by manifold and new risks and vulnerabilities embedded in most walks of life. The prospects of both man-made and natural disruptions entail concrete consequences for human security and safety.

The Europeanization of the traditionally secluded domestic realm of national security affairs adds another dimension to the *security problematique*. European matrixes of coinciding and contradictory interests do not fall into a simple pattern. Each new party in a multilateral club or union increases the number of coalition combinations. The entry of sub-national actors that lend voice to new issues and relationships expand the range of trade-offs and outcomes.

I would like to ponder these perspectives from two angles. Firstly, to shift the focus to the European sub-regional level and to clarify interrelations with the wider setting. Secondly, they also provide an opportunity to introduce Swedish security policies in the *tour d'horizon* of individual countries. Integration and EU studies have yielded a good notion for accumulated achievements. Taking the *acquis* of Baltic Sea regional co-operation as a point of departure and as a benchmark for observing change, several traits in the unfolding political landscapes could be easier to discern, describe and evaluate.

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\* Carl-Einar Stålvant is senior lecturer in political science at the Swedish National Defence College.

The title “widening the circle”, then, alludes to a shift in the dialogues between governments. Unfolding national decisions are framed within more prestigious international decision-making arenas within a set up of constellations that transcend the confines of Baltic Sea co-operation. Choice situations are shaped by the confluence of geopolitics and organizational politics in constant flux. It is fair to admit that such a perspective could also harbour a slight Swedish bias and a Stockholm - centric fixation point. This is justified, however, in an overview of how Baltic Sea states adjust their policies with regard to European defence and security. In a security situation where the options are less constrained countries enjoy the benefit of choosing friends and engagements of their own liking.<sup>1</sup> In this respect Swedish positions are also moving, adding another piece to the composite pattern.

Moreover, the significance assigned to the objective of stabilising developments in Northern Europe in the post-socialist crises and during the years of transition was a concern managed with much success by the national governments concerned and by Brussels. After enlargement and NATO expansion, a “new neighbourhood” beyond the immediate vicinity area and Baltic Sea littoral states implies new geographical distinctions of the external environment and a new approach to the framing of policies.

So, the article is divided into four sections. Firstly, what factors revived and launched Baltic Sea regional co-operation and how should one characterize its nature? Secondly, what are the landmarks on the path towards enhanced Baltic Sea co-operation in the security and civic protection fields? Thirdly, how has Swedish security and defence politics been adapted with regard to developments in adjacent areas and by commitments entailed in EU membership? And lastly, what are the ramifications for European defence and security when regional security is downplayed and not very topical? What does a more diversified external and internal environment mean for the Baltic Sea states individually and as a group??

## 1. A Regional Baltic Sea Perspective

In the Baltic Sea Basin popular contacts and commerce suffered from the Cold war division. Only early in the 1970s did a very modest degree of regional co-operation

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<sup>1</sup> While stating the case of a traditional power-related understanding of politics, the new European environment still entails a freedom of choice. See Hyde Price A., “European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force”, *European Security* 13, 4, 2004, p. 323-343.

emerge as a rational response to shared environmental problems.<sup>2</sup> Two conventions were signed, one on the management of fisheries and one on the environmental protection of the Baltic Sea. These two Baltic Sea Conventions were among the few instruments and negotiated relations that were not affected by negative spill-over from worsening political and military relations in the early 1980s. Evidently they embodied both a symbolic and substantial value, although within very limited fields.

In the late 80's a region- building process took speed. It yielded concrete and successful results despite turbulent conditions. The process required a wider appreciation of international relations, and of the individual states and nations that make up the formation. Systemic shifts in European politics provided the background for the regional revival, inspired by long-term historical analogies and driven by immediate environmental concerns. The story of Baltic Sea co-operation is filled with entrepreneurial spirit and direct networking. Popular movements and associations, corporations and public authorities, local communities and civic interests, both stimulated the growth of the region and gave shape to some of its institutional and substantive innovations.<sup>3</sup>

Formal high level Baltic Sea co-operation, once initiated in 1992, had some difficulties in establishing itself and carving out a role. As Jacek Starosciak, the first head of the Council of Baltic Sea States' (CBSS) secretariat noticed in an overview of the first five years: A large number of state actors on different levels of governance proliferated. They have left strong imprints on the forms and modes of Baltic Sea co-operation. Organisations and networks constitute a web that brings Baltic Sea countries together and their shifting relationships have an effect on the Council and its work.<sup>4</sup>.

In conjunction with the wider changes in the European security environment, a window of opportunity opened. A pattern of interlocking institutions and graduated statuses of membership gave impetus to and guided European security developments. The unfolding "géometry variable" had according to many observers a particular

<sup>2</sup> Johnson, B. "The Baltic". Churchill R., et al. ed: *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*. Collected papers I-III, 1973, New York: Oceana Publications. These papers were the first in a series of yearly volumes monitoring the Law of the Sea regime.

<sup>3</sup> An inventory of initiatives and actors can be found in Stålvant C- E., *Actors around the Baltic Sea*. An inventory, Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs., 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Starosciak, J., *The Council of Baltic Sea States*. SCHIFF- texte no 56, Schleswig.- Holsteinisches Institut für Friedenswissenschaften an der Christian- Albrechts Universität Kiel, 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Joenniemi P. and Stålvant C-E., *Baltic Sea Politics*, NORD, the Nordic Council, 1995, p. 30. For a critical review of academic and political uses of the terms soft and hard security, see Knudsen O. F. "Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region", Chaillot papers no 33, Paris: Institute for Security Policy, 1998, p. 47-50.

density in the North. A number of specific institutional innovations were created. As Bo Huldt has remarked, the transformation of the region was much in the hands of the smaller states- possibly a historically unprecedented record.<sup>5</sup> Germany and Russia were preoccupied with drastically changing domestic conditions. A benign engagement on part of outside powers was also helpful. In a bird's eye view it seems that very many basic interaction characteristics and trajectories for the region's path were established quite early.

A number of distinguishing features and landmarks are discernible, aptly summarized in the following section.

## 2. Tracing Baltic Sea Co-operation Features and Landmarks

- Regional Baltic Sea co-operation became a framework of action of great appeal for governments and private actors alike. It proceeds on several levels: While intergovernmental multilateralism is a core feature of the CBSS, much of the dynamics is sustained by sub-regional actors, public and private, in grand scale reaching across old borders.
- There is a general agreement that during this period of transition regional members, and in particular the smaller states successfully managed stability and security.<sup>6</sup> The Nordics were successful in offering assistance and in diffusing political and economic norms- a form of soft power projection - while offering incentives for co-operation and making investments. Hence, Baltic sea co-operation became a means for projecting stability within a wider web of international competition and rivalry. Not so few items and policies that later have been advanced by EU assistance programmes were initiated and probed in this regional context - but on a modest scale and without the EU clout and conditional membership promises.
- The distinction between high and low politics impacted on governments' appreciation of the nature of the European strategic

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<sup>5</sup> Huldt B., "The post-Cold War Transition in the Baltic Sea Region: A decade of Small State Activism", in *International Security in a Time of Change: Threats, Concepts, Institutions* Festchrift für Daniel Adam Rotfeld, ed. by Giessmann H., Kuzniar R., Lachowski Z. In Serie Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden no. 164, Baden-Baden, NOMOS, Verlag, 2004, p. 392-406.

<sup>6</sup> The Baltic Sea Choir- Still in Concert?, Conference Report, Swedish National Defence College, 2005.

environment. Regional policies were obviously framed on the logic of *a dual agenda*.<sup>7</sup> Very early civilian security concerns of a non-military nature became a strong driver sustaining reform and increased interactions. Much support was lent to prop up other civilian order-maintaining structures through direct trans-state co-operation and transfer of technical and normative know-how.<sup>8</sup> However, improvements in civil security and less threatening military contingency postures notwithstanding, more traditional security concerns regarding the Baltic States were also evident throughout the 1990s. For example, there was a widely shared appreciation of the vulnerable situation of the three small Baltic States that prompted many donor governments to assist in helping them build-up their military security capabilities and to co-operate in the military and defence fields. Sweden stepped up its profile by framing a program for security enhancing support and the transfer of equipment and know-how for three battalions.

- A different type of game and national utility calculations guided national governments when strategic possibilities were opened by reforms in European and Atlantic institutions, not least with the gradual opening of doors towards enlargement. The core question – the conditions for inclusion in European and Transatlantic structures – brought the diplomatic heterogeneity of the Baltic constellation into the open. But on the other hand the conditional nature of the “open doors” policies of NATO and EU added much ambiguity to the process and raised some question marks about timing and the finalization of objectives. As multilateral negotiations and national preparations for membership either in the EU or NATO dragged on, more pressing threats from areas in the vicinity made inroads on the regional agenda. The new challenges were mainly of two kinds: civic security risks yielded by intensified exchanges and trans-boundary effects, and common problems stemming from the socialist legacy.
- Regional flash points are few although tension in Baltic states – Russia relations are easily activated, be it by the citizenship issue, the border question or by symbolic historical figures of speech. A deal concluded in 2005 between Germany and Russia concerning the construction of a

<sup>8</sup> Stålvant C-E., “Transnational Forces, States and International Institutions: Three Perspectives on Change in Baltic Sea Affairs” in Browning C., ed., *Remaking Europe in the Margins*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 191.

<sup>9</sup> Hubel H. and Gänzle S., “The Soft Security Agenda at the Sub-regional Level: Policy Responses of the Council of the Baltic Sea States”, in Moroff H., ed., *European Soft Security Policies. The Northern Dimension* Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik, 2002.

gas pipeline on the Baltic Sea floor is depicted as another case of big power collusion -a new Rapallo or Tilsit communality of interests - that stir public opinion in the Baltic States.

- All states are engaged in Trans-atlantic political dialogues and economic interrelations. Eight of the Baltic Sea Riparian are members of EU while five belong to NATO. Russia is a strategic partner to EU and a privileged partner in the NATO-Russia Council. Iceland and Norway are economically part of the EU internal market.
- The Nordic family of states displays divided and heterogeneous lines of actions with opt-out clauses or reservations with respect to mainstream membership obligations in both organizations. However, differing formal affiliations do not impede these countries for co-operating “as far as possible” with both NATO, PfP, EU- and also the EMU.
- The NATO and EU memberships on part of the three Baltic States and Poland implies
  - they enjoy double membership status - like Germany
  - a big push for transforming the basis of regional co-operation.
- Big region-based international companies and financial institutions have made major investments and expanded their activities throughout the region by foreign direct investment (FDI), establishment of subsidiaries and mergers and acquisitions of plants. To an increasing extent, economy, finance and welfare issues have become priorities in the CBSS agenda as means to defend and promote regional interests within a competitive Europe
- The many co-operative networks make up a multi-level region of variable contours. This feature is pronounced by the institutionalisation of old and new sub-groupings where for instance co-operation between the Baltic and Nordic countries (the eight) has taken the character of special relations. (“3 plus five”). With EU enlargement another caucus group of the six members emerged with the purpose to consult, prepare and harmonize views before meetings in the European Council.
- NATO and EU entries salved the predominant security concerns of the three Baltic States and Poland. These changes did not necessitate a change in Finnish and Swedish postures of military non-alignment. Regional security concerns, however, have been relegated to the sidelines, as governments have downplayed the risk of armed attacks

from neighbouring states and the rise of global threats.<sup>10</sup> To a certain extent, the stakes have moved beyond internal regional preoccupations to a concern with external threats and international relations more broadly. The much less pronounced image of Russia as a tacit enemy has lessened the motives for Nordic security assistance. Normalisation might well render the Baltic Sea region a less distinct profile in a wider Europe.<sup>11</sup>

### **3. Sweden: a Reluctant EU Member Adapts its Security and Defence Policy**

New and broader trans-national challenges, cuts in the size of military forces and the total costs allocated to defence, EU membership and domestic vulnerabilities in everyday life have prompted fundamental reassessments in Swedish security policy. It took some time, however before a new doctrine was framed and a concomitant restructuring of the security sector was initiated. A comment on three major elements could illuminate the changes in postures and objectives, and give clues to the consequences they might entail for the future course.

#### **3.1. New Security Thinking and the Restructuring of Defence**

The new European security order was much welcome, bringing new opportunity for a peaceful development. It was nevertheless accompanied by new international obligations to act in crisis situations abroad and in peace-making operations. Moreover, biting implications for defence policy were initially stalled. A crisis-torn Russian development suggested that a traditional neutrality guard should be maintained. Only in 1996 made the government an overhaul of threat images and risk assessments by introducing a bill on the restructuring of defence. Sweden thereby joined the trend that prevailed in most other countries and benefited from the so called ‘peace dividend’ that occurred as a consequence of the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. successive reformulations of the national security concepts in Baltic Sea States. Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001, 2004, Sweden 2001, 2004, Latvian National Security Concept 2002, National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia 2001, 2004, Lithuania’s Security and Foreign Policy Strategy 2002. See also Erik Noreen, “Who is afraid of a lost bear? Russian and Estonian Threat Framing after the cold war”, 2005, <http://www.threat-politics.net/index.htm> and Holtom, P., “The gatekeeper “Hinge” Concept” in Smith J., ed., *The Baltic States and Their Region*, Amsterdam- New York: Rodop, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Stålvant, (note 8) p. 198.

It has resulted in a reduction in national defence budgets in Europe of approx. 30 %. As there is no longer any territorial threat, pressures for lowering defence spending have been accommodated in successive decision cycles<sup>12</sup>. Reductions were initially met by not increasing the budget. In the 2004 government bill, the ceiling was actually lowered by three billions kronor.<sup>13</sup> Fiscal constraints coincide with mounting costs for maintaining installations and modernizing forces that were set up to counter an invasion. The new uses of military instruments and coercion strategies require other types of capabilities. Modernization means not only new procurement, but also a major change away from mobilized, stationary forces in the nation's reserve. The transformation into a leaner but meaner and technologically advanced defence set up has been accompanied by a build-up of rapid stand-by forces for international crisis management and expeditionary operations.

It was only in 2002 that four major parties, including the governing Social Democrats agreed on a reformulated doctrine. Having pronounced that Sweden remains military non-aligned, and that the policy of neutrality has served the country well, the text continues:..." For the future it is more evident than ever that security is more than the absence of military conflicts. Threats to peace and our security can best be averted by acting in concert and in self-chosen cooperation with other countries".

The declaration merely codified a development that both openly and discreetly had brought Sweden into the many Transatlantic and European security frameworks created during a decade. But the wordings also lent support to enhancing the role of EU in security affairs by promoting of CFSP and ESDP as national instruments. They also hastened an in-depth reorientation of defence policy and the military. The profile to be is international and interoperable, deployable and flexible.<sup>14</sup>

### **3.2. The EU Factor**

When joining the EU, Swedish politicians were rather mute on eventual security gains, in contrast to Finnish representatives. Economic necessities and opportunities carried more weight. The government and substantial parts of public opinion remained wedded to a cold war strategic culture and policy outlook that took time to change.

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<sup>12</sup> A highly institutionalized five year cycle of defence decisions and a norm of "broad political support" helped to insulate the security sector from more mundane politics.

<sup>13</sup> Swedish Government bill 2004/05:5. Vårt Framtida Försvar, (Our Future Defence). The new amount is set to approximately 37 billion kronor per annum. Stockholm: Government's Printing Office, 2004, p. 229.

<sup>14</sup> Speech by Swedish Minister of Defence, Leni Björklund, in Cartagena, May 23, 2003, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/1202/a/7304>

The oath to unbent neutrality was toned down in many expositions of foreign policy while the value of non-alignment was repeatedly assured.

In order to forestall an eventual framing of a common defense policy - an option that enjoys considerable support among old EU members despite their rivalries, divisive national experiences and strategic outlooks-, military non-aligned Sweden and Finland proposed a formal adoption of the Petersberg tasks. The alternative looked worse: a possible transfer of the mutual defence obligations of the WEU into a solemn Union text. Dissociation from such alliance commitments, and in particular to art 5 in the Atlantic Alliance, is a fundamental fact in Swedish politics. They define and delimit international engagements while expressing the essence of an independent national self-image.<sup>15</sup>

Crises management tasks and Peace support operations won solid endorsement in the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty. When members later endorsed the Helsinki Headline goal and the build-up of a modest military staff, ESDP was on track. 9/11 and the new, assertive American policy of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in conjunction with the divisive invasion in Iraq prompted member countries to explore their common instruments in view of a fundamentally altered international environment. Solana's identification of new trans-boundary and global threats – terrorism, proliferation, WMDs, organized crime, and failed states won general support in the 2003 security doctrine for the EU. By implication these threats and risks were elevated to challenges for Sweden as well. Moreover the complex nature of these insecurities drove a strong Swedish advocacy for integrating military-civilian capabilities in the management of external crises. In the Feira European Council in 2000, EU decided to establish comprehensive capabilities for civil crises management.

The Berlin plus accord in 2003 gave EU access to NATO resources and created an impetus for major EU members to go beyond a rapid response mechanism and develop a proper European concept for Battle groups.<sup>16</sup> Within a very short time, and during the preparation for the 2004 defence policy decision, the concept won wide acclaim by the Swedish security establishment. "Almost too enthusiastic" a leading defence MP explained, hinting that the army was looking for a hard warfare mission once its own territorial defence had become obsolete. Sweden volunteered for serving as Framework Nation in the establishment of a Nordic battle group, and linked to a

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<sup>15</sup> In an answer to a question posed by a Swedish MP, Prime Minister Göran Persson gave a principled exposition of foreign and security policy. "We do not exclude any other form for international co-operation besides agreements on mutual and binding defence guarantees." Records of the Swedish Riksdag, January 30 2004.

<sup>16</sup> UK/France/ Germany food for thought paper Brussels 10 February 2004. In EU Security and Defence. Core Documents 2004. Volume V, *Chaillot Paper* no 75, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005.

British HQ. The Military leadership opted for a national contribution at first but political considerations won the day when Norway and Finland were invited to form a “Nordic group”. Somewhat later Estonia pledged a contribution, expressing its Nordic affinities.

As noted by Arita Ericsson, such ESDP participation with a direct and standing involvement of the defence apparatus is something revolutionary for Swedish security and defence policy. The distinctive character of EU capability requirements, she claims, were at first underestimated but then quickly included in normal working procedures at policy making and defence planning levels.<sup>17</sup>

Sweden co-operates with NATO in international operations and out-of-area. Successes in terms of interoperability and efficiency, however, can barely offset the influence deficit for a non-member. Membership in the EU provides opportunities and lends a certain weight to the influence of a small country. The government's preference, it seems, is to restrain binding collective policies both within the external and external field while accepting the value of a comprehensive EU security governance. By taking part in the Artemis Congo Operation in 2003, Sweden demonstrated its resolve to take part in distant and rapid military operations and to carve out a position in ESDP developments. This fore-front support for the development of the security and defence dimensions of EU is less controversial in domestic politics than for instance EMU and aspects of the internal market policy.

### **3.3. Societal Disruptions and Antagonists**

Although many scholars, including the arch-realist Hans Morgenthau, have made the point that the distinction between internal and external security is like drawing a line of water, the legal and practical manifestations of these state properties are resilient facts of life. For any mature state it was taken for granted that internal security was a contingent means to buttress the defence against outsiders in case of attack. A self-sufficient and non-aligned small state deeply needed to back up its foreign freedom of manoeuvre by a robust society. This was the *leit-motif* between the Swedish planning for *total defence*; a concept that also impacted on defence thinking in the three Baltic States before NATO membership introduced a different strategic set of requirements.

Infra-structural interdependencies and internationalization contain many forces that erode the domestic-foreign marker. A reduced ability of modern states to control and regulate trans-boundary flows and dependencies for good or bad yield

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<sup>17</sup> Ericsson A., “The Europeanization of Defence Policy. The Swedish Case” Mimeo, seminar paper November 24, Forum for Security Studies Swedish National Defence College, 2005.

consequences for security governance. Nils Andrén, a well-known Swedish academic don in security affairs, has coined the term *functional security* as an equivalent to civil protection and societal security. The object is to prop up life-sustaining structures and mechanisms for the normal functioning of society. When hit by disruptions, be it due to natural hazards or man-made intended action, governments are expected to take the lead in framing an adequate response.

The Madrid and London bombings prompted a sudden awareness that also European Union citizens were not insulated from acts of terror. Terrorism as a diffuse threat and as a targeted action blurs the inside-outside dimension and challenges civil-military boundaries in the maintenance of domestic public order. Sweden has ever since 9/11 struggled with the problem of adjusting the politico-legal framework and national competencies for coping with large-scale terrorism.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, recurrent manifestations of extreme weather events, infrastructure breakdowns and a recently articulated fear for an outbreak of pandemic diseases reveal a haunting new spectrum of cross-boundary contingencies.

The costs involved and the methods necessary for restoring society to normalcy, so the argument goes, is quite independent of the causes and mechanisms making disruptions occur.<sup>19</sup> Taken at its face value, the consequences are paradoxical when and if public policy failures override traditional security problems on top of the national agenda.<sup>20</sup> While recent changes in military strategy and technologies have brought the threat of war and the conduct of military operations under restraints and calculated political control, the ramifications of disasters and social or technological ruptures are costly and enduring. Moreover, making things worse or the prospects of deliberate exploitation of catastrophic conditions is not absent in disruption-scenarios.

The solidarity clause inserted in the EU Constitutional Treaty mentions these dual sources of disturbances. Despite ratification hang-ups and the unlikely survival of the text in its present form, the commitment as such is sustained by a political declaration from the European Council.<sup>21</sup> EU competence within the security and civil

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<sup>18</sup> The legal problem has been examined by two public commissions during a four-year period of grace when no changes have been made in the normative stipulations for engaging military force in domestic matters.

<sup>19</sup> Swedish Defense Preparatory Commission. "Säkerhet i en Ny Tid" (Security in a New Era) Stockholm: Government's Publishing Office, 2001.

<sup>20</sup> For a traditional view separating security dynamics and social problems, see Hyde Price A., (note 1) p.323-343. For a post-modern view on linkages to security and shifting supreme interests, see Buzan -B., de Wilde J. and Waever O., *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

<sup>21</sup> Declaration on Combating Terrorism. Brussels, March 25 2004,  
<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/79635.pdf>

protection sector in case of crises situations spans the Union “homeland” with its many constituent territories into external lands. Internal security has lost its domestic focus while foreign threats are regarded as footloose. EU Ministers, in principle, take the same stand as the Swedish government that terrorism is a matter for police and justice cooperation. But members seem to have reinterpreted the Petersberg tasks beyond its original objectives. The draft Constitutional Treaty added that within the ESDP, these tasks could “contribute to the fight against terrorism.”

Europeanization has undoubtedly made inroads across the board of unpredictable risks and insecurities. Its impacts on security and defence was at first hesitant and gradual but has now stepped up in unprecedented ways. For Sweden that traditionally –not unlike Britain- has kept a distance to involvement on the “continent” the reverse attitude represents a silent revolution.<sup>22</sup> The battle group pledge ensures war-fighting preparedness and not only participation in the lower and civilian end of EU instruments.

The observation conjures up new questions. What about the Union partners in the Baltic Sea Basin? Do they encounter the same options and reach similar conclusions regarding ESDP and the solidarity clause? Does diverse and spatially dispersed challenges also spell divided responses? Which options and preferences open up in the leap from co-operative habits fostered by a “small state club” to the many stakeholders in EU institutions?

## 4. Implications of Enlargement

### 4.1. Regional Impacts

NATO expansion and EU enlargement has restructured Baltic Sea regional co-operation in a number of ways. Sub-regional institutions and agreements experience more austere conditions, as public resources are cut and mandates reassessed. Nordic and other friendly donor countries phase out their direct assistance programs. They have been reallocated into less identifiable but more resourceful multilateral schemes. The Nordic policy of cultivating privileged mentor roles has also lost steam as the agenda has tilted towards infra-structural and economic management. The implicit division of labour in sustaining the efforts of a particular Baltic state neighbour has evaporated. Sub-group unity is also less apparent among the three Baltic States. The utility of the Baltic Council is debated. The joint Baltic Battalion BALTBAT ended after ten years of operation, because it has “successfully fulfilled its goals”. Launched

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<sup>22</sup> Ericsson A , (note 17) suggests that the “last bastion” has been merged with fellow-political systems.

as a contribution to peace making services the force won acclaim and international recognition.

NATO entry satisfied the objective of hard security guarantees. EU membership secured access to new markets and enhanced welfare. As a strategic partner in the NATO-Russia Council, Russia has also found a position from where it could monitor non - article V developments to a certain dismay of the new members.

Moreover, EU entry has also reopened an issue of ranks and statuses. Polish politics had a clear Baltic Sea leaning in the beginning of transition- Solidarity was born in Gdansk - and the first foreign visit by a non-socialist Prime Minister went to the Baltic Sea Summit in Sweden, 1990. However, in the preparations for the Nice Treaty, Poland's ascendancy as a regional and major European power was a fact. The weight (27 votes) given to Poland (and Spain) in majoritarian decision-making in the Council is almost on par with Germany. As the simplification formula of the Constitutional Treaty is very unlikely to be taken, Poland enjoys a different standing than the 3+3 minor Baltic Sea EU members.

#### **4.2. A Wider EU - Transatlantic Political Perspective**

As the case for policy convergence on Baltic Sea security issues had lost strength, regional cohesion was open to international issue intrusion and policy realignments under the impact of new policies, rules and agendas.

9/11 and American policy on Iraq unveiled political divisions between old and new Europe in the EU. While pitting uncomfortable security choices on all members this transatlantic rift also had clear ramifications for regional Baltic Sea affairs. Such inter-linkages- and the elevation of regional perspectives to international tables- were exposed on a number of occasions. Denmark followed Blair and Aznar in endorsing US policy in a letter to the Wall Street Journal (Jan 20 2003). In a second letter by the “Vilnius Group”, all three Baltic States joined in, causing the French president to issue a non-diplomatic warning about their immaturity for EU membership and a missed opportunity for “shutting up”. There are also indications that such twisting tactics was not absent from American persuasion campaigns to the extent that it made it clear that NATO entry was not yet a fact of life for these ten states<sup>23</sup>.

The strategic divide also coincided with the EU cleavage concerning the choice of welfare models. Estonian Prime Minister Parts and Tony Blair brought it into the regional agenda by a joint article, claiming support for competition and a downsized

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<sup>23</sup> Albania and Macedonia also joined in although they are treated in a different category of aspiring members.

state. This libertarian model has ever since been pitted against the Franco-German discourse on the merits of responsible welfare states with its clear Swedish appendix.

Having realized their primary objectives with dual memberships, the new members jockey for quite different roles and missions within the two security-providing organisations. But this is not the whole story as these institutional solutions also entail strategic ambiguities - and apprehensions that they could not deliver all desired results. “Big bang” changes seemed to open up a wider menu of choices for regional actors in terms of partners and issues.

Bleak support given to Turkey’s bid for guarantees before the Iraqi war and the sending of more NATO missions out of area rendered the Allies’ pledges less comforting. The Alliance agenda has nevertheless changed to out of area operations and more civilian affairs. A certain convergence with EU priorities is evident as civilian crisis management and rescue operations have been taken on board. In autumn 2005 the Ministers after long debates engaged NATO resources both in the US Katrina clean –up and in helicopter assistance flights after the Pakistani earthquakes.

In a similar manner, the EU vision lost some credibility. The civilizationary zeal that created incentives for reform clearly risk being bogged down into tactical haggling about budgets and advantages within an opaque bureaucratic system. Judging from the set of rules, the structural restraints for a Baltic Sea caucus to wield effective influence are evident. A common standpoint among the eight regional riparian is arithmetically weak within the calculated EU decision –making procedure. They could neither bloc nor win a proposal unless joined by additional countries. This “correlation of forces”- to quote a Marxian idiom- relegate much of regional developments to European decisions in Brussels.

There is a lack of studies of how the new members have customized themselves to EU decision-making and what the prospects are for pursuing common interests. The negotiations for a Constitutional Treaty in 2004 became a first test on the ability of Baltic Sea EU members to harmonize views and policies. A cursory overview of 10 central items revealed that regional cohesion was very low<sup>24</sup> It is only to expect that a similar dose of dissension in economic reasoning would lessen incentives for alignment in the EU game of coalition –building. Another bone of contention has been the EU budget 2007-13 where net payer Sweden strongly supported a low-income ceiling to the detriment of cohesion policies favouring new members. A Swedish-Latvian dispute concerning the rules and conditions for a service producing company to compete and offer services on the labour market of another member state has been

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<sup>24</sup> Stålvant C- E., “Interests, Loyalties and the Lures of Power: Baltic Sea States in future European Governance” in Huldt- Mörtberg Davidsson eds *The New Northern Security Agenda*, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2003.

elevated as a test case to the European Court of Justice. The case has aroused a lot of interest in view of its alleged importance for the work on the EU Service Directive. And one should note that in contrast to the old say by former Finnish President Paasikivi that Moscow is not a county court, Brussels is such a court. Judgements in singular cases could have biting consequences for entrenched national principles .

## Concluding remarks: A plurality of security needs and institutional answers

Poland, followed by the three Baltic States seem to face three strategic choices when responding to a security crises:

- to follow the US lead in a coalition of the willing,
- to lean on NATO and its formal guarantee or
- to strengthen the EU as a security actor by joining the Europeanist wing of the European Union.

It is noteworthy that each alternative could count its pros and cons. “Instinctive Atlanticism” has become a less straightforward and electoral rewarding choice.<sup>25</sup> After all, there was a big difference between Clinton’s open welcome to Riga in 1998 and the security guarded and secluded reception that met president Bush when visiting the city in 2005. Nevertheless these four countries have kept up their open support for the US case in far away operations.

The two non-aligned states face fewer options as they have eliminated the numbers. There is little support for US unilateralism and power politics generally. Joining such a coalition is a non-starter tantamount to joining a bloc with mutual security guarantees i.e. NATO. So, and in contrast to Denmark with its opt out rights from the CFSP and EDSP the EU path has been favoured.

Security interests and issues are somewhat more intriguing when taking the rapidly changing EU security perspectives on Europe into account. CFSP is said to built on three ambitions: effective multilateralism, preventive engagement and global responsibilities.<sup>26</sup> While Baltic Sea regional members might are expected to support the effort to improve relations with and the role of the UN, priorities diverge with respect to the two latter objectives.

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<sup>25</sup> Osica O., “Poland: A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?”, *European Security* 13 (4), 2004, p. 301-322.

<sup>26</sup> Haine J-Y., “The Union Inaugural Adress” in Pilegaard J., *The Politics of European Security* Copenhagen: DIIS, 2004.

*Preventive engagement.* The New Neighbourhood policy is strongly supported by the east European members. The pivotal position of Poland and Lithuania was put to a test early in connection with the disputed presidential election in Ukraine in November 2004. Baltic state activism in Caucasus and in East Balkan states also reveals similar concerns and willingness to export its experience to prospective listeners.

There is little doubt that the next set of states lying in a band further to the East will be a new test ground for European security and stability. New front states that used to be located at peripheral positions appear: next in line is Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus and the Caucasian complex. The implication is not only a forward expansion of the borders, but also a widening of the vital zone of security for the Union. The Union faces a neighbourhood of great differences in economic and social terms. Russia is most reserved and is vehemently resisting the emerging EU policies in the post- Soviet space. The Union is criticized for its unilateral framing of policies and a “conceptual deficiency” in making the new neighbours and Russia “objects” of policies.<sup>27</sup>

What will other Baltic Sea countries do? Take the challenge and work side by side or redefine their roles to provide support to the new Eastern EU members behind the front lines? This might be a commendable course, but so far the prospects have been given rather scant attention. The course suffers from a lack of domestic popular engagement. Neither is there evidence of a self-generated dynamic bottom-up process. This judgement however is gainsaid by a number of decisions taken by the EU Council to prop up support for development assistance and security sector reforms as a part of NNP. But it is more than likely that country roles will be recasted when projecting “lessons of transition” further to the East.

*Global responsibilities.* On this score national choices are intriguing. Even in the case where the Atlanticist path is not followed there are great differences in the build up of a hard EU military force. As a matter of fact, European diversity and geometry variable is very much present in the selection of eligible partners for battle group formation:

- The Nordic Group is a misnomer while Denmark remains at the side-lines while Estonia opts-in.
- Finland has circumscribed its support for the Swedish helm by also linking up with Germany and the Netherlands.
- Lithuania and Latvia are joining Poland and Slovakia, and supported by the Netherlands and Germany.

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<sup>27</sup> Emerson M., *The Wider Europe Matrix*, Brussels: CEPS, 2004.

Although European security policies have progressed in many respects, the outcome is bewildering. I have not dealt in depth with the interrelations in the civic and functional security field where Baltic Sea cooperation has a good record and much to offer other regional formations. The relationship between such regional tables and the overriding European agenda is both vulnerable to policy shifts and supply side solutions, yet hopefully resilient.



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**Hanna Ojanen\***

*Finnish Institute of International Affairs*

## The ESDP and Finland: a Question of Credibility<sup>1</sup>

This paper will depict Finland's view on, and its relationship with, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by using the concept of credibility. Three examples are given of cases in which credibility seems to have played a central role. First, there has been the question of the credibility of Finnish national defence. Second, the credibility of Finland as a non-aligned EU member has been an issue. Finally, there has also been a debate in Finland on whether the mutual defence clause of the proposed Constitutional Treaty is credible or not, and under which circumstances. In all, credibility and the lack of credibility are powerful arguments in political debate. In reality, credibility is, however, always relative.

### Introduction

There are many ways of analysing Finland's relation to the ESDP. In this paper, the concept of credibility is chosen to highlight some of its peculiar features. Finland takes international organisations and agreements seriously and hopes that they deliver. Credibility is very central when assessing them, and when assessing defence-related international organisations in particular. For many – and certainly not only in Finland – the ESDP is a paradigm case of a question of faith. But credibility has two sides to it: while in Finland, the discussion seems to revolve around whether or not the EU is credible enough to "guarantee" Finnish security, it has for a long time been an open question within the EU – and perhaps in some circles still is – whether Finland is a credible member of a common security and defence policy.

To set the context, it is important to point out that the ESDP has acquired increasing significance for Finland in the past couple of years. The centrality of the EU is highlighted in the Security and Defence White Paper of 2004 that says that Finland works to strengthen the EU both as a security community and as an

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\* Dr. Hanna Ojanen is Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on a presentation at the conference 'Contemporary European Defence and Security Policy and the Baltic Sea Region', organised by the Military Academy of Lithuania, Department of Political Science, in Vilnius on 23 September 2005.

international actor. Finland's "line of action" in security and defence policy is said to be based on a credible national defence, the functioning of society, a consistent foreign policy as well as a strong international position and an active participation as a member of the EU.

## 1. Credible Defence

The first sense in which the word 'credibility' enters is in relation to the defence of the country, in this somehow very Finnish way of describing its security policy: credible national defence. It is one based on conscription and territorial defence. Those particularly fascinated by Finnish security policy may also remember the twists over the precise choice of words here: the "independent defence" *à la* 1997 and the "credible national defence" since 2001. Cuts in the resources of the armed forces and defence administration frequently lead questioning the continued capacity of Finland to defend its territory. Yet, what is more seldom articulated is the threat against which the country should be able to defend itself, and how much would be enough.

Yet, 'credibility' is only one word of the core vocabulary of Finnish security debate. Contrary to old times when debate on foreign and security policy was not really encouraged in Finland, there is now a lively debate, even though not always very informative. It tends to be based on home-made concepts that might not be understood outside Finland – if they are understood in Finland in the first place. These include "Nato option", "defence core", "security deficit" and "security guarantees". The presidential elections in January have made the debate even livelier.

Finland would thus aim at having a credible defence, but does it have a credible security policy, and who should believe in it? When Finland joined the EU, the question of credibility was particularly acute. What was questioned was the credibility of Finland as a member of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Here, we have the second form in which 'credibility' appears.

## 2. Finland's Credibility in the EU

Between 1989 and 1992, as many as three ex-neutral, then now non-aligned, countries had applied for EU membership. Some seemed to think that taking them in would imply problems for the new 'common foreign and security policy' that had been established in the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty was already in force when their membership negotiations started, and thus set the scene for them. By the time of its application, Finland redefined its neutrality to fit into the Union. Neutrality was compressed into its 'core' of military non-alignment. But the European Commission

was still worried for eventual problems of incompatibility. In its *avis* on Finnish EU membership in November 1992 (but also on Austrian and Swedish memberships) it noted that military non-alignment can be a hindrance to Finland accepting the Union's foreign policy in its entirety, including the development into common defence. The Commission thus questioned the explicit guarantees that Finland had given on its willingness to accept the whole *acquis* and be an active participant.

Finland emphasised that it joined the EU as a militarily non-aligned country whose credible independent defence capability is an important contribution to the Union's common security.<sup>2</sup> It underlined that it would actively and constructively participate in common policies and specified that military non-alignment does not imply restrictions as to its participation in European cooperation.

Today, one might add, the meaning of non-alignment has been brought close to none at all. It is said to mean, simply, that Finland is not a member of a military alliance. This, in turn, importantly implies that the EU is not a military alliance. In foreign policy, the Prime Minister puts it, Finland is "anything but non-aligned";<sup>3</sup> "[A]s a member of the European Union, Finland is neither neutral nor non-aligned; rather, Finland is committed to the Union's objectives and activities".<sup>4</sup>

In mid 1990s, Finland in fact went a bit further than the others in emphasising the security dimension of the Union. It took the stand that the EU really was a security community where through solidarity among the members the security of each was strengthened. The Finnish government even noted in 1995 that "Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure".<sup>5</sup> Within the EU, one might argue, this was more than what was generally thought the CFSP or the Union could deliver. The EU had only just invented the CFSP and linked itself to WEU. Not many really believed in a development towards a common security and defence policy, after the decades of different views on foreign policy. Finland not only believed but also saw concrete results: quite soon, it was confirmed that membership as a matter of fact had strengthened Finnish security.

There was, however, a credibility gap that stemmed from the distance between the new CFSP and the remnants of neutrality. From this gap ensued the need to show activism. Paradoxically enough, Finland, often together with Sweden, has actually

<sup>2</sup> See Finnish government report on security 1995 (*Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy*), pp. 56-61.

<sup>3</sup> Speech by Matti Vanhanen, Prime Minister, at a seminar on security policy organised by *Kaleva* in Oulu, 16 November 2004. At

<http://www.vnk.fi/vn/liston/vnk.lsp?r=90046&k=fi&old=2079&rapo=2113> (In Finnish.)

<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's Review of Foreign and Security Policy. Abridged from the Prime Minister's speech given at Ylihärmä on 4 April 2004. at <http://www.formin.fi>.

<sup>5</sup> Finnish government report on security 1995, (note 2) pp. 57-58.

brought the defence dimension forward on several occasions. As a first instance one might speculate that even the wording of the Maastricht Treaty took into account the membership applications of ex-neutral countries – a stricter discipline seemed to be needed. Second, by helping with their compromise proposal the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty, they helped the EU take an important step ahead. And, third, they have been generous in their capabilities commitments, perhaps even slightly competing with each other.

Through its actions, Finland showed that it did believe in the EU as a foreign and security political actor. Yet, interestingly enough, it seemingly started to believe less in it once the ESDP really started and the EU set out to become a security political actor.

Incidentally, it was during the Finnish EU presidency that major decisions on EU's own military capabilities were taken. The "Helsinki Headline Goal" was adopted at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999.

There, Finland was perhaps not that active itself, however. As late as in November, the Finnish political leadership still thought that such difficult decisions would be left for later: the Finnish minister for foreign affairs maintained that a concrete decision on troops could not yet be made in Helsinki.<sup>6</sup> As the decision however was taken, a very Finnish way to sweep out signs of what might seem as poor command of the situation was to declare that the decision taken was, in a sense, a Finnish initiative, a continuation of the one on the Petersberg tasks.<sup>7</sup>

Again, for the active and constructive member, the blueprint for European crisis management troops was not a problem. On the contrary, it was now maintained, participation was a good way to further the Finnish aim of efficient crisis management. Moreover, Finland already had the troops necessary for assuming its own part in such a move.<sup>8</sup> Finland also managed to get its representative, General Gustav Hägglund, to lead the EU's new Military Committee from 2001 to 2004.

But, the development did not stop here. It was only starting, and the year 2003 added to the ESDP not only the proof that it was working, the first operations, but also a more principled side. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was approved, and,

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<sup>6</sup> Tarja Halonen on 15 November 1999 in Brussels. This might have prompted the United Kingdom and France in their bilateral summit of 25 November to ask for clear decisions and dates in Helsinki (*Helsingin Sanomat* 26 November 1999.)

<sup>7</sup> See the interview of the late Finnish EU Ambassador Antti Satuli in *Suomen Kuvailehti* 49, 10 December 1999.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g., communication by the Finnish Prime Minister to the Parliament on European security and defence policy on 26 November 1999. ('Kriisinhallinta Suomen puheenjohtajuuskaudella. Pääministeri Lipposen ilmoitus eduskunnalle Euroopan turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikasta. *Helsingin Sanomat*, net edition.)

through the work of the European Convention, also a commitment to mutual defence entered the Constitutional Treaty.

This was where Finland started to have some doubts. Finland even tried to prevent the inclusion of common defence into the draft Constitutional Treaty. It sought for a compromise that would remain somewhere below real mutual defence. The Finnish foreign minister maintained that the Convention's proposals risked splitting the Union and thus weakening the CFSP. Instead, he argued for some kind of an "enhanced solidarity".<sup>9</sup> As an extraordinary measure, Finland convened a group of non-aligned countries (Austria, Ireland and Sweden, that had not been active as a group earlier) to sign a letter in which they proposed a totally different wording for the common defence clause: "If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with art 51 of the UN Charter."

This was for obvious reasons not accepted. Instead, the then presidency country, Italy, drafted a compromise stating that

"[I]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter".

The article adds to the obligation of aid and assistance that "This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States." – something that certainly did not add to the clarity of the Constitutional Treaty.

Now, the reasons for this move can be speculated about. Interestingly, the doubts were formulated as follows: Finland cannot agree to the clause because the EU is not credible, the so-called defence guarantees it offers are not credible. To this, others would note that Finland did not need any "guarantees", since there was no "security deficit". The vocabulary used was, thus, high-flying: it was a question of guaranteeing each others' security. More tangible reasons for rejecting a defence clause were, first, that Sweden and Ireland would have opted out, and, second, that the potential defence burden was feared: in a worst-case scenario, Finland would have to defend the Baltic states against Russia.

Again, Finland wanted to compensate in practice what it might have harmed in theory. It eagerly supported both the battle groups and the European Defence Agency

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<sup>9</sup> "For a genuinely European defence". Address by Mr Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at the Western European Union Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, 2 December 2003. (at <http://www.formin.fi>)

– something that entitled it, again using the Finnish vocabulary, to a seat in the EU's "defence core". As to cooperation in armaments industry, Finland had for some time already been of the opinion that it should be brought into the Union – thus enabling also countries with no significant armaments industry of their own to participate.

And when it was decided in November 2004 to build the 13 Battle Groups, Finland profiled itself as one of the most active countries: it has scarce resources but divides them so that it participates in two groups with a total of some 200, if not even 350 troops, to maximise its presence (or to make the training system smooth). The Nordic neighbours are the ones with which cooperation is easiest,<sup>10</sup> and NATO countries the ones with which it is most interesting.

Here, credibility enters once more in the sense that Finland had to work hard to be recognised as a credible participant in battle groups. It worked against the blueprints of permanent structured cooperation that would have been limited to the most willing and able members only. It also wanted to remove all national hindrances to full participation, notably the requirement of a mandate by the UN or by the OSCE that is still in the Finnish peacekeeping legislation. This requirement will seemingly be dropped for the benefit of the Union's independence and for the possibility of equal participation. Also harmonisation of the rules concerning the use of force is necessary to ensure common ways of functioning, as well as more rapid decision-making at home. This, again, can be seen as a real confession of faith in the EU's ability to act, always in an irreproachable way. It is also a confirmation of the principle that Finland lives by participation.

The latest credibility problem occurred with the Constitutional Treaty when it was voted down in the referenda in France and in the Netherlands. In Finland, this changed the view on the EU security guarantees to a notable extent. Suddenly, the so-called "security guarantees" that the Constitutional Treaty included – despite all Finnish efforts to take them out – would have indeed been credible, had the treaty been ratified. At least some reacted in such a way, saying that now that the security guarantees did not materialise, it would be best to join NATO. These people also recommended joining NATO after the treaty was signed, but that time for the opposite reason: because such guarantees were not credible. For a non-member, Finland has all the time been a remarkably warm supporter of NATO and a firm believer in its capacities.

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<sup>10</sup> The one is composed of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Estonia, the other of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland.

## Conclusions

Credibility, thus, seems to be a core word for Finland. But what is it that makes the EU credible? Some see operational capabilities as the basis of credibility. Others would emphasise independence. The EU has shown operational capability, it has shown solidarity. Is it credible in that it also respects the treaty text and texts such as the Security Strategy? The question is whether there now is broad interest within the EU to develop all this further, and if so, where or how, or, in other words, whether there is a consensus on the EU as an international actor and on the implementation of the ESS.

One also needs to ask what it is that makes a member state credible. Is it the adopting of a treaty text, or participation in common operations? Finland might not have been too credible when it looked for credible commitment, even “guarantees” for security, but was seemingly active in saying ‘no’ to them itself.

In every statement on credibility, there is a built-in comparison. The reason why something is not found to be credible is that there is something else that *is* found credible. Finland is not a credible country compared to other, more credible countries; the EU is not credible compared to more credible organisations. At the end of the day, however, the comparisons often fail. In the case of Finland, it sometimes seems that only the organisations where Finland is not a member, and that it does not know from the inside, continue to enjoy the benefits of credibility.



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**Nina Græger\***

*Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*

## Norway – from Atlantic to European Security?

The paper analyses Norwegian security and defense policy in the 1990s and how Norway has adapted to a new security environment and to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in particular. As a traditionally Atlanticist state with close historical, political and military relations with the US and as a non-EU member, the emerging EU security and defense dimension represented a particular challenge to Norway. The transatlantic split following US unilateralism in the Iraq conflict added to this. It is the overall aim of the paper to analyse the wider implications of these developments for Norway, as well as the country's political and military response to them. The paper is organised around three empirical questions, which are central to Norway's security context: To what degree has the ESDP influenced on Norwegian security and defense discourses? What has been Norwegian authorities' response to the ESDP, both in terms of political and military cooperation? To what extent has the ESDP triggered a breach with the defining concepts and core practices of Norway's security and defense policy?

### Introduction

Norwegian security and defence policy has been anchored in NATO since 1949. During the Cold War there was consensus among political and military elites and the general public that NATO was the primary guarantee for the security of Norway<sup>1</sup>. External events such as the end of the Cold War, the wars in ex-Yugoslavia and 9/11 led to changes in the strategic concept, command structure and tasks of NATO. NATO has transformed itself from a territorial defence alliance into a politico-military instrument with a global reach. Yet NATO is struggling to survive as a relevant security organisation.

The EU, on the other hand, is becoming an increasingly more ambitious security actor, as expressed in a European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the European Security Strategy (ESS). On the other side of the Atlantic, US foreign policy has become less predictable, and more oriented towards global than European security.

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\* Nina Græger is Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

<sup>1</sup> The NGO 'People and Defence' ([www.folkogforsvar.no/left6678l](http://www.folkogforsvar.no/left6678l)) publishes polls twice a year on Norwegian attitudes towards NATO, and more recently also towards the EU, which confirm this picture. In the latest poll 87% responded that 'European security cooperation' is important. In Parliament, only the Socialist Left Party is against Norwegian NATO membership.

These developments have put the future of the transatlantic relations as we know them into question.

Yet, the wider implications of these developments for Norway's security context and policies are only slowly trickling down into the Norwegian discourse. There have been few principal debates about the impact of these events for the traditional Atlantic orientation in Norwegian security and defence policy.

Three main questions will be addressed in this introduction: To what degree has ESDP influenced on Norway's security and defence discourses? What has been the Norwegian authorities' response to ESDP, both in terms of policies and military practices? To what extent have there been adjustments or shifts in the Norwegian discourse, which may represent a breech with the defining concepts in Norway's security and defence policy? In my intervention I will first look at the traditional security context of Norway and the defining concepts in Norwegian security and defence policy, as a background, before I go on to explore Norway's political and military response to the ESDP.

## 1. Norway's Security Context: Defining Concepts

Certain conceptualisations have defined and framed the national discourse and policies and are put to work in the debates about Norwegian security and defence policy. Since World War II, these concepts have been Norway's geographical location, and particularly the proximity to the Soviet Union, NATO membership and the close relationship with the USA<sup>2</sup>.

### 1.1. Bordering Russia – Geopolitics

Norway's border with the Soviet Union and later Russia has been – and to a considerable degree still is – given a particular, geopolitical meaning. During the Cold War, the Soviet military presence and activity on the Kola Peninsula was seen as formative for Norwegian security and defence policy. Consequently, the defence of Norway was concentrated in the north, where the role of the armed forces was twofold: to hold the mountains of northern Norway until NATO reinforcements could

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<sup>2</sup> Græger N., Leira H., "Norwegian strategic culture after World War Two: From a local to a global perspective", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40 (1), 2005, p. 45-66.

arrive, and to make preparations in times of peace to facilitate such assistance<sup>3</sup>. This defence concept defined military career patterns, as well as the discursive limits of the political debate<sup>4</sup>.

Norway's geopolitically sensitive position between two superpowers also generated a consensus culture. This was seen as an assurance, as formulated by former foreign minister and defence minister Johan Jørgen Holst: "for a small country in a vulnerable position . . . disagreement about the main policy lines may become costly"<sup>5</sup>.

After the Cold War the geopolitical and border state arguments were reconstructed with reference to chaos threats and nuclear threats from an unstable Russia<sup>6</sup>, while more recent reconstructions or re-representations of the Russian threat has focused on Russia as a great power. The borders Russia and Norway meet in an area of traditionally great strategic importance to Russia (the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons based on the Kola Peninsula), and a sea area of great economic importance to both countries (oil, gas and fish resources in the Barents Sea), whose jurisdiction is still disputed. As formulated by the Ministry of Defence: "Although Russia does not represent an immediate military threat to Norway today, it is still 'a central framework factor for the formulation of Norwegian security and defence policy'"<sup>7</sup>. These arguments are also central in the debates about national versus international use of the Norwegian armed forces. Especially the agrarian party, the socialist left party and the progress party have expressed the concern that strategic and national interests in Norway's "near abroad" in the North may suffer because of Norway's engagement in international operations<sup>8</sup>.

In order to avoid 'being left alone' with Russia in the north, the Norwegian Government has pursued a threefold strategy: to continue to promote openness and reduce suspicion related to military activity through military contact and cooperation,

<sup>3</sup> Tamnes R., *Oljealder 1965-1995*, volume 6, *The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997, p. 61.

<sup>4</sup> See Foucault M., *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock, 1994 (1972); *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, New York: Pantheon, 1980.

<sup>5</sup> Holst J. J., "Om utenrikspolitikk og Norge", i Johan Jørgen Holst & Daniel Heradstveit, red., *Norsk Utenrikspolitikk*. Oslo: Tano A.S, 1985, p. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Græger N., "Norway and the EU security and defence dimension", in: Græger N., Larsen H. and Ojanen H., *The ESDP and the Nordic countries: Four variations on a theme*, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (UPI)/Berlin, Institut für Europäische Politik, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Government Proposal no. 12, "For budsjetterminen 2004"*, Oslo: MOD, 2003/2004, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> Græger N., "Norway between NATO, the EU and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18 (1), 2005, p. 89-108.

to ‘multilateralise’ the relationship with Russia through NATO and EU cooperation structures and to be able to deter Russia militarily from taking liberties in the disputed area<sup>9</sup>. One major challenge here is that the US has its own strategic interests in this area, whereas the EU seems to have other, more pressing issues to attend to. The recently elected Norwegian government has launched a targeted policy towards the Northern areas in order to state Norway’s interests and demonstrate stronger engagement.

## 1. 2. NATO-Membership

The other defining concept in Norwegian security and defence policy has been NATO membership. After 1990 it was generally agreed that Norway could still best ensure its own security by supporting the common NATO structure and new NATO tasks. In the words of then Defence Minister Godal:

“Norway [is] completely dependent upon both stable and predictable international frameworks and a strong and vital NATO. Through our international participation we contribute to both. If we cannot contribute abroad, then we cannot expect help from abroad should we need it”<sup>10</sup>.

The linkage made here between national defence and international military engagement came to dominate the defence discourse from 2000 and onwards.

The NATO transformation process initiated in 2002 confirmed the rather dramatic transition of the alliance that started back in 1991. Despite this, Norwegian authorities presented military transformation as a “natural” continuation of Norwegian policy and commitment towards NATO (‘alliance solidarity’), of Norwegian engagement policy (‘international solidarity’) and as necessary for the modernization of the armed forces (“interoperability”)<sup>11</sup>. Interoperability also has been a core argument in favour of military reform at home (together with reduced budgets). Support for the transformation process has also been presented as necessary and ‘rational’ in order to ensure NATO’s survival. The latter has become particularly relevant following the US foreign policy priorities since 9/11, and the dynamics of the ESDP.

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<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Defence (note 7).

<sup>10</sup> *Parliamentary proceedings*, Session 2000-01. “Debatter m.v. i Stortingen”, Sesjonen 2000-2001, debate on 13 June 2001, p. 3762.

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Defence (note 7) p. 27.

### 1.3. Norway-US Relations

In a Norwegian security context, the close bilateral relationship with the US has been seen as a precondition for the security guarantee in NATOs Article 5. This is institutionalised in a number of military practices, such as agreements of the pre-stocking of military equipment in Norway (renewed in 2005). The Bush administration's neglect of NATO in relation to the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and US unilateralism in relation to Iraq in 2003 put the existence of a transatlantic security community of shared values into question. Many Europeans felt that US judgements no longer could be trusted<sup>12</sup>.

Foreign Minister Petersen (did not want to dramatise the transatlantic rift over Iraq, however: "Those who seek friends they only agree with, get no [friends] . . . The Alliance is about to put the problems in relation to the Iraq dispute behind it. We disagreed—but now we are in a phase which brings us together: With the objective of building a democratic Iraq."<sup>13</sup> Here, the US-Europe disagreement is imbricated in a friendship discourse where disagreement is seen as a passing phenomenon that does not touch the grounds of the transatlantic relationship per se. The minister called for 'business as usual', both towards NATO and the US: "For Norway it is decisive to contribute to a strengthening of transatlantic relations in the time ahead of us"<sup>14</sup>. The present government has expressed that it will keep up the good US-Norwegian relations but at the same time not hesitate to criticise elements of US foreign policy with which Norway disagrees.

## 2. Norway's Response to the Rise of the ESDP

The Norwegians have voted no to the European project twice; in 1972 and in 1994. Although not an EU-member, subsequent Norwegian governments, of different political colours have promoted a closest possible attachment to the EU. In this context "possible" refers to the government's interpretation of the mandate given by the referendum, as well as to the limits to Norway's participation set by the EU.

In Norway, the EU has traditionally not been considered as relevant in a European - and certainly not in a Norwegian - security policy context. Most Norwegian political and military elites never really believed that the EU would reach

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<sup>12</sup> Cox M., "*Whatever happened to the transatlantic crisis? Or farewell to Robert Kagan*", paper presented to the 5<sup>th</sup> Pan-European conference on IR, The Hague, 9-11 September, 2004, p.24.

<sup>13</sup> Petersen J., "Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse", 27 January. Oslo: MFA, 2004.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

political agreement on a common policy in this area. And even after the European security and defence policy (ESDP) became a reality, the dominant view has been that ESDP would have few direct security policy implications for Norway. As late as 2001 the Norwegian defence minister stated that: “[I]ndependent of the question of Norwegian EU membership, it is nevertheless in Norway’s interest that NATO still appears as the primary forum for Western security and defence policy co-operation”<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, there has been a transatlantic framing of the EU, making the ESDP part of a broader transatlantic policy<sup>16</sup>.

However, the ESDP unleashed a lot of diplomatic activity in Norway. During 1999, the Norwegian government elaborated a strategy that sought influence in the ESDP through a combination of direct claims vis-a`-vis the EU and indirect claims through NATO and bilateral, primarily Nordic, channels. At the outset, the Norwegian approach was set on obtaining the best possible formal arrangements for Norway in the ESDP structures. The government put heavy emphasis on the need for establishing arrangements that would ensure a satisfactory inclusion of the non-EU allies in the new EU structures, modelled on the relationship between NATO and the WEU, and on Norway’s WEU associate membership. The institutional arrangements offered by the Nice European Council in 2000, however, have not attracted the interest of the EU and have not been filled with political substance<sup>17</sup>. This problem is intensified by EU enlargement, where these arrangements are expected to have even less substance and also are facing a very uncertain future.

## **2.1. “Troops-for-Influence” and “Reality checks”**

As regards military participation, the Nice EU-summit decided that non-EU states that contribute with forces shall in principle enjoy the same rights and commitments in the implementation of an EU-led operation (e.g. access to command structures and certain planning and other related activities). Countries with “significant contributions” would get a place in the Committee of troop-contributing nations, which is responsible for the daily running of the operation. In operations where the EU draws on NATO assets the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements between the EU and NATO in principle provide non-EU allies with the right to participate and to exercise operational influence.

Based on the idea that a little influence is better than no influence, Norway was among the first non-EU countries to designate forces (3000-3500 military personnel)

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<sup>15</sup> Godal B. T., radio broadcast debate, ”Her og Nå”, NRK P2, 25 July, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Græger (note 8).

<sup>17</sup> These include meetings between the EU and the five non-EU allies (15 + 5) and the EU and the candidate countries and those five (15 + 15).

to the European force catalogue (Helsinki Headline Goal) and has participated in the Capabilities Commitment Conferences since 2000. This policy was part of an approach to the EU that I have earlier called a “troops-for-influence” strategy, where military contributions are sought converted into political access and influence<sup>18</sup>. This adjustment of strategy from claims to contributions came with the Labour government in 2000. The idea was to stress Norway’s role as an “external ressource” to the EU, rather than as a country seeking “special arrangements” all the time.

Norwegian military and civilian personnel have been deployed to EU missions in Macedonia, *Concordia* and *Proxima*, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). However, Norway’s experience after participating in the EU-operations is that third countries have only marginal influence in the implementation of EU operations<sup>19</sup>.

Norway has learnt the same lesson within another area of EU security cooperation, defence procurement and defence material cooperation. As an associated member of the WEU since 1992 Norway has enjoyed full membership rights in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). On 1. January 2005 this was replaced by the European Defence Agency (EDA). While the EU assured that a policy of openness towards non-EU states who are members of the WEAG (Turkey and Norway), the process ended with the formulation that “non-EU nationals may be invited” to participate in certain meetings and programmes. Consequently, Norway (and Turkey) was excluded from force structure planning within the EDA, which could affect Norway’s possibilities to offer relevant military capabilities to EU-led operations. In addition, Norway was excluded from the three Stearing boards and will only be consulted after the meetings.

Despite these disappointments and setbacks – not matter how unrealistic were the initial Norwegian demands – Norway still pursues a policy where support for and the wish to participate in the ESDP is expressed in terms of military and civilian force contributions.

In line with this, the Norwegian Defence Minister, being otherwise known for her pro-US and pro-NATO policies, recommended in late 2004 that Norway accept the invitation to participate in the Nordic EU Battle Group together with Finland, Sweden and Estonia. In the constitutional debates that followed – they always do when Norway’s adjustment to the EU crosses new thresholds - the governemnt assured that “[P]articipation in the EU’s reaction forces is [therefore] a natural continuation of Norway’s active relationship with the development in the EU”<sup>20</sup>, and that it “represents a furtherance of the government’s support to the EU’s security and

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<sup>18</sup> Græger (note 6).

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Defence (note 7) p. 20.

<sup>20</sup> Eidem B. T., ”Norsk deltagelse i EUs innsatsstyrker”, *Aftenposten*, 27 November, 2004.

defence policy”<sup>21</sup>. The idea here is not to raise the EU debate, which complicates things utterly.

As regards influence, Norwegian officials have expressed new hopes that participation in the Nordic EU Battle Group will provide better access to the ESDP. This is related to the fact that there will be parallel decision-making structures, which could imply that Norway will at least have access to information, but not influence, in the “upstream” planning of an operation, and not just in the “downstream” part of it (offering and deploying forces), which is the case today. Whether this is going to materialise, however, remains to be seen.

## Concluding Remarks

NATO is still the cornerstone of Norway’s security and defence policy. The close relationship with the US is continuing, albeit more criticism against US foreign policy decisions that are in conflict with those of Norway is expected to be voiced, as in relation to the Iraq war. Deviant positions may also be reflected in military practices, such as the recent decision to withdraw the Norwegian forces from Iraq before 2006. To some extent, the ESDP has “europeanised” the Norwegian security discourse and military practices.

The EU’s demand for multilateralism and for a UN mandate for military interventions are central elements in the Norwegian foreign policy tradition. Consequently, the EU is likely to become increasingly more relevant to Norway as a framework for conducting future operations, alongside the UN and NATO.

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<sup>21</sup> Ministry of Defence, ”Avtale om EU-innsatsstyrke signert i Bryssel”, *Press briefing* no. 18, 23 May, Oslo: MOD, 2005.

**Kęstutis Paulauskas\***  
Vilnius University, Lithuania

## The Euro-Atlantic Dilemma of the Baltic States\*

This paper discusses the opportunities and challenges the Baltic governments face after their nation states became member states of both NATO and the EU. The paper explores the reasons behind the pro-American sentiments of the Baltic political elites, while maintaining that they have (somewhat misguidedly) paid too little attention to the development of CFSP. The author makes the case that a stronger EU's security and defence role is very much in the interest of the Baltic States. The author prompts Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius to reappraise their approach towards CFSP and ESDP, to internalise the EU in their strategic thinking and to become normal and credible member states instead of "a special case".

### Introduction

From 1995, the Baltic States have built their foreign and security policies upon three principles: Euroatlantic integration, regional cooperation, and good relations with Russia and other CIS countries. These principles bore fruit in 2004. Paradoxically, the Baltic States now face a more complex agenda. While today the place of the Baltic States in Europe is assured, they have yet to define their specific role within the EU in general and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in particular. EU and NATO membership were clear strategic landmarks that drove the foreign and security policies of the Baltic States during the past decade. The new agenda will have no clear landmarks and will extend over decades to come.

This paper seeks to address a widespread myth that the Baltic States are stubbornly pro-American and inherently CFSP-skeptical. The paper contends that the strategic mindset of the Baltic political elites is more complex and multifaceted than this myth suggests. The political leadership of the Baltic States had long perceived membership of the EU and NATO as two compatible strategic objectives and seen the Western community they aspired to join as a single entity. They acceded to the two

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\* Kęstutis Paulauskas is a graduate student of the Institute of International Relations and Politics, University of Vilnius.

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organisations at a time when transatlantic relations were shattered by the war in Iraq. Political elites in the Baltic States increasingly see their foreign policy in the light of a dilemma between the support for the “certain idea of Europe”, *Europe puissance*, and support for the Atlanticist idea of Europe as a pillar of NATO. This paper explains how the Baltic political elites see their strategic environment and why they consider the strength of the transatlantic link as vital to their security.

The Baltic States have yet to find their niche in the defence structures and policies pursued by both the EU and NATO. The three countries have long been seen as a security problem and a would-be burden for the Western security and defence institutions. Their military capabilities were sometimes ridiculed, and defensibility often questioned.<sup>1</sup> The Baltic States now seek to prove their critics wrong and become a part of the solution by providing tangible civil and military contributions to the activities of both the EU and NATO.

The concluding section of the paper will discuss the possibilities the Baltic States have to maintain the delicate balance between their close alignment with the United States (US) and the desire to be “good Europeans” in the eyes of Brussels. The paper will make the case for reappraisal of the EU in the strategic thinking of the Baltic leadership.

## 1. The Puzzle of the Strategic Triangle

Popular myth holds it that the Baltic States, as well as most of the other Central and Eastern European countries, have a pro-American and anti-Russian mindset. They tend to rely on the US-led NATO Alliance as their primary security guarantor, while being lukewarm towards CFSP and even trying to obstruct its development, serving as America’s “Trojan horse” in Europe. This myth was reinforced by the war on Iraq, which gave rise to heated debate about the division between “old” and “new” Europe. This narrative oversimplifies a more complex reality and, in certain respects, is plainly wrong. This section attempts to reappraise the place of the Baltic States in the transatlantic security dialogue and the role they play (or could play) in the pursuit of truly common European foreign, security and defence policy.

Throughout the 1990s, the foreign and security policies of the Baltic States were driven by the urge to dissociate from the past of the Soviet occupation and become an

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<sup>1</sup> Dalsjo R., ‘Are the Baltics defensible? On the utility of and prospects for a capability for self-defence’, *RUSI Journal*, London, 1998.

integral part of the Western community. Grazina Miniotaite eloquently captures the importance of the East/West opposition to the Baltic States<sup>2</sup>:

*The Baltic States [...] have been creating narratives of belonging to the West, with the East as their threatening ‘other’. The West is being associated with prosperity, security and democracy, whereas the East is linked with poverty, unpredictability and insecurity. Positive identification with Europe is accompanied by dissociation from non-Europe, with the emphasis on Russia’s threats.*

The EU and NATO for the Baltic leaders were two sides of the same coin. Membership in the EU symbolised political, cultural and ideational reunion with Europe as well as economic and social prosperity, whereas membership in NATO was seen as the most efficient “hard” security guarantee against perceived military threats. The buzzword for NATO-EU security cooperation at the time was ESDI – European security and defence identity *within* NATO. Semiotics was important for the Baltic States: it was always about *Euroatlantic* not simply *European* integration.<sup>3</sup>

The Baltic leaders, however, could not foresee that they would join a qualitatively different Euroatlantic community from the one they aspired to join in the mid-1990s. The launch of a more autonomous European security and defence policy (ESDP) in 1999 at least nominally made the EU a defence actor in its own right. In the aftermath of 9/11, Russia became an important ally for the US in the war against terrorism and the NATO-Russia Council was created. In 2003, NATO went “out of area” after it took over the ISAF mission from the UN. NATO also transferred missions in FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the responsibility of the EU. These rapid changes in the global and European security architecture were already complex enough for the Baltic leaders to fully apprehend, but the diplomatic rift over the Iraq war between the US and France and Germany was a nightmare.

As a result of these “tectonic” shifts, the Baltic States have joined the two organisations with a somewhat more complex “mental map” from the one they had in the nineties (see Scheme 2). The US and NATO and the EU are no longer seen as two sides of the same coin, but as separate actors with sometimes conflicting interests. Russia has become a “strategic partner” for both the US and the EU. The idea of the European security identity within NATO has never materialised and is already being replaced by a more balanced EU – US strategic dialogue.


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<sup>2</sup> Miniotaite G., “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities : A decade of transformation in the Baltic States”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs”, 16, 2, 2003, p. 214.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, member of the European Parliament, 24 May 2005

The Baltics see themselves as being stranded in the strategic triangle with no easy way out. Their best bet, as they see it, is the survival of the transatlantic link as epitomised by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Any other strategic configuration: either the EU aligning with Russia against the US or the US aligning with Russia against the EU would undoubtedly bring new troubles to the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. What further complicates this puzzle for the Baltic leaders is that both the bigger EU member states and the US seek to have special relations with Russia, albeit for different reasons. These relations could potentially jeopardise the vital security interests of the Baltic States if the transatlantic link breaks down irreparably.

Scheme 1. The “mental map” of the Baltic decision makers.



Notwithstanding the dramatic changes over the past few years, the Baltic States continue to perceive their close partnership with the US as vital to their security for a number of reasons. The US (despite taking part in the Yalta agreements) formally never recognised the occupation of the Baltic States.<sup>4</sup> The oppressed nations saw more hope in the American *Realpolitik* of destroying the “evil empire” than in the Western European *Ostpolitik* of engaging the Soviets. In the post-Cold War situation, the Baltic States sought to rely on the support of the US when it came to withstanding the provocations or outright pressure of Russia. The US was among the most ardent

<sup>4</sup> For example, after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution declaring that the Final Act would not affect the continuity of US recognition of the independent Baltic States.

supporters of Baltic membership in NATO amidst widespread hesitance among the Western European countries.

The EU's lack of a viable defence dimension led the Baltic countries to believe that the EU would be unwilling or simply not able to repel a major aggression had Russia re-emerged as an expansionist and revisionist regime. Conscious or not, "myopia" towards Russia is undermining the credibility of the EU as a strategic actor in the eyes of the Baltic States and other Central and Eastern European countries inside and outside the EU's borders. It is the factor that pushes them towards a closer alignment with the US on certain strategic matters, especially those concerning European defence – an area in which the EU seeks to become a more prominent actor. Toomas H. Ilves argues that if some old member states resented the Central and Eastern European countries' pro-American attitudes, the new members view the old members' approach to Russia in a similar way. And this is, according to Ilves, "the crux of internal EU relations in the realm of CFSP".<sup>5</sup>

The US has been reinforcing Baltic pro-American sentiments with high-profile diplomatic gestures. During his visit in Vilnius in 2002, George W. Bush declared: "anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America". The Baltic States have never heard anything remotely similar from any of the Western European leaders. In sharp contrast, Jacques Chirac made his infamous comment on the Vilnius group communiqué<sup>6</sup> supporting the war on Iraq: "they missed a good opportunity to keep quiet".

All in all, if there were a serious contingency in the Baltic neighbourhood, the Baltic leaders would most likely first dial Washington's number, not the Brussels' one. Not surprisingly, the Baltic States fully supported the US before the Iraq war. Lithuania was among the initiators of the Vilnius declaration in February 2003. The Baltic States did not perceive their decision as anti-European - the EU itself did not have a clear policy line towards the issue and many among the old members supported the US decision to go to war. In the end, the choice of the Baltic States to send troops to Iraq was based on a rational calculation: the Baltic States had to assist their most important strategic ally if they expected this ally to help them in times of trouble.

However, the alleged Baltic pro-Americanism does not go far beyond "hard" security issues and relations with Russia. The importance of latter factor is also fading, because, as argued earlier, any military clash between NATO and Russia is unlikely if not unthinkable. Apart from America's moral support on the historical question of the occupation of the Baltic States, there is little the US can offer the Baltic States in other

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<sup>5</sup> Ilves H. Toomas, 'The Pleiades Join the Stars: trans-Atlanticism and Eastern Enlargement', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, forthcoming.

<sup>6</sup> 'Statement of the Vilnius group countries', available online: [http://www.urm.lt/view.php?cat\\_id=9&msg\\_id=1791](http://www.urm.lt/view.php?cat_id=9&msg_id=1791)

areas of crucial importance, such as the economic and social development or their dependence on Russian energy supplies. In the case of the Eastern neighbourhood (with the notable exceptions of Russia and South Caucasus) due to objective historical, economic and geographic reasons the EU has stronger vested interests and, therefore, is a more active player than the US. The Baltic States are also of no particular strategic importance for the Americans in terms of their number one priority – the war on terrorism. The Baltics were hardly even mentioned among potential candidates for the global realignment of the US defence posture. Meanwhile, the importance of the EU to the Baltic States in political, economic and social spheres will continue to grow. These are some of the reasons why the Baltic leadership should reassess their sceptical approach towards the development of the CFSP.

## 2. Reappraising the CFSP

The importance of the EU in the life of ordinary Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians as well as their governments has rocketed since accession. The Baltic governments have already synchronised their schedules with those of the European institutions. Economic cooperation with the EU was of the utmost importance for the Baltic States in their quest to diminish all-around dependence on the Russian economy. For example, in 1996, Lithuania's imports from and exports to the EU stood at 45 percent and 38.5 percent respectively. Imports from the CIS constituted 32.2 percent and exports 39.3 percent of total Lithuanian foreign trade. By 2004, the trend had been reversed. Lithuania has boosted its trade with the EU: imports from EU stood at 63 percent and exports to EU at 66.4 percent of the respective totals in 2004, while share of trade with the CIS has significantly dropped (imports – 16.1 percent, exports – 26.9 percent in 2004)<sup>7</sup>. The trade dynamics have been similar in Latvia and Estonia.

The growing importance of the EU to the Baltic States has been strongly reflected in the public mood. The inhabitants of the Baltic States expressed clear commitment to the European project in overwhelming support for the membership of their countries in the EU: 91.04 percent voted “yes” in Lithuania, 67.49 percent in Latvia and 66.8 per cent in Estonia in 2003. By the end of 2004, 69 percent Lithuanians, 52 percent Latvians, and 40 percent Estonians considered membership in the EU “a good thing” (the EU-25 average was 56 percent)<sup>8</sup>. In addition, Lithuania became the first EU member state to ratify the EU Constitution. Latvia did so immediately after the failure of referenda in France and the Netherlands.

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<sup>7</sup> Statistics Lithuania, available online: <http://www.std.lt/web/main.php>

<sup>8</sup> Eurobarometer 62: public opinion in the European Union, December 2004, p. 8

Public support in the Baltic States for the common foreign, security and defence policies is also more than significant and surpasses the average of the EU-25 (see table 4). Even in decision-making on European defence policy, inhabitants of the three countries are ready to give a stronger say to the EU institutions than to the national governments or to NATO (see table 5).

**Table 4: Support for common foreign, security and defence policy**

	<b>Common foreign policy</b>		<b>Common security and defence policy</b>	
	For	Against	For	Against
Estonia	70	18	84	8
Latvia	71	14	85	6
Lithuania	71	6	81	5
<b>EU25:</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>14</b>

Source: Eurobarometer 62: public opinion in the European Union, May 2005, pp. 117-119

**Table 5. Decision making regarding European defence policy**

	<b>EU</b>	<b>National governments</b>	<b>NATO</b>
Latvia	50	20	16
Estonia	58	15	16
Lithuania	49	16	17
<b>EU25:</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>

Source: Eurobarometer 62: public opinion in the European Union, May 2005, p. 121

The accession negotiations on the CFSP chapter were fast and smooth for all three countries. The Baltic States did not have any problems in adopting the CFSP *acquis*. In practical terms, even before enlargement, Baltic diplomats were aligning themselves with the EU positions on all of the global issues on the agenda of the UN, be it the Kyoto protocol, the ABM treaty or the International criminal court. Yet, when it comes to the question of cohesiveness of the CFSP, the Baltic governments do not seem to share the public sentiments. Baltic diplomats thus far have tended to prefer intergovernmentality and consensus principles as modus operandi of the third pillar over supranationalism and qualified majority voting. The Baltic elites still cannot get rid of persisting if unvoiced fears that the development of the CFSP could somehow infringe on the future of the transatlantic link.

In fact, a strong CFSP will not kill the transatlantic relations, but a weak CFSP is undermining Baltic security interests vis a vis Russia. Intergovernmentally driven CFSP may guarantee more autonomy for the Baltic decision makers but it by no

means guarantees more weight and success in relations with Russia. It is also naïve to assume that the veto right the small countries enjoy under the consensus principle is a measure they could seriously consider let alone use. The Baltic States should instead put all their energies in support of a stronger, more cohesive and more supranational CFSP. The choice for the Baltic leaders is between pursuing narrow national interests they cannot attain alone and compromising in favour of common interests that have more chance of success.

It would be unrealistic to expect that CFSP could replace the bilateral relations that individual member states pursue vis a vis Russia<sup>9</sup> (or any other country, for that matter). However, a stronger CFSP based on commonly agreed goals and principles would both diminish the necessity to pursue national interests bilaterally and increase the likelihood of attaining them. Europe speaking in one strong voice would have more chances of success than a chorus of 25 soloists. It is much more difficult for Russia to deal with the EU institutions (be it the Council, the Commission or the Parliament) based on the common goals of all member states, than to pursue bilateral relations with individual countries. Not surprisingly, the Russian media rejoiced after the French voted “no” to the Constitutional Treaty<sup>10</sup>, one of whose objectives was to give the EU more weight in international affairs.

The Baltic States have a vital stake in the success of the European idea. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands was therefore a worrying development they could not possibly welcome. Although, the worst case scenario – the return to power politics in Europe, which would plunge the whole of Central Europe back to the status of a buffer zone and a playground for the big powers – does not seem likely, the global strategic equation remains uncertain. The Baltic leaders can neither cheer the idea of the *multipolar* world advocated by some European leaders, nor should they be happy with the *unilateralism* of the US, which would defy international norms. In a multipolar system, where the balance of power dictates the rules of the game, the smaller countries become what Vladimir Putin once described as “expendable change” referring to the situation of the Baltic States during the interwar period.. By the same token, whenever multilateral norms of international law collapse, the small states are the first to suffer. For example, after the US invasion of Iraq that came at the expense of multilateralism, Russia was quick to include the possibility of pre-emptive strike into its own strategic planning – a move with which the Baltic decision makers were hardly happy. Only some sort of *restricted unipolarity* could best accommodate the security concerns of the Baltic States.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with an EU official, 25 May 2005

<sup>10</sup> See, for example: Yusin M. ‘The French said “no” to senseless enlargement of the European Union’, *Izvestia*, May 31, 2005 (in Russian)

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have yet to develop a clear long-term vision of what shape the CFSP should take in the future and pursue their foreign and security policies accordingly. So far, the predominant feature of these policies was ad hoc decision making without reflecting much on the future implications of their choices. The initiatives of the Baltic States would be more likely to succeed if they had at least a few older members on board. To do that, they have to follow the overall agenda of the EU and actively support the other countries when it matters to them. Although the Baltic States are very active in the Council meetings when relations with Russia or other Eastern neighbours are discussed, they tend to disappear during any other discussion<sup>11</sup> that may be of utmost importance to other members or even the whole EU. Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania hardly has an elaborated opinion on the negotiations with Iran or the future of the arms embargo on China.

If the Baltic States do not change this approach, there is a danger that the other members will see them as “one issue countries”. Admittedly, adapting to life inside the EU, learning the rules of the game and procedures devour most of the time and energy of the Baltic representatives in the EU. It is therefore natural that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are as yet unable to take full part in all of the EU policies. But there is a growing awareness that “Africa will have to be important to us, if we are to be important in the EU and if we expect support for our Eastern neighbourhood initiatives”.<sup>12</sup>

Every EU country wants the CFSP to become the policy it wants. Constant compromises may not be the most optimal way forward, but it is arguably the only way if the EU is to have a common policy towards the outside world. Therefore, the Baltic States and other new EU members should be more sophisticated and avoid pursuing their national interests too aggressively. For example, notwithstanding the success of the mission of the Polish and Lithuanian presidents in Ukraine during the “Orange Revolution”, the Chairman of the European Parliament Joseph Borrell criticised both countries for acting as “a “Trojan horse” for the United States”.<sup>13</sup> The older members of the EU were not happy to take a back seat during a major crisis in Europe. They also seemed reluctant to alienate Russia by meddling in what they regarded as the Russian backyard. New members, including the Baltic States, will have to learn to take into account differences of interest and political sensitivities existing among the 25 members of the EU. By the same token, the older members

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with an EU official, 25 May, 2005

<sup>12</sup> An interview with Rytis Martikonis, Deputy Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the EU, 25 May 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Paulikas, Steven ‘A House Divided: the Orange Revolution is carving new fault lines between Old and New Europe that have nothing to do with war in Iraq’. *Newsweek International*, online edition: <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6830803/site/newsweek/>

themselves still need time to start treating the newcomers seriously. The EU will have to recognise that being unable to always act by consensus and timely on all issues in some cases it will have to rely on the leadership of individual states, which will not necessarily be the major powers, and back them with its political and financial weight.

### 3. Adding Value to the ESDP

There is a persisting fear among Baltic decision makers that the ESDP project could be detrimental to the transatlantic link that NATO represents. In other words, they do not take an autonomous EU defence role for granted, fearing it would eventually replace NATO in the European defence architecture. However, they should shed the illusion that the ESDP could represent a sort of an extension of NATO. It is a solely European project, one in an array of measures the EU possesses to pursue its own strategic goals.<sup>14</sup>

Some Baltic diplomats already comprehend that the “big battles are over” and the EU will go ahead with its separate defence structures and military capabilities. However, a stronger EU role will not necessarily undermine the role of NATO in European defence. To the extent the distinction between “Atlanticist” and “Europeanist” camps of EU member states makes sense, enlargement strengthened the “Atlanticist” camp. After all, the United Kingdom itself, as “Atlanticist” as it gets, was the initiator of ESDP together with France in 1998.<sup>15</sup> Despite reservations they may have towards the direction of the ESDP, the Baltic States have already decided that it is better “to sit at the table even if no one would listen” than not to.<sup>15</sup> The question is now what they can bring to that table?

Thus far, during ESDP deliberations, the Baltic representatives focused almost exclusively on the preservation of the NATO-ESDP link, scrupulously trying to get NATO mentioned in any ESDP-related text. Apart from such editorial comments, they contributed little on the substantial matters, including ESDP activities on the ground. For evidence, one only needs to look at the current and previous participation of the Baltic troops in major NATO and EU military operations (see table 6).

**Table 6. Participation of the Baltic States in major military operations**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
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<sup>14</sup> An interview with an EU official, 26 May 2005.

<sup>15</sup> An interview with Rytis Martikonis, Deputy Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the EU, 25 May 2005

<b>ESDP Operations</b>			
CONCORDIA	1 staff officer	2 staff officers	1 staff officer
ARTEMIS*	-	-	-
ALTHEA	<i>1 platoon (~32)</i> <i>1 staff officer</i>	<i>1 staff officer</i> <i>2 military police instructors</i>	<i>1 staff officer</i>
<b>NATO operations</b>			
SFOR**	1 company (~ 100)	1 company (~ 100)	1 company (~ 100)
KFOR***	<i>1 company (~ 100)</i> <i>1 military police unit (22)</i>	<i>1 company (~ 100)</i>	<i>1 company (~ 100);</i> <i>1 platoon (~ 30) within Polish-Ukrainian battalion</i>
ISAF	7 specialists	<i>11 specialists (medical team)</i>	<i>1 provincial reconstruction team (~ 120)</i>
<b>US-led operations</b>			
<i>Iraqi Freedom</i>	<i>1 platoon (32)</i> <i>Staff officers (~ 5)</i>	<i>1 company with Polish contingent (~ 120)</i>	<i>2 platoons with Polish and Danish contingents (~ 110); Staff officers (~ 12)</i>
<i>Enduring Freedom</i>	5 specialists	-	1 Special operations squadron (~ 40)
<b>Notes:</b>			
* Missions in <i>italic</i> are ongoing as of 2005.			
** The three Baltic States were rotating a company size unit (the Baltic Squadron) every six months within a Danish Battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2000-2003.			
*** From 2003 the Danish contingent with the Baltic Squadron has been transferred to KFOR.			

Sources: The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania; the Ministry of Defence of Latvia; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia

Until 2005, the three Baltic States altogether contributed 9 officers to the EU military operations in FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina and none to the operation in Democratic Republic of Congo. Estonia would “boost” its participation in ALTHEA mission by sending 1 platoon in December 2005. Meanwhile, all three countries actively participated in nearly all NATO operations from the mid-1990s, contributing platoon or company-size units. The EU still does not appear to figure in the mentality of the Baltic authorities as a full-fledged military actor.

It would be an exaggeration to talk about “strategic culture” of countries as small as the Baltic States but it would be also wrong to assume that they are nuisance in terms of military capabilities. The Baltic States started from scratch in 1991 – they

had no military equipment, uniforms or even shoelaces to equip the first volunteers with, to say nothing about defence management structures. From this perspective, the progress made during the past 15 years is remarkable. After the Baltic States have been granted the Membership action plans in 1999, Baltic defence establishments pursued an ambitious agenda of defence reforms. Upon NATO recommendations, the Baltic governments decided not to build all-round defence capabilities and focus instead on developing deployable land forces capable of contributing to the full spectrum of operations led by NATO/EU, or ad hoc coalitions. The Navies and Air Forces of the Baltic States retain limited combat capabilities and are maintained for certain support roles, such as search and rescue missions and sea and air surveillance. BALTRON is contributing mine countermeasure capabilities to the NATO maritime forces.

**Table 7. The Armed Forces of the Baltic States**

	<b>Total Armed Forces (conscripts)</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Air Force</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	4 980 (2 410)	4 450	335	95
<b>Latvia</b>	4 880 (1 600)	4 000	620	250
<b>Lithuania</b>	13 510 (3 950)	11 600	710	1 200

Source: The Military Balance 2004-2005, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.47-60

The three countries have to continue their efforts to scale down their oversized territorial defence structures and reorganise them into modern reserves capable of carrying out wider range of missions, including international ones. Also, only Latvia has announced plans to fully professionalise its forces, whereas the Estonian and Lithuanian defence establishment still retain the conscription, although the conscripts are not allowed to participate in the international operations, which is the top priority for all three countries. Modernisation of armaments and equipment should also continue if they are to meet the high requirements of NATO and the EU.

The political elites in the Baltic States have been strongly supporting the development of the Armed Forces. This support resulted in a gradual increase in defence expenditures in the three countries (see table 8) amidst meltdown of the defence budgets in many other EU member states. However, the political elites should

avoid the temptation to reallocate the funds to more popular areas – “free-riding” is not the best way to guarantee security.

**Table 8. The defence expenditure of the Baltic States\***

	<b>2001</b>		<b>2002</b>		<b>2003</b>	
	<b>US\$m</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>US\$m</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>US\$m</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	67	1.2	99	1.5	172	2
<b>Latvia</b>	75	1.0	113	1.3	194	1.9
<b>Lithuania</b>	215	1.8	247	1.8	342	1.8

Source: The Military Balance 2004-2005, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.353 - 354

The success of the defence reforms in the Baltic States reflects on their increasingly active participation in international operations. However, this activity thus far manifested itself in a peculiar form. While the Baltic States tended to participate in several operations at a time, in many cases the actual contributions were limited to platoon size units or even 1 staff officer. Although such participation puts the flag of the country on the map, from the point of view of military expediency it does not make much sense. All three countries have therefore undertaken commitments to NATO to prepare far more substantial contributions - deployable battalion-size units (some 1000-1200 troops).<sup>16</sup>

All three countries have taken active part in both “coalitions of the willing” in Afghanistan and Iraq (see table 6)<sup>17</sup>. From 2002-2004, Lithuania was among the handful of Allies whose special forces carried out expeditionary tasks, including combat, during the operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Last but not least, from 2005, Lithuania has engaged into the most ambitious military project thus far by deciding to set up a national Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan. These episodes suggest that the Baltic States do not shy away from expeditionary tasks as a possible response to counter contemporary threats – the kind of missions the EU’s Battle Groups will have to be ready to undertake if needed. It also indicates that the Baltic States have a broad approach to security, which does not end at their national borders. Although such threats as terrorism or proliferation of WMD may not be of immediate danger to the Baltic security, they develop rapid reaction capabilities for international missions at the expense of territorial forces, necessary for national defence.

<sup>16</sup> Lithuania is planning to rotate such a unit in operations from 2014. For Estonia and Latvia it will be a longer-term prospect.

<sup>17</sup> Lithuania sent its first contingent to Iraq, albeit a small one (8 logisticians and 4 medics), when the active phase of war was still ongoing (April 2003).

All of this is an asset for the EU. The armed forces of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania may not be headliners among the EU members, but at a time when defence spending is ever more unpopular and the populations all the more wary of international engagements, every contribution counts and matters. All three countries have earmarked contributions to the EU's Headline Goal. They will also join the EU Battle Groups. Lithuania will contribute some 200-strong convoy unit and Latvia 30-strong military police unit to the Battle Group that will also include Slovak and German troops, and Poland as the framework nation. Estonia will join the Nordic Battle Group and contribute a 45-strong force protection unit. In the longer run, with further improvement in readiness levels and modernisation of equipment, the Baltic States should be able to increase their contributions to the EU's pool of military capabilities.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have yet to develop a coherent approach towards the civilian dimension of ESDP. Thus far, they hardly even had necessary legislation in place to be able to deploy civilians to international operations. The three countries contribute only a few police officers to the EUPM mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Proxima mission in FYROM. More notably, Lithuania has initiated the first EU rule of law mission (EUJUST THEMIS) in Georgia.

The Baltic States have two concerns regarding the future of ESDP. First is the concern that the EU's military standards will become different and defence planning system separate from those of NATO. For the past decade the Baltic defence establishments worked hard to live up to the high NATO standards. In recent years, however, the EU has established its own security and defence dimension. There is already a considerable duplication between the civil and military bodies of NATO and the EU, which forces member states to split time, energy and people between the two. Once the EU and NATO rapid reaction forces (the Battle Groups and NRF respectively) become operational, clashes of ambitions over which flag to use in a particular operation may become inevitable, unless both organisations works out a way to coordinate their decision making and synchronise their defence planning. Otherwise, the members of both organisations will be forced to take sides, as they all have only a single set of forces. This is of acute importance to such small states as the Baltic countries, which can only make one substantial deployment at a time.

The second concern relates to the future direction of the European Defence Agency. The Baltic countries in recent years have concluded several major arms acquisition deals with the US (see table 9). These deals were prompted by a number of political (partnership with the US), financial (American foreign military funds), and defence (compliance with NATO standards) incentives. While the importance of the consolidation of European defence industries is understandable, a common European

procurement policy would put the Baltics in an unfavourable position. They hardly have any significant defence industry and therefore could not expect subcontracts for major procurement projects. Yet, they would still have to follow the “buy European” strategy, which would hardly offer the incentives they have in dealing with the US. It is therefore of utmost importance for the Baltic States that the European armaments policies remain open to the transatlantic cooperation, not only competition.

Table 9. Major arms acquisitions of the Baltic States in 2001-2003.

Country	Year of order	Equipment	Details of acquisition	Supplier
<b>Estonia</b>	2001	4 helicopters	Aid	US
		1 surveillance radar	\$ 12m, part of BALTNET project	US
	2003	18 towed guns	NA	Germany
		160 anti-tank missile	NA	Germany
<b>Latvia</b>	2001	1 surveillance radar	\$ 13m, part of BALTNET project	US
		2 fast attack craft	Aid	Czech rep.
	2002	1 Minelayer	NA	Norway
	2003	1 Armored bridge layer	Aid	Poland
<b>Lithuania</b>	2001	75 anti-tank missiles	\$ 10m	US
		72 towed guns	Aid	Denmark
	2002	3 air surveillance radars	NA	Germany
	2003	60 surface-to-air missiles, 8 launchers, 15 Humvees	\$ 31m	US

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.423-435; SIPRI Yearbook 2004, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 493-512

To sum up, the “Euroatlantic dilemma” of the Baltic States is not as dramatic as one might think. To the extent that one can talk about the “grand strategy” of the Baltic States, the preservation of the transatlantic link will likely remain the guiding strategic principle and daily mantra for the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian decision makers in the foreseeable future. As they see it, the transatlantic relations are not about being pro-European or pro-American, but about surviving in the first place. However, the transatlantic link will not disappear – too many countries in Europe see it as vital to their own security. At the same time, there are a lot of reasons for the Baltic civilian and military leadership to reassess their approach towards CFSP and ESDP. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius have a clear interest, strong public support and credible, if small, armed forces to do just that.

## Conclusions: Becoming normal Europeans


Since the accession to the EU and NATO the leaders of the Baltic States have set out to look for new ambitious priorities of their foreign and security policy. The three countries in fact search for something that has already found them: they face a very complex agenda without any set deadlines, clear landmarks or end-results to pursue. It will require some good diplomatic skills and political instincts to manoeuvre Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania through the troubled waters of ever-changing strategic landscape. In order to succeed as established democracies and credible members of both the EU and NATO, these countries need a fresh approach to the problems that were haunting them before the double enlargement.

As important as it is, the transatlanticism should not become a dogma overshadowing the rest of the foreign and security policy agenda the Baltic States have to deal with. The membership of the Baltic States in the EU in the long run will have much more profound and far-reaching effects on the three countries than NATO membership or the special partnership with the US could possibly have. The Baltic States must therefore reappraise their view of the EU.

- *Seeing the bigger picture.* The leaders of the Baltic States must realise that Western Europeans and Americans alike have their own national interests, which sometimes will not coincide with those of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. No sensible Western leader would be willing to complicate his countries' relations with Russia because of historical anxieties and phobias of the Baltic States. Today, the security situation of the Baltic States is not special, has no immediate strategic significance to any big power and in the terms of high politics has become a closed issue with their accession to NATO. And there are no reasons for the three countries to want it otherwise.
- *Thinking out of the box.* The three countries have to "think globally" in order to be able to "act locally" in the most expedient manner. What is important for other EU members and the EU as a whole should be important to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They must be aware about the problems in Myanmar and Kinshasa if they want their partners to be aware about the problems in Minsk and Chisinau.
- *Internalising the EU.* For Baltic governments, as well as public, the EU to some extent still remains an external entity, not quite a part of their own national identity. The three nations need to develop a "we feeling", a truly European mentality. It is no longer about Estonia *and* the EU, it is about Estonia *in* the EU. In addition, the rules and principles of inter-state relations that were valid outside

the EU may not necessarily be applicable from within the EU. Such concepts as “sovereignty”, “territory”, “borders”, “citizenship”, or even “democracy” gain new meanings once a nation state becomes a member state.

- *Putting more effort into strengthening the CFSP.* A weak CFSP is not in the best interest of the Baltic States. If they want to feel the weight of the EU behind their backs when their vital interests will be at stake, they need a strong, cohesive and efficient CFSP. The Baltic leaders, as well as those of any other EU member state, must be ready to sacrifice part of the national sovereignty and decision-making autonomy in favour of common goals.
- *Getting serious about the ESDP.* The Baltic civil and military leadership needs to develop a more knowledgeable stance towards the ESDP. Asserting the need for close cooperation between NATO and ESDP is one thing. Participating in the deliberations on the substance of ESDP and delivering actual capabilities is quite another. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armed forces already have a proven record of peacekeeping under the US or NATO leadership but they are yet to contribute more substantially to civil and military endeavours of the EU. It is about time to put some weight behind the repeated declarations of support to the development of ESDP if the Baltics want to be considered credible EU members.
- *Becoming normal.* In the end, Baltic leaders should seek to turn their countries into ordinary, normal EU members, safely locked in the middle of the united, free and secure Europe, not a “bridge”, a “transit link”, a “buffer zone” or another ambivalent entity, which would imply geopolitical uncertainty.



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**Lars Wedin\***

National Defence College

## Baltic Security and Western Crisis Management

The paper analyses three possible, albeit not necessarily likely, crisis scenarios with the involvement of, on the one hand, Russia and, on the other, the three Baltic States. The purpose is twofold. Firstly, the idea is to test a crisis management method developed by the French General Loup Francart on the multilateral level – EU and NATO, respectively. This method takes a number of important issues into account: the fact that it may be difficult to see when a situation becomes a crisis and why, the importance of political support, and the definition of political objectives as a function of possible actions. Second, the idea is to look at possible western responses in the case of Russian aggression – more or less overt – against the three Baltic States. From a strategic point of view, the situation of these states are very interesting, as they constitute the only members of both EU and NATO that have common borders with Russia. The scenarios treat three different levels of crisis: asymmetric threats mainly of a non-military nature, intimidation with some military implications, and use of force.

The paper argues that both the EU and NATO would have important roles to play – the political will of their members would be a crucial issue. Regarding possible military actions, there is a dilemma between the temptation to avoid escalation and militarisation and, on the other hand, the risk of coming too late. For geostrategic reasons, the territory of non-NATO member Sweden would be very important in any possible military undertaking. The crisis method tested functioned rather well and permitted important issues to be discussed. More work on multilateral strategic theory is, however, needed.

### Introduction

Regarding the Nordic-Baltic area, the post-Cold War period could be said to have ended in spring 2004 with the enlargement of the EU and NATO to include, inter alia, the three Baltic States. By definition, enlargement implies a widening of borders and the creation of new neighbours.

In today's world, the interest of strategic thinkers is focused on Asia, Middle East and Africa. Non-state actors generally have replaced states as potential or actual

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\* Lars Wedin is Policy Director, Forum for Security Studies, National Defence College, Sweden

adversaries. We talk about asymmetric warfare implying that the organised and high-tech military forces of the West will engage guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents and so on. This is not only mainstream thinking but also the official view of the EU as outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS). However, it is the duty of strategic research to think in different terms from the mainstream. The strategist must ask himself/herself: “what if ?” This is particularly important when it comes to the defence of vital interests – the fate of states and organisations.

There is a risk that our present focus on various forms of crisis management operations and on asymmetric warfare makes us forget that the world around the European Union is not totally post-modern. There are still potential threats from state actors. Not, however, in the old, “modern”, sense. There will not, in the foreseeable future, be any armoured columns breaking through the Fulda gap or invasion fleets over the Baltic Sea.

The present development in Russia towards less democracy, reduced freedom of speech and so on is worrying. What will happen after Putin? Belarus is already a dictatorship and we know from experience that dictators do not always abdicate in a peaceful way. This author does not in any sense argue that there is a real threat from either Russia or Belarus. However, to keep peace, you have to prepare for war (*Si vis pacem – para bellum*), as the Romans said. In a tense situation, the credibility of NATO’s security guarantee and of EU solidarity will be extremely important. The Falklands war in 1982 showed what apparent disengagement might lead to: by withdrawing its last regular naval presence in the area, Great Britain was perceived as signalling a disinterest in the Falklands. The Argentine Junta, in need of success, saw the possibility of a relatively cheap Argentine victory. It was to take a huge reactive military operation to retrieve the Status Quo Ante.

Conceivable actions by the “West”, here loosely defined as the sum of the EU and NATO and their Member States, will be multilateral. Theory about crisis management, however, is normally about how individual states, i.e. governments, react and decide. In a multilateral situation, the decision-making process is on two levels: the organisational level where both the organisation itself and all Member States have to agree, and the national level, given that issues in this context require consensus (or unanimity in the EU).

Against this background, this paper will analyse three possible, if not necessarily likely, scenarios regarding the security of the Nordic-Baltic area with regard to the possible responses of the EU, NATO and their members. The purpose is twofold: to conduct a hypothetical discussion about a possible security issue and its implications and to attempt to apply a crisis management methodology to a multilateral environment. The scenarios treat three different levels of crisis:

asymmetric threats mainly of a non-military nature, intimidation with some military implications, and use of force.

It must be underlined that the paper should in no way be seen as offering forecasts of the future. Moreover, as the process of formulating policy and strategy is complex even within a single state, it becomes extremely complex when one discusses large organizations like the EU and NATO. Hence, the author will have to simplify in order to keep the discussion manageable. It is hoped, anyway, that some interesting general conclusions may be drawn from the results.

## 1. Geopolitical considerations

The three Baltic States are situated at the Western edge of the Eurasian landmass. They also constitute the eastern part of the Nordic and Baltic area, which increasingly is called simply the Nordic area. This area in turn constitutes a rimland, to use the term of Spykman,<sup>1</sup> between Russia, the great land power and the Ocean dominated by USA and to some extent by NATO. From this point of view, the region constituted a vital strategic area during the Cold War. The shortest route from the Ocean to Russia, and vice-versa, goes through or above Swedish and to some extent Norwegian territory.

To this rimland, we must add the Baltic Sea. There is a tendency to talk about the Baltic area without taking its defining area, the Baltic Sea, into account. This is a narrow sea, what naval strategists call a littoral sea with “green water” or “brown water” implying that its depth and width is too small to allow “blue water” naval procedures. It can only be accessed through narrow straits around Denmark or through the Kiel Canal. The Swedish Island of Gotland has a dominant position and is often called an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

The Nordic-Baltic area also constitutes the Northern Flank of both the EU and NATO. Like the British Isles, the Nordic area is to some extent not only physically but also psychologically separated from Continental Europe. Finland and the Baltic States constitute the single border with Russia for both the EU and, in the latter case, NATO. Russia in turn, is the single great power that is situated immediately outside the area of the EU and NATO. In this area, we also find the last (hopefully) real dictatorship in the European area: The Republic of Belarus.

The enlargements of the EU and NATO have practically turned the Baltic Sea into a European lake. Russia has been separated from it, only keeping two outlets: the exclave Kaliningrad and St Petersburg via the Gulf of Finland. Thus Russia has not

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<sup>1</sup> Nicholas J. Spykman (1893 – 1943) argued that the rimland – between the heartland and the adjoining seas – was the strategically most important area.

only failed to achieve its historic strategic goal of unhampered access to the Ocean; it has been further removed from it and has lost an important buffer zone (*glacis*). Enlargement has meant that Sweden, Norway and Denmark now have a very convenient strategic situation whereby the Baltic States serve as a *glacis* between them and Russia. The Finnish geopolitical situation has not been too much affected; it still has a long border with Russia.

## 2. Political and strategic factors

The Nordic area is often depicted as a rather homogenous area. In the original Nordic area, people tend to understand the languages of others and there has been an area of freedom of movement since the 1950s. When it comes to security policy, however, there is more diversification than homogeneity. Sweden and Finland are members of the EU but not of NATO, Finland is a member of the Eurozone, which Sweden is not, Norway is a member of NATO but not of the EU and Denmark member of both NATO and the EU but with important limitations regarding the latter. Ironically, only the newcomers, the three Baltic States, are “normal” European states, i.e. members, without restrictions of both the EU - even if not yet in the Eurozone - and NATO.

The armed forces of the Nordic countries have been substantially weakened since the Cold War. The three Baltic States are still in their build-up phase and they all emphasise the capability to participate in crisis management operations of the EU and NATO. Finland still keeps a sizeable territorial force while trying to get a stronger capability for crisis management. Sweden is in the midst of transformation, which, due to lack of funding, has led to a severe loss of operational capabilities both regarding the defence of its own territory and its crisis management capability. Norway is increasingly seeing its strategic future in the context of its important offshore assets. Denmark has wholeheartedly prioritised its international capability.

The democratic development in Russia is viewed with increasing concern due to President Putin’s emphasis on tight control of the state, including the media and the right of free speech. Russian policy vis-à-vis the Baltic States oscillates between cold and unfriendly. Some observers feel that the Russian military has gained more influence and that its military capability will be strengthened in the years to come. These views do not necessarily imply that Russia will become a military threat, but rather that such a situation cannot be completely discarded. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that Russia at some point after the present term of President Putin will have the capacity to become a menace to one or more of the three Baltic States.

The situation in Belarus is different. President Lukashenko's firm grip on power is based on undemocratic methods, and history shows that such a situation is untenable in the long run. One might speculate about what Russia's reaction would be to some kind of orange revolution *à la* Ukraine in Belarus. Efforts for regime change might cause unrest that would spill over to Baltic neighbours (and to Poland and Ukraine, although that is outside the scope of this paper).

Regarding the EU, this paper assumes that the present Treaty on the European Union (TEU) will still be in force for a long time. The CFSP and ESDP, however, will probably continue to be developed as these policy areas are relatively unaffected by the collapse of the draft Constitution. This means that towards the end of this decade, Headline Goal 2010 will be reached albeit with shortcomings due to the European States failure to fund their military forces. In particular, the EU Battle Groups will be in place including the Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian one. A problematical consequence of the failed Constitution, however, is that the EU's present structure of three separate pillars for 'Community competence' including economic affairs, external security, and internal security, respectively, will remain in force. This means that there will be difficulties in shaping a coherent response to a crisis. There are, certainly, both more positive and more negative scenarios possible regarding the EU towards the end of this decade, but the assumption for the following discussion is that the Union will at best be muddling through. As the meteorologists say, there is a 60% chance that the weather tomorrow will be the same as today.

Although also NATO has its problems, there is no reason to believe that it will have gone through major changes over the next 5-10 years in comparison with today. This is at least the assumption for this paper. Hence, the Alliance will still be responsible for the collective defence of its members but mainly preoccupied with operations outside Europe. It seems safe to assume that Finland and Sweden remain non-members. Regarding the capabilities of its European members, NATO will have about the same resources as the EU – the members are essentially the same. The gap between Europe and USA has probably become even wider than today but the consequences of this for NATO are not all that clear. The question is rather to what extent USA will be ready to allocate forces to NATO and to what extent it will act, if at all, through coalitions of the willing.

In the case of a Baltic-Russian crisis, the UN and OSCE would probably be blocked from any meaningful action, notably by Russia's own grip on their decision-making. But there are a great numbers of others that could act: the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, and various formats of coalitions of the willing and individual states. In this paper, the only actors to be discussed are the EU and NATO including their members. The main emphasis will be on the multilateral level.

A very important factor is European dependence in general, and of the Baltic States in particular, on Russian oil and gas supplies. This fact seems to give the Russians an important source of leverage in a possible crisis.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Russia is dependent on the income from its energy exports. The author is not qualified to assess the possible balance of these interests in a crisis situation. I have, hence, touched on the subject but mostly in order to illustrate the method of analysis. The issue certainly requires more research.

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1. What constitutes a crisis and what is crisis management?

The very definition of “crisis management” is open to debate. There are man-made crises and crisis caused by natural disasters. Sometimes the latter lead to the former. This paper only discusses man-made crises of a political nature. A classic definition of “crisis” would highlight the fact that important values are at stake, that there is limited time for decision and response and that there is considerable uncertainty.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, according to a strategic dictionary, a crisis is a situation of very high tension between two states where use of military force is contemplated.<sup>4</sup> Another definition is that a crisis is a situation where the previous balance has been suddenly altered by a major event, which might disrupt the whole system.<sup>5</sup> “Crisis” is, therefore, a rather narrowly defined concept. “Crisis management”, on the other hand, is quite wide. According to the official NATO definition it is: “The co-ordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.”<sup>6</sup>

According to the Washington Summit declaration of 1999, NATO’s *Operation Allied Force* against Serbia in 1999 was crisis management.<sup>7</sup> Milosevic, however, probably perceived the operation as a war against his vital interests, i.e. his power. Accordingly, the difference between war and crisis management is, partly, a question of perception. It is also clear that wars, when they occur, usually start with a crisis. In fact, one of the reasons why western military forces engage in crisis management is

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<sup>2</sup> This view has been confirmed since the writing of this paper through the short-lived (?) gas-crisis in January 2006 between Russia, Ukraine and the EU.

<sup>3</sup> Sundelius B., et al. *Krishantering på svenska - teori och praktik*. Nerenius & Santérus Förlag AB, 1997, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Géré F., *Dictionnaire de la Pensée stratégique*., Paris:Larousse, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Francart L., *Stratégies et Décisions*, Paris : Économica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 2002, p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/en/aap6-e-c.pdf>, May 3, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> NAC-S (99)63, 23 Apr 1999, para. 15.

the perceived need to prevent wars or, when necessary, reinstall stability and peace. In this context, it is of course necessary not to forget the important differences between “war” and “crisis management” in international law.

The main purpose of the ESDP is to launch and conduct “EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the CFSP.”<sup>8</sup> The missions delimited in the Treaty on the European Union are the so-called Petersberg missions, somewhat enlarged through the ESS. It should be noted that CFSP also encompasses “the security of the European Union in all its aspects”<sup>9</sup>.

To conclude, crisis management includes all phases of crisis and conflict: prevention, acting in armed conflict and post-conflict stabilisation. Furthermore, crisis management operations might entail all potential levels of violence and use of force – from peaceful cooperation to high-intensity battle.

### **3.2. How does one do crisis management?**

The paper will use the method proposed by the French General Francart in his book *Stratégies et Décisions* (Economica Paris 2002). This method consists of three parts, which will be further elaborated in the paper:

- 1) Appreciation of the Situation<sup>10</sup>.
  - a) *What has happened?* In the beginning of a crisis there may be a series of not necessarily linked events. In a real situation, this step would include a rather detailed list of events and actions. In order not to burden the analysis too much, this step is omitted.
  - b) *Describe the situation today.* This includes issues like media and public opinion.
  - c) Define the *present unfavourable situation*. Sometimes it is obvious when a crisis starts, like 11/9 2001. Sometimes a crisis starts in a more subtle way, gradually passing from a nearly normal situation to crisis. Sometimes a situation is, after all, not a crisis – or one chooses not to make a crisis of a situation.
- 2) Analysis of the Crisis.
  - a) *Understanding the crisis.* What is the crisis about? Who are the actors and what do they want?
  - b) Answer the questions:  
*Could we act?* Is there legal support for an action, do we have enough resources, etc.?

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<sup>8</sup> Presidency conclusions European Council Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. Annex 1 to Annex IV.

<sup>9</sup> *Treaty of European Union*, article 11.

<sup>10</sup> In French, all three steps are called “Analyse”; I have used Appreciation, Analysis, and Assessment, respectively, as I believe this will be easier to understand.

*Should we act?* Does the crisis seem to be in the need of handling? Will media and public

opinion require or support an action? Which restrictions will be posed by the public opinion

(e.g. not to use force)?

*Will we act?* Does the situation need handling and do we have the resources and support to

do so?

It should be noted that the two first stages, in particular, would often need to be recycled several times as events unfold. The question “will we act” might initially be answered with a “no” if the situation does not seem too serious. Later, as the situation develops, this assessment might need to be changed into a “yes”.

- c) *Define the future situation*, as we want it to be. What political objective or political endstate do we want to achieve provided that we will act?
- 3) Assessment of Strategies.
  - a) *Exploring the strategies of the actors*. Who might do what?
  - b) *Analyzing our possible strategies*. What are our possibilities? Check them against the possible strategies of other players.
  - c) *Choice of the best strategy*. (This paper, however, will not propose choices of best strategy.)

## 4. Scenario 1. Asymmetric threats

### 4.1. Appreciation of the Situation

*What has happened? Describe the present situation.*

There is turmoil in Belarus; democratic groups want a democratic and pro-western government. There are also groupings that support the authoritarian government and want to keep close relations with Russia. The Baltic States openly support the democratic movement. This view has irritated Russia, which accuses them of meddling in Belarusian internal affairs. In the Baltic States there is increasing unrest among disaffected Russian-speaking groups. Russia officially backs up their demands and its President talks about discrimination and hints that Russia might be forced to protect its “compatriots”. Criminal groups have stepped up their activity; some of the gangs are believed to have close relations to Russian groups.

The Russian media support the official view regarding miss-treatment of ethnic Russians. Demonstrations are held in many Russian cities to support their “brothers and sisters”. Some newspapers in Western Europe support this view, in particular in

France and Germany. Others call for investigation, while still others express solidarity with the Baltic States and their citizens. Newspapers in the Baltic States talk about crisis and demand a show of solidarity from its partners in the EU and NATO.

#### *Character of the present situation*

The situation is characterised by Russian non-military pressure against members of the EU and NATO as well as support to non-democratic, anti-western groups in Belarus. Basic Western values are at stake, at least in Belarus. Hence, three issues could be identified: the future for the democratic movement in Belarus, the security of the Baltic States and the cohesion and credibility of the EU and NATO.

### **4.2. Analysis of the crisis**

#### *Understanding the crisis.*

From a Western perspective, it will be important to discern to what extent incidents in the Baltic States are orchestrated or just supported by Russia. Is it really an international crisis? The Russian move could be seen as limited, just aiming to distract and deter the West while it works to keep Belarus outside the Western camp as a close friend and ally. The Russian objective, however, might also be more far-reaching, that is to gain some control over the Baltic States in order to avoid further “meddling” in its affairs. A first step could then be to use the “discriminated-against” Russian-speaking groups to reduce the reputation of the Baltic States vis-à-vis their allies and public opinion in the West.

Russian objectives in Belarus would be pretty obvious. This, however, would not be the case regarding the threat against the Baltic States – a defensive move or the beginning of a more ambitious offensive? This ambiguity may make the assessment difficult, which in itself might constitute a crisis for capitals, the EU and NATO.

#### *Could we act?*

From a legal point of view, NATO could act in accordance with article 4 in the Treaty: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The outcome of such a consultation, however, is not evident. The discussions within NATO about the protection of Turkey before *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in early 2003 showed how implementation of article 4 might be blocked.

Regarding the EU, still from a legal perspective, it is obvious that there is a mandate in the Treaty. The CFSP is “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways” and “The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the

interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” However, these provisions require a basic agreement on the nature of the crisis, without which there can be no “common” security policy. There are also possibilities for action within the realm of the first pillar, the Treaty of European Communities (TEC). Would there be enough of relevant resources? There is hardly any question of using tangible military resources under this scenario, as any concrete military action probably would be deemed as out of the question. Any major action would need to be based on political and economic actions and here, in principle, there is no lack of resources.

*Should we act?*

Most European citizens would presumably support Belarusian democracy as well as the security of the Baltic States. It is less clear, however, to what extent they would support more tangible actions. There would also be an interest in keeping a dialogue with Russia, and there is a general tendency in some countries towards a policy of “Russia first”.

*Will we act?*

The problem with this step in a multilateral environment is that the outcome is dependent on an agreement, or at least acceptance, on a strategy. Members might agree on the necessity to do something while being unable to agree on what to do; in that case there will be no action at all. With this caveat in mind, it is probable that both the EU and NATO would agree to do something. No European political leader can avoid giving some measure of support to a democratic movement. Furthermore, a demand for political solidarity from the Baltic States must, in principle, be met with support. However, the outcome would be dependent on the way their governments present the issue.

*The desired future situation*

One may identify two different objectives: a democratic Belarus emerging without bloodshed and the Baltic States still firmly in the Western camp. Simultaneously, it would be important not to endanger the present level of co-operation between Russia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other.

### **4.3. Assessment of Strategies**

*General remarks*

A clear-cut strategy would require a common view on the crisis, its origins and possible consequences. If this is not the case, there might still be a common strategy

but built on compromises of different sorts using some degree of creative ambiguity. If no common strategy is possible, members will be free to act individually. The less cohesive the Western response is, the easier for Russia to “divide and conquer”: this applies both regarding individual states and in terms of efforts to play off one organisation against another (“forum-shopping”). The outcome depends on how the political leaders of the members of the two organisations assess the opportunities and risks, taking into account both external and internal factors. It will also be heavily dependent on how Russia, Belarus and the Baltic States play their cards. These remarks are valid for the EU as well as for NATO.

#### *Exploring the strategies of Russia*

Russian strategy could be to signal discontent of the behaviour of West in general and Baltic States in particular. Through avoiding tangible actions, Russia could keep open the option of deniability, which would allow for an eventual return to a friendlier situation. On the other hand, depending on Western responses, Russia might escalate in order to gain influence and divide the West if an opportunity arises. In short, Russia’s strategy would entail testing Western resolve while keeping her own freedom of action.

However, Russian strategy may also be more offensive, the present situation might just be the first step towards a more ambitious goal. Finally, Russia might not be ready to go further than she has done so far, meaning that the aim is to make a one-off political statement rather than to gain strategic advantages.

The important issue, from a Western perspective, is that it is difficult to be certain of Russian intentions and how far Russia might go if it feels provoked. Different interpretations may make decision-making very difficult.

#### *Analyzing our possible strategies: The European Union*

Regarding Belarus, a Common Position would contain political statements of support for democracy in Belarus. There are, in principle, various possibilities to support the democratic movement like meetings with the opposition, economic aid to media etc. In a tense situation, however, it might be impossible to do any work inside the country.

It would also be important to give practical and economic support to those Member States, which are in a particularly direct position to influence the situation: Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. (The same goes for Ukraine depending how the situation there develops). Plans should be made for a possible need to take care of refugees and for the provision of humanitarian aid. The latter is an issue that could be handled on a legal basis under the TEC. At the same time it would be important to

keep a dialogue with Russia with, if possible, a mixture of carrots and sticks to influence Moscow's behaviour.

Regarding the Baltic States, it is important to show an unwavering support for their integrity. In particular, it would be important avoiding possible perceptions of the EU and/or NATO mediating between some of their Member States and an outside party – although there might well be some people who argue for such an action.

If terrorism threatens to become rampant, the EU Solidarity paragraph adopted after the Madrid bombings provides a political basis for common action within the EU area against this threat. But it should be noted that there are no objective criteria for such a decision – if Member States assess that such a move is appropriate, it is. This would give Member States the possibility, through deployment of police and even some military assets, to support local authorities and, equally important, to demonstrate political support and resolve. The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) might constitute an important asset in this regard. It is extremely important that the EU and NATO are seen as co-operating and that they evade any attempt to play the two organisations against each other.

#### *Analyzing our possible strategies: NATO*

In principle, there are a number of military actions that could be taken: increasing NATO's meagre presence in the Baltic States through increased aerial patrolling, staging exercises and so on. However, there would probably be a reluctance to make any move that could give the crisis a military character. NATO civil protection assets may also be prepared for a refugee situation. Again, NATO actions must be based on an assessment of Russian strategy. If this situation is just a beginning of a long-term strategy to gain control, an increased military presence is probably worth the political prize.

Through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) where it sits with NATO nations, Russia has some influence over NATO actions. In particular, one might expect some nations to be susceptible to Russian threats to leave the Council.

There are of course actions to be taken in the military field that would not risk escalating the situation. SHAPE, for example, should see to that there are appropriate plans for quick reinforcement of one or several of the Baltic States. Naval exercises and visits are not constrained by the CFE Treaty and would provide a non-offensive but clear message of support. Both Sweden and Finland, on their own initiative, could play useful roles in this regard. In fact, this is one of the very few situations where the non-membership in NATO of these two countries could be of value. An interesting possibility would be to exercise those EU Battle Groups that have Baltic members – like the Nordic Battlegroup including Estonia – in order to show political support.

### *Conclusion*

There are several options. The Solidarity Paragraph, in particular, offers possibilities for practical actions to show solidarity. There are also some military actions that could be undertaken without risking escalation. Probably, however, states would try to avoid any militarization of the crisis. The big problem would be to assess the crisis and to decide whether this is the beginning of a long-term Russian move or not. It is very important that the EU and NATO are perceived as mutually supportive and reinforcing.

## 5. Scenario 2. Intimidation

### **5.1. Appreciation of the Situation**

#### *What has happened? Describe the situation today*

The basic scenario is the same as the one depicted above. However, in this variant, Russia is using military intimidation through staging exercises close to borders of Estonia and Latvia, increasing readiness etc. The frequency of regular military flights over the territories of the Baltic States is increasing. In the Baltic States, the police believe that some acts of criminality in fact constitute terrorism and preparation for further terrorist activities. Unrest in Belarus spills over into Lithuania. Russia presses for new regional arms control and restraint measures in order to get more insight in Baltic military dispositions but, above all, to get a *droit de regard* regarding Baltic military activities and to restrict NATO options for local demonstrations and reinforcement. The new Russian President says that, in order to safeguard “legitimate defensive interests”, Russia must be sure that the Baltic states cannot be used by possible “aggressive criminal and terrorist” organisations in the West in order to threaten law and order in Belarus.

Public opinion in Europe and USA would probably be more polarised than in the first scenario. Many would argue for clear actions in support of the Baltic States and Western values. On the other hand, one could expect others to warn against any moves that could escalate the crisis. Peace groups, always hostile to the EU, NATO, and the US will certainly take this position and argue for “understanding” of Russian motives. This will place several European governments in awkward positions and some will be tempted to act as mediators and/or to support Russian ideas of regional arms control (this has happened before).

*Character of the present situation*

The present situation can be characterised as a lightly disguised aggression towards the Baltic States – members of the EU and NATO - linked to a revolutionary situation in Belarus. There is, however, still a possibility to assess the situation as basically non-military in character. The crisis encompasses unrest in Belarus implying humanitarian suffering that would spill over into Lithuania, threats against the stability and integrity of the Baltic States and, as a consequence, the credibility of the EU and NATO, as well as, in the worst case, risk of a military confrontation with Russia.

## 5.2. Analysis of the crisis

*Understanding the crisis*

In this scenario, it should be pretty clear that the Russian objective is to gain some control of a *glacis* consisting of the Baltic States and Belarus. However, it might be argued that Russia would be satisfied with measures of arms control and transparency in military matters. If so, its objectives towards the Baltic States could be defined as defensive. On the other hand, the situation might also be seen as the first stage in an attempt to cut away the Baltic States from the West and reduce them at best to ‘second-class allies’. If this is the case, its objectives are offensive. The choice between these two different ways of assessing the crisis will be of utmost importance and may, in itself, provoke an internal crisis in the EU and/or NATO.

Relations with Russia will be a crucial factor. By definition, a crisis between three Member States and an outside power is a crisis both for the EU and NATO. However, there will certainly be those who would like to avoid an open crisis with Russia and in particular a military crisis. After all, Russia is a nuclear power! In this context, arguments made before the enlargement of NATO about the impossibility in practice of defending the Baltic States might be resurrected. As the issue will be of great interest for the media, public opinion will exercise pressure on national leaders. There will be two main lines of argument in this regard: live up to your responsibility vis-à-vis our Baltic brothers, and do not risk war with Russia, respectively.

In comparison, the situation in Belarus will be of less importance. There will certainly be arguments, perhaps in particular from the Poles, about the importance of supporting the democratic movement, but this is not a vital issue for the West as a whole.

To conclude: there is a crisis with military connotations between the Baltic States and Russia. As Russian objectives are not known, it is not clear how grave this issue is and might become. The need to arrive at an assessment will, in itself, constitute grounds for a possibly serious internal crisis in the EU and in NATO, where the cohesion and credibility of these organisations could be in danger. Furthermore,

there is a risk for a grave crisis with Russia. In comparison, the crisis in Belarus is less vital for the West. Western governments will be under severe domestic pressure, which may provoke national crises.

*Could we act?*

The EU would have the possibility to use the Solidarity paragraph regarding terrorism as in the first scenario. However, many of its Member States would argue that this situation belongs to the realm of collective defence and, hence, should be handled by NATO. Ideally, there would be a distribution of responsibilities where NATO handles possible military activities while the EU takes the responsibility for non-military activities. NATO in turn would, in principle, have a clear mandate to act according to article 4 and prudent militaries would start or update planning for a possible article 5 situation. Again, a common view is a prerequisite for both organisations. As in the first scenario, there might also be actions that could be undertaken on a legal basis under the TEC. Furthermore, individual states may act. The US has, in principle, the national resources to do so.

What about resources? If we extrapolate the present trend of development, Western armed forces will be weak and the cream of the remaining ones often deployed in faraway places. Certainly, NRF as well as US forces would be sufficient for some kind of prepositioning or preventive deployment but, the military would argue, there are few reserves if the situation escalates. There are hardly any tangible resources that could be brought to bear on the situation in Belarus given the hard attitude taken by Russia.

*Should we act?*

The answer should be obvious both in the EU and in NATO: Member States are threatened and this cannot be tolerated. However, leadership will be required in order to get public opinion to understand the importance of solidarity.

A main difficulty will be the elaboration of strategies. These will depend on how the Russian objectives are assessed and on whether an acceptable balance between deterrence and risk of escalation can be found. In many countries, any deployment of military forces would need parliamentary approval – which seldom goes without saying.

*Will we act?*

It is hardly conceivable that there would not be an agreement in both the EU and NATO regarding the necessity to do something vis-à-vis the Baltic States. It is less obvious that States agree on an action – except of a declaratory nature – regarding Belarus.

*The desired future situation*

The main objective would be to support and safeguard the Baltic States. Simultaneously, the crisis should not be allowed to escalate. Furthermore, future relations with Russia should, if possible, not be endangered. Finally, the EU and NATO should not forfeit their credibility.

The situation in Belarus would be of less importance – or too difficult to do anything about in the present situation. However, any opportunities to help the democratic movement should certainly be seized.

### **5.3. Assessment of Strategies**

*Exploring the strategies of Russia*

Russian objectives towards Belarus seem rather obvious. If Russian objectives towards the Baltic States are relatively defensive, Russia may settle on a compromise if challenged. A Western military reaction might, however, be seen as a preparation for a future NATO offensive. In such a case, Russia might deem it as necessary to act before any Western deployment has been made. If, however, Russia's objectives are offensive, she must be prepared to pre-empt to be able to reach her objective. Pre-emption in this case would imply the creation of a *fait accompli* before West has been able to act. Russia might also use the dependence of the Baltic States and, indeed, Europe's dependence on Russian energy.

*Analyzing our possible strategies: The European Union*

A Common Position regarding Belarus, would hardly contain more than declarations and the possibility of humanitarian support to refugees. The European Commission could give humanitarian support to refugees in Lithuania and Poland.

Regarding the Baltic States, in principle, the ESDP could be used in order to give possible military support. However, many NATO Nations, including the Baltic States themselves, would argue that this issue should be dealt with under NATO's article 5. The non-NATO members of the EU would probably agree, some of them might even contemplate taking a neutralist standing in the crisis. Some Europeanists might, however, argue that this is a European issue and, hence, the EU should be in the lead. It will, however, be extremely important that the EU openly supports NATO. First, this will reduce the possibilities for Russian divide-and-role politics. Second, a EU Common Position in support of NATO would create a political context for actions by non-NATO Member States, in particular Finland and Sweden.

The EU Solidarity paragraph may be used in order to support the Baltic States regarding terrorism. Here, the EU may take recourse to assets not in the inventory of NATO namely civilian rescue resources, police, and the European Gendarmerie Force.

However, the role of the EU would be largely political and economic. An important political objective would be to show support for NATO and to do what it can to create a united European front. In a case where Russia uses its energy as a weapon, the EU would have a crucial economic role. If deliveries to the Baltic States were threatened there would be a requirement for economic solidarity from the rest of Europe. Would that be forthcoming; also if Russia threatens to stop all deliveries to Europe?

*Analyzing our possible strategies: NATO*

NATO has three main options. The first would be to negotiate a settlement with Russia. The second would be deterrence – to demonstrate readiness to deploy to the Baltic States if the situation deteriorates. The third would be defence – a preventive deployment to the Baltic States to be ready to defend them.

Negotiations must be conducted in such a way as to avoid the impression that NATO is mediating between three of its members and Russia. Negotiations must be underpinned by some military action like an increased presence in the area of naval and air forces, the staging of exercises, and so on – all designed to show clear support for the independence of the Baltic States.

A credible defensive posture on the territory of the Baltic States would require large numbers of forces including reserves supported by substantive naval and air forces. The Russians, it would be argued, may see such a deployment, as provocative and hence dangerous. Such a deployment would also be time-consuming and expensive.

Deterrence would imply taking a posture that would facilitate military action if needed. This issue will be further developed in the next and final scenario. It may, however, already be noted here that there would be a need for naval and amphibious forces that only the US can provide. In such a context, for geographic reasons, Swedish territory would be of high importance. A credible force, temporarily based in Sweden, would be an excellent way of creating a rapid reaction capability without need for major deployment in the Baltic States. To show resolve, it should be combined with some preventive deployment in these states as a trip-wire.

The likelihood that Sweden would support such a move could certainly be discussed. On the one hand, Sweden does accept the importance of solidarity between EU Member States. On the other hand, Sweden has refused to become a member of NATO exactly because it wants to avoid being drawn into situations like this. Furthermore, its meagre armed forces would probably reduce its willingness to stick

its neck out. A EU Common Position could, however, present the political basis needed.

From a more general point of view, the fact that not all EU Member States are also members of NATO might constitute a weak point in the European security architecture, which might be explored by the Russians.

### *Conclusion*

The choice of strategy would require careful balancing between the risk of escalation and the risk of losing the initiative. Again, the assessment of Russia's long-term objective would be crucial. Both the EU and NATO have important complementary roles to play. Co-ordination between them would be crucial but might be difficult to achieve because of asymmetries in membership.

## 6. Scenario 3. Use of force

### 6.1. Appreciation of the Situation.

#### *What has happened? Describe the present situation.*

Again the basic scenario is the same. This time, however, Russia uses open, albeit limited, force. After a quick intervention, which caught the other Western powers off guard, Russian forces have taken important areas (airfields, harbours, road junctions). Russia makes it very clear that the move is a defensive one – seen against the background of Western “aggression” towards Belarus and the “appalling” situation for the Russian “minorities”. Russia, its new President says, has no intention of expanding its borders outside the traditional ones: but at the same time he warns NATO that any aggressive moves will be dealt with in accordance with the legitimate right of self-defence.

Media reactions and opinions would certainly be outraged by Russian behaviour. Simultaneously, there will be those who warn against general war with Russia. Peace groups would argue: “we should not die for these tiny states”. The situation would probably be aggravated by the fact that the present generation of European leaders are not used to handling situations like these.

#### *Character of the present situation*

The situation is characterised by an open attack against three members of the EU and NATO. NATO could not survive as an organisation without taking action in defence. There would, however, be important risks of escalation both horizontally and vertically. The political credibility of the EU would also be at risk. In short, besides

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the future of the three Baltic States, the whole European security architecture is at stake. Badly handled, there is a risk of nuclear war.

In comparison, the situation in Belarus is of less importance.

## **6.2 Analysis of the crisis**

### *Understanding the crisis*

This is an existential crisis for Europe, the trans-Atlantic link, the UN and, indeed, for the whole world. Open aggression by a great power against small neighbours cannot be accepted. The legal issue is also clear: article 51 in UN Charter and NATO article 5 would apply.

### *Could we act?*

Legally, the answer is yes – in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter. Regarding resources, the answer is less certain and will be discussed below.

### *Should we act?*

In principle, the answer cannot be but yes – the security architecture of Europe is at stake. Among the citizens of Europe, there would certainly be different views ranging from those favouring solidarity to those arguing that “war never solves anything and, moreover, the Baltic States are not worth dying for”. It will take a lot of political skill to generate the clear and sustained support needed for a military operation.

### *Will we act?*

It is hardly conceivable that NATO would not act – the problem will be how. The same should apply for the EU. There is, however, a risk that some EU Member States revert to neutralist positions.

The situation of Belarus being of less importance, no direct action is taken in that regard.

### *The desired future situation*

The main objective can only be defined as “*return to status quo ante*” meaning the full withdrawal of Russian forces from the territories of the Baltic States and a clear declaration of support for their independence. Simultaneously, both vertical and horizontal escalation should be avoided. Furthermore, the integrity of both the EU and NATO must be upheld.

### **6.3. Assessment of Strategies**

#### *Exploring the strategies of Russia*

Russian strategy seems evident – to create a *fait d'accompli* and then wait for Western actions. For one or another reason, Russia believes that the West will not take any military action in response – perhaps because of preoccupations far away from this area. Its military capacity would no be sufficient for a military strategy with more ambitious goals (like reaching the Norwegian Sea). On the other hand, it is not clear how far the Russians are prepared to go in order to defend their present position. Conversely, where would their bottom line lie? Could a withdrawal be bought at a reasonable price? Could the action be a diversionary one to cover or distract from some act elsewhere, more vital for Russian interests? Are they really prepared to fight a war, even a limited one, with the West or did they count on Western lack of cohesion and lack of resources?

#### *Analyzing our possible strategies: The European Union*

As the situation calls for collective defence, the ESDP would have no direct role – “The policy of the Union shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)” (TEU article 17). The EU could, however, underpin NATO by taking a Common Position condemning the Russian attack and demonstrating supporting for NATO’s actions.

An interesting issue is the handling of tourists and expats from other EU Member States as well as EU offices in the Baltic States. Normally, evacuation is seen as one of the Petersberg tasks. However, with NATO in the lead for military actions – the role of the EU co-operation in this regard would probably be limited to co-ordination and information.

Furthermore, the EU would have to play a huge role in handling likely refugee flows, transport and trade disruption etc; and after the crisis, for humanitarian aid, reconstruction and so on.

#### *Analyzing our possible strategies :NATO*

In order to reduce the risks of escalation, it can be presumed that NATO would avoid actions in other parts of Russia. This means that action in the Kaliningrad and St Petersburg areas should be avoided as much as possible. Furthermore, deep strikes into Russian and Belarusian territory “behind” the Baltic States would also need to be avoided. In this context, Belarus must, from a strategic point of view, be seen as part of Russia.

Kaliningrad might pose a particular challenge as a base for Russian naval forces, albeit rather weak ones compared with NATO's capacity. These forces cannot be neglected, however. In particular the S-300 has a range permitting it to engage targets far outside Kaliningrad's borders<sup>11</sup>. This air defence systems pose a threat to NATO air strikes and air transport bound for any of the Baltic States - in particular Lithuania. Consequently, an action against Russian forces in Lithuania probably requires strikes against Kaliningrad. This geostrategic situation may limit the freedom of action of the new great power in the area: Poland.

The Allies can only reach Estonia and Latvia reached by the sea. Hence, the operation must be of an amphibious character. The NATO Reaction Force will have this capability as well as high readiness. It would hardly be strong enough, however, to make a forced entry on Russian held territory. The US Navy and its Marine Corps would be the only forces with reasonably sufficient strength. To stage an operation would require at least one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). There would certainly be a need for, at least, one Carrier Group for air operations – aiming at air superiority, interdiction and close air support.

These are huge units. A Carrier Group could consist of 12 surface ships and submarines and would probably be reluctant to operate in the narrow Baltic Sea – the normal deployment area for one Carrier Group in principle equates to the whole of the Baltic Sea from Åland to Poland. The preferable mode of action, hence, would probably be to organise a staging area in the North Sea and fly over Denmark and southern Sweden. In this way, Kaliningrad's air defence could be avoided. However, obviously, this would require Swedish consent. Given that this was provided, Swedish air bases would provide landing opportunities for damaged aircraft and forward bases for tankers.

Certainly, there are alternatives to bases in Sweden – Poland, Germany and perhaps Denmark. They all have the drawback that it will be more difficult to avoid the air defences in Kaliningrad. Hence, there might be a need to destroy them, which would constitute an escalation.

A MEB has 15000 sailors and marines and would require about 15 amphibious ships and their escorts. To carry out an amphibious assault these ships would need to enter the Baltic Sea. Even if the Sea Basing concept of the US Navy offers provide virtually autonomous mobile platforms, the island of Gotland would be of importance as a forward basis for helicopters, support aircraft and amphibious craft. One might

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<sup>11</sup> Russian S-300PMU-2 Favorit SAM system has an effective range from 3km to 200km and can engage aircraft and ballistic missiles, <http://www.aeronautics.ru/s300market.htm>, November 3, 2005.

make a comparison with the use the Allied fleets made of this island during the Crimean War.

Naval aircraft would, obviously, be supported by long-range aviation (B1B, B2 and B 52) from the USA as well as by European air forces. For the latter, bases in Sweden would be of great importance.

Such a reactive operation would be very difficult and risky. The naval forces needed are of a scale and type not normally seen in this part of the world. They will need time to regroup, during which Russia can strengthen its hold over the Baltic States and, in particular, deploy air defence assets. NATO's air forces would probably be able to gain air superiority but that would take some time. This means that a deployed NRF would be at risk, as reinforcements by US maritime forces will need time to reach the area.

It must be underlined that an operation of the sort outlined above cannot be improvised. Planning and rehearsals, including at least some training, must be undertaken in advance. For the planners, the issue regarding Sweden's possible position on the use of its territory might cause particular difficulties. Again, the fact that not all EU Member States are members of NATO is reduces the credibility of European defence.

## 7. Discussion

The above is an extremely simplistic and synthetic study. Nevertheless, it allows some preliminary conclusions to be drawn.

### 7.1. Substance

A main problem with the first two scenarios, where Russia's activities are relatively low-keyed, is the difficulty of assessing its strategies and objectives. In turn, this makes it difficult for the West to agree on a strategy. Both the EU and NATO members would, in this case, be torn between their obligations to three small Member States, their wish to maintain good relations with Russia and their fear of overreaction and escalation. There might be a risk of wishful thinking in this regard. This issue will be harder for some countries than others because of economic dependencies (energy) and traditional policies. The handling of public opinions will be extremely important.

However, any policy of appeasement à la Munich 1938 would mortally endanger their credibility and, hence, the European system of security. In particular, it is necessary to avoid temptations to mediate – the EU or NATO cannot regard themselves as third parties to a conflict involving one of their own. Negotiations will be necessary, but these need to be based on a solid common position supported by

leverage. The interplay between the EU, NATO and capitals will be crucial given the vital importance of their being perceived as united. Asymmetries in membership may, however, create disagreements and may present options for Russian divide-and-role tactics.

The EU would be of particular importance in a situation where there is a low level of violence. In such a situation, states would probably prefer to avoid militarizing a crisis. If a military crisis occurs, NATO – not ESDP – would probably be the preferred framework. In a warlike situation NATO would be the self-evident choice - above all since US resources would be needed. Even in that case, however, the EU would have an important political supporting role and would *inter alia* provide the political framework for involvement by the non-NATO members Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, the EU would have a huge role in refugee control, humanitarian aid and political and economic reconstruction after the crisis.

A main problem for the West will be its nations' reluctance to be the first to introduce military elements into a crisis. The discussions above seem to suggest that at the lower levels of crisis, the West would like to avoid or delay militarization. Nevertheless, in principle, the same problem will apply in a more intense crisis too. There would still be some who argue that the West must avoid a posture that could be perceived as provocative and lead to escalation. If, however, Russia pre-empts by attacking one or all of the Baltic States, the West would be at a clear military disadvantage. Major resources would be needed to redress the situation, but there would still be a risk of escalation. This problem is not new – it has been called “self-deterrence” meaning that an actor does not dare to take defensive measures because he is afraid of provoking a potential assailant.

Generally, Russia could play on Western reluctance to use military force and on the likely lack of inter-national and inter-institutional cohesion. The geographical situation, where the Baltic States have a direct land border with Russia, makes early deployment all the more important.

NATO should plan for this eventuality. It would be wise to increase the Western military presence in the Baltic area at a very early stage. The best way is to establish a normal pattern of presence in the area in order to have forces at hand from the outset. In the EU, too, some thought should be given about how to react to such a situation, taking account of the ‘signal’ effect of decisions e.g. on border management, interruption of transport and evacuation.

If a crisis reaches military levels, Swedish territory – air bases as well as the island of Gotland – would be very important. The present disarmament of Swedish Armed Forces might, however, make Swedish government more prone to withdraw to traditional policies of neutrality. The fact that NATO’s planners cannot be sure of non-member Sweden will complicate their preparations.

## 7.2. Process

The methodology, based on the method of General Francard, tested here is useful. It highlights the importance of understanding the characteristics of the crisis as well as the importance of public opinion. It also shows that one of the main difficulties will be the assessment of the other actors' long-term strategies and objectives. This step, however, is crucial as a basis for the development of suitable strategies. Multilateral decision-making will increase these difficulties.

In this paper, the EU and NATO have been treated as actors although they are actually collectivities of sovereign states with somewhat diverging views. This approach is certainly more fruitful than just considering the organizations as monoliths, but it complicates the analysis. The reality is even more complicated as states might interact in clusters within the organisations. They will also, most probably, take some positions and actions nationally without regard to organizational solidarity. Finally, the academic discussion over whether the EU and NATO should in fact be seen as independent actors has been avoided here. In spite of these simplifications, the analysis quickly becomes very complex.

The need for unanimity or consensus makes the question "will we act?" difficult to answer. In fact, there can only be a positive answer if states can agree on what to do. It is quite conceivable that members of EU/NATO will decide in principle to act but, failing to find a common way, are not able to do so through any of the two organisations. In such a case, the analysis would need to encompass several states or groups of states and their possible actions. As a consequence, in particular in a multilateral environment, the process encompassing the three questions (could, should, will we act?), the definition of the political objective, and the exploration of possible strategies need to be repeated several times until an acceptable balance is found.

From the point of view of future research, there seems to be a need for deeper study of the possibilities of cooperation in crisis management *within the European area* between the EU and NATO. To do this, we need a strategic language and structure that not only focuses on the national level but also on the multilateral. Another subject, which seems to call for further research is the role that Europe's dependence on Russian energy, and any elements of reverse dependence, could play in a crisis situation.

## Conclusion

A major conclusion of the analysis is the difficulty the West would have to assess Russian objectives. This might possibly lead to a temptation do too little too

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late in order not to alienate Russia and/or to escalate the crisis. A main problem, however, is that if Russia is prepared to use military means, then the West will be in a very difficult situation. In fact, geostrategic considerations suggest that West must preposition credible forces if it wants to have the option to deter Russian aggression while keeping the conflict at the lowest possible level. In this context, it must be underlined that, as both the EU:s second pillar and NATO are dependent on consensus, all member states must agree on actions taken even if they do not necessarily agree on the nature of the crisis.

Another important conclusion is that both the EU and NATO would have a role to play. Their comparative advantages differ and so their respective roles in the three scenarios but the outcome would depend on their ability to be mutually supportive. Obviously, this in turn will require political will of their members.

Swedish territory would be very important, for geostrategic reasons, in the context of any Western major military action in support of the Baltic States. The problem with this situation is twofold – Sweden is not a member of NATO and is, at present, militarily weak.

It would be extremely important that Western political leaders keep together. In particular, any move that could be interpreted as an effort to mediate between any of the Baltic States and Russia must be avoided. Hence, members of EU and NATO be given priority against the preference of some States for a “Russia first” strategy.

The crisis management method has proved useful in this multilateral scenario. However, it seems important to continue the development of a strategic theory and language that caters for multilateral organisations as actors.

The great unknown in this short study is the role of energy. From what happened in January 2006, it is obvious that this “weapon” could be the Russian method of choice. It seems important to study the balance of power and dependencies in this regard with the view to a possible future crisis.

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**Erik Männik\***  
*Manchester Metropolitan University*

# The Role of the European Security and Defence Policy in Estonia's Security Policy

## Introduction

This paper will discuss the role of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Estonia's security policy. It is an intriguing subject with different aspects. In general, Estonia's security policy has been aimed at becoming full member of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). These memberships were expected to provide respectively 'soft' and 'hard' security. However, the ESDP evolves in the direction that blurs such a distinction. The ESDP has been increasingly directed towards developing military capabilities for the whole spectrum of conflict. These developments are bound to influence Estonia's security policy and have serious resource implications for the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF).

How are Estonian policy makers reacting to those developments? What discourses have evolved and what practical commitments have been made? Some answers to these questions are given below.

The analysis begins with the outline of the main traits of the Estonian ESDP policy. It is followed by three insights into developments on the background of that policy. The first of them touches upon the threat perceptions of Estonia that have been reflected in official documents. The second insight will provide an overview of the views of different political parties that have been elected to the Estonian Parliament since 1999. The third and last insight will deal with Estonia's practical contribution to the ESDP and the associated problems. The paper ends with brief summary and conclusions.

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\* Erik Mannik is the researcher of the Manchester Metropolitan University

## Estonia's ESDP Policy

Estonia has been supporting the development of the ESDP from its inception. Such a support has been in line with Estonia's EU-integration as it required the full adoption of the *acquis* with respect to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1999 then Foreign Minister of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves said while commenting on the relationship between the CFSP and Estonia:

Our work in this area is facilitated by the fact that Estonia is already part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Indeed, for a number of years, our Foreign Service has been part of a dense web of foreign policy co-operation and co-ordination. We participate in CFSP working groups, we associate ourselves with EU declarations and we exchange information with member states on a regular basis<sup>1</sup>. Proceeding from such a total alignment with the CFSP, Estonia's policies regarding the ESDP have:

- Supported the development of the ESDP in general and envisioned it as a tool for dealing with various crises in the framework of Petersberg tasks (humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and tasks of armed forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) and later – with terrorism;
- Stressed the need to avoid duplication of effort with NATO in developing concrete military capabilities (NATO has been seen and still is perceived as the primary security instrument for Estonia);
- Stressed the need to maintain and to avoid weakening the transatlantic link;
- Envisioned a practical contribution to the ESDP.

### **1. The First Insight: Threat perceptions, Views Outlined in Strategic Documents**

Since regaining independence, Estonia has adopted two National Security Concepts (in 2001 and 2004) and two National Military Strategies (in 2001 and 2005). The threats to Estonia's security outlined in these documents indicate how Estonia's EU and NATO memberships have affected Estonia's threat perceptions and facilitate explaining Estonia's ESDP-policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Ilves T. H., "EU enlargement and Estonia's identity on the international stage", Remarks at the International Conference "Estonia and the European Union" on 5 November 1999 in Tallinn.

Estonia's National Security Concepts adopted in 2001 and 2004 have considered mainly various crises and uncontrolled developments as the major risks to Estonia's security. The risk of military conflict has been considered low<sup>2</sup>.

However, Estonia's Military Strategy adopted in 2001 outlined a very different threat assessment. Whereas a major attack against Estonia was not considered likely in the short-term, the military risks, such as military intimidation, coup attack and full-scale attack on Estonia were outlined as the primary concerns in the development of the EDF<sup>3</sup>. The latest document – Military Strategy adopted in 2005 – considered large-scale attack against any NATO member state as unlikely in the next 10 years. However, the re-occurrence of traditional threats was not fully excluded in the more distant future. Various crises were seen as the most probable risks to Estonia's security in the short- and medium-term. Such crises could be caused by an unexpected build-up of military forces in Estonia's proximity, large-scale military exercises violating international agreements, deliberate violations of Estonian land, air and sea borders, and terror attacks against Estonia and/or its neighbouring state.<sup>4</sup> The new strategy did not mention territorial defence any more (total and collective defence were mentioned) and stipulated contributing to the ESDP for the first time as one of the tasks of the EDF.

## **2. The Second Insight: Political Parties, their Programmes and Debates in the Parliament**

Since 1999 nine different political parties have been elected to the Parliament. Of these, the Estonian United People's Party (party of the Russian-speaking minority) has had the most ambiguous political programme with regard to security policy. It stated that Estonia's foreign policy ought to be guided first of all by economic interest and only then by security considerations. It expressed scepticism about the usefulness of NATO membership in providing security and did not state clearly party's views on Estonia's EU membership.

The other parties have been supportive of Estonia's EU- and NATO-integration efforts. However, none of them has outlined any specific views regarding the ESDP. The latter has been treated in the context of the overall need to contribute to the European security and to participate in the common EU policies.

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<sup>2</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu , National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, 2001, p. 8; Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu, National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus, Eesti sõjalise kaitse strateegia, 2001, p. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus, *Sõjalise kaitse strateegiline kava*, 2005, p. 2-3.

The prominence of the ESDP in Estonia's foreign policy can be characterised by the fact that it has been mentioned in eight out of Government's 13 bi-annual foreign policy reports to the Estonian Parliament since 1999. It has become a permanent topic since 2002. However, the ESDP has been mostly mentioned by the Estonian Foreign Ministers in the context of stressing the need to avoid duplication of capabilities with NATO and to avoid jeopardising the transatlantic link.

The parliamentary debates on the ESDP in Estonia have focused similarly on Estonia's desire to maintain transatlantic link, to avoid duplication with NATO and prevent intensified defence cooperation between selected members of the EU. Estonian views on the proposed European Security and Defence Union are characterised by the fact it was not even discussed in the Foreign Committee of the Parliament, but rejected immediately.

Parliamentary report on the political effects of joining the EU (prepared in 2003) included only one descriptive paragraph touching upon the ESDP. The ESDP was mentioned in connection with the decision-making in the CFSP<sup>5</sup>. The document 'Estonian Government's European Union Policy for 2004-2006' focused again primarily on stressing the need to continue cooperation in the CFSP-ESDP framework while avoiding duplication with NATO and undermining transatlantic link<sup>6</sup>.

### **3. The Third Insight: Resource Aspects and Estonia's Practical Contribution**

As was said before, one aspect of the Estonian ESDP-policy has been contributing in practical terms to the ESDP in military field and participating in the EU-led operations. Estonia's first contribution of forces to the ESDP was made at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. It included one military police platoon, one mine-clearing unit, some civil-military co-operation specialists, two minesweepers and one auxiliary vessel, and one infantry battalion. They were 'double-hatted' units as they were made also available for NATO operations. Estonia adjusted its contribution by excluding one minesweeper from its contribution by March 2003. This adjustment was recognition of the facts of life: Estonia was all the time only able to deploy simultaneously two ships to international operations.

The adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 signified much higher and more detailed military requirements regarding Estonia's contribution. It tested seriously

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<sup>5</sup> Riigikogu Euroopa asjade komisjoni töörühm ), *Ülevaade Euroopa Liiduga ühinemise mõjudest*, 2003, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus, *The Estonian Government's European Union Policy for 2004-2006*, 2004, p. 36-37.

Estonia's willingness to contribute to the ESDP. Estonia struggled and was still in the process of determining the nature of its contribution to the Nordic Battlegroup in December 2004. As it was decided, it will be 45 men. Their function will be force protection and for the first time Estonia's contributions to NATO and the EU will *not* be 'double-hatted'. Hence, by participating in the Nordic Battlegroup Estonia has committed itself to carrying out deployments on short notice in two different frameworks (EU and NATO). For the EDF it means that more units will be engaged in producing expeditionary capabilities. It is another long step away from the 'traditional' (decade-long) orientation of the EDF towards territorial defence.

While evaluating Estonia's contribution to the ESDP it must be taken into consideration that Estonia's defence development has been considerably slower than expected. The first full-scale battalion exercise was carried out only in 2003 and Estonia's plans foresee the ability to deploy simultaneously up to 250 people to long-term operations from 2008<sup>7</sup>. The EDF are working hard to achieve the 8-40 ratio, i.e. to be able to maintain 8% of the EDF in international missions while 40% of ground forces must be readily deployable. The EDF peacetime strength is 5,700 men and strength after mobilisation is envisioned to be 16,000 men<sup>8</sup>.

As of June 2005 Estonia had 128 troops deployed to international operations. Of them, three participated in EU-led military operations and six in civilian operations.

## Conclusions

The brief analysis carried out above shows that Estonia has been preoccupied with dealing with its immediate security concerns since the end of Cold War. Whereas the official documents have stressed the 'new risks' (mainly various crises) since 2001, the military has been only slowly re-orientated to the expeditionary tasks. Only in 2005 became contributing to the ESDP an official (outlined) task of the EDF.

Estonian political parties have seen the ESDP in the context of the EU-integration, but the practical policies have been crafted in tight connection to Estonia's NATO-integration. Estonia has tried desperately to link the ESDP development to NATO and prevent any pressure on transatlantic link. The driving force in developing the ESDP-policy in Estonia have been civil servants who deal with the issue on the daily basis. Only a limited number of studies have treated the subject so far.

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<sup>7</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium, 2004, *Kaitsejõudude struktuur ja arenguplaan kuni aastani 2010*, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

Estonia's practical military capabilities have been developed slowly. The initial contributions to the Helsinki Headline Goal have been unsustainable and the Battlegroup concept has presented a serious challenge to Estonia. However, contributing to the Nordic Battlegroup has clearly facilitated orientating the EDF increasingly to the expeditionary operations and away from the territorial defence.

To sum up, what will the future bring to Estonia and the ESDP? Realistic guess would be that drastic changes are unlikely. Estonia's material resources simply do not permit significant increase of contribution to the ESDP while the threat perceptions have been slow to change.

Perhaps the words of the Estonia's Defence Minister Jaak Jõerüüt about the Estonian deployment to Iraq are indicative of the future also in the context of ESDP: 'In my personal opinion the foreign policy dimension of our deployment to Iraq is more important than the defence policy dimension.'<sup>9</sup> If the deployment to the mission with the highest intensity of conflict since regaining independence is seen primarily as a foreign policy element, then Estonia's participation in the ESDP might be also seen as a tool for gaining influence (being 'loyal ally' and 'good Europeans') and less important for providing security.

The ESDP developed in the framework of the headline Goal 2010 has a potential to take Estonia into as serious a situation as is presently in Iraq. Swedish Special Forces have already been engaged in heavy fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Estonian contingent may well find itself in a similar situation during some future mission. As such, it will be a test of Estonian resolve to follow common the values and the principle of indivisibility of security, and put the troops into harm's way to defend them.

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<sup>9</sup> Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu, 2005, X Riigikogu stenogramm, VI istungijärv, 13.04

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**Žaneta Ozoliņa\***  
University of Latvia

## Adapting to New Security Challenges: a View from Latvia

The aim of the article is to address the challenges to Latvian security policy after the accession to the EU and NATO. Analysis focuses on policy documents and institutional aspects of security policy-making that is confronted with practical steps that have been taken by Latvian institutions involved in security policymaking. The first part is devoted to domestic response to international security challenges, but the second part elaborates on institutional adaptation to new security environment. Attention is paid to the EU and its CFSP and ESDP policy. Integration into the EU and NATO was a challenge itself for Latvia. Adaptation to new policies developed by the EU put an additional burden on new EU member states. NATO still remains a priority while ESDP is treated as one of EU projects that should be followed but not treated as a substitute to NATO.

### Introduction

Accession to the European Union and NATO changed security landscape in Latvia significantly. It also had an impact on security situation and security policy-making process. In terms of security situation the most important concerns have vanished and a list of achievements can be proudly drafted – there are no direct threats to the country, security guarantees are provided by NATO, main executive structures are at place, financial restrictions have been removed, National Armed forces have been established, new security and defence culture has been introduced based on the norms of democratic society. At the same time, actors involved in security policy-making found themselves caught into a trap of novelty.

The article will focus on the challenges to Latvian security policy after the accession to the EU and NATO. Analysis will focus on policy documents and institutional aspects of security policy-making that will be confronted with practical steps that have been taken by Latvian institutions involved in security policymaking.

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\* Dr. Žaneta Ozoliņa is head of Department of Political Science and Director of Advanced Social and Political Research Institute, University of Latvia.

## 1. Domestic response to international security challenges

Latvian security policy-making process since 1990 was mostly driven by the incentive of NATO membership. In 1995 after the withdrawal of Russian troops Latvia officially announced that the main goal of the country's foreign and security policy was a full membership of the EU and NATO. Since then Latvian security agenda was fully dominated by fulfilling the requirements for NATO membership. A very strong presence of alliance policy in Latvian security agenda was the main reason explaining why it was so successful. Clear vision of the goal to be achieved kept decisions and actions in a coherent security policy frame. Another important element of Latvian security policy at the time was a very strong support of public.

After the accession to both institutions security situation changed drastically in very many respects. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the new situation was related to the fact that Latvia became a part of regional and international security system not only benefiting from it but also contributing to stability and security *via* participation in the EU and NATO. In addition, accession to the Union and alliance was complemented by differentiation and multiplication of risks and threats in the international system. It was obvious to all actors involved in security policy already in the beginning of the XXI century that national means and resources alone could not avert the complex world of threats, therefore the necessity for Latvia to draft a new national security concept was not driven only by the newly achieved membership in the EU and NATO but also by a changed security landscape.

Latvian National Security Concept (LNSC) is an extremely interesting document to be analyzed by an academic who has been following Latvian security policy developments for more than a decade. Although the document is not an exhaustive proof of main trends in the field of Latvian security, it suggests that official concepts that have passed the corridors of Ministries, involved agencies and adopted by the Parliament have a clear impact on security identity, security culture and efficiency of security policy-making in the country. The above-mentioned considerations called for a deeper examination of Latvian National Security Concept (LNSC).<sup>1</sup>

One would assume that a new document should put aside fulfilled tasks and bring forward basic principles and tasks that should correspond to the changed

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<sup>1</sup> *The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia*, adopted by the Parliament on 2 February 2005. <http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid=125>, 02 09 2005.

security environment and security challenges. LNSC 2005 however in many respects steps backwards in comparison with the previous LNSC.<sup>2</sup> The first contradiction that is included in the new LNSC is a misbalance between national and international components of security policy discourse. The LNSC of 2002 is based on analysis of international environment and tools that would promote more effective integration into transatlantic community. Among different tools – international cooperation has a priority over others. But the document of 2005 does not have international, regional and cooperative context. In the introductory part authors refer to a changed international environment and call for respecting of principles adopted by the UN and OSCE but the overall concept is loosing any reference to the above-mentioned changes.<sup>3</sup> Thus, according to the LNSC discourse Latvia is not going to utilize opportunities that have been provided by the new status of an ally for strengthening of national security and is not offering substantial contribution with its national security resources to international security.<sup>4</sup>

The second contradictory point is related to the understanding of membership status. On the one hand, the document states that EU and NATO membership changes external security environment. On the other hand, it is not clearly defined that the membership also changes national security, that is - that both organizations are not part of Latvia's external environment but rather that Latvia has become an integral part of that security landscape and that the new status offers diverse security tools that can be applied to the national security policy. Another problem is that the EU is not referred to as a comprehensive security entity. Despite the fact that the LNSC 2005 was adopted 6 years after the formulation of ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), the EU is treated only as an economic and political association of states.<sup>5</sup> Only once does the document talk about European security space, and such abbreviations as CFSP and ESDP that are parts of the EU everyday business are

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<sup>2</sup> *The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia*, adopted by the Parliament on 24 January 2002.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> It is noteworthy that even the structure of both documents demonstrates the quality of the concepts and attitude of policy makers towards the importance of the concepts. The LNSC of 2002 consists of 4 parts defining the essence of national security, followed by the next chapter that gives overview of security environment and risk assessment. The third part focuses on risk prevention and security policy tools. The last part elaborates on the National security plan. The concept of 2005 has only three parts: a short introduction, a brief report on Latvian national security and national security policy and the third part, that is called “Principles of averting threats to national security”, is not focusing on principles at all but is covering different topics - such as economic security, terrorism, crime, foreign policy, which obviously are not principles.

<sup>5</sup> *The National Security Concept* (note 1).

missing.<sup>6</sup> As a result, Latvian security discourse appears not to be related to its participation in the EU and NATO. According to the LNSC Latvia's membership was needed for changing the security environment but not for a long-term multifunctional participation in transformation of international security environment that is the main precondition for stability on the national level.

Another difference between the two concept papers worth mentioning is a regional component of security policy, which has diminished in 2005 version of the LNSC. Cooperation as an important driving tool that ensured successful integration into the EU and NATO is excluded from security discourse. The question could be raised whether Latvia is abandoning those regional projects and principles that it has abided by for the last decade. The reason for this awkwardness is related to a poor quality of the document but not to principal changes in Latvian security policy. However, it should be noted that the lost regionalism has an impact on approaching such security issues as migration, crime, border control, terrorism that are put into national framework neglecting contemporary security mind-set that puts cooperative efforts above others.<sup>7</sup>

Despite several conceptual vulnerabilities evident in the LNSC 2005, there are also some novelties or components that have been neglected in the previous security policy documents. Recently, societal security has become a substantial part of Latvian security agenda. Secondly, the security concept as such has been widened and deepened in many aspects. Thus, national security is defined as ability of a state and society to protect security interests of society in general and each individual as well. As far as the core values are concerned they are defined as follows – protection of independent state, democratic system, territorial integrity, human rights, internal security and welfare of population, free development of society, political and economic stability.<sup>8</sup> National security interests however are defined in the following way – to ensure the necessary conditions for the long term development of society and the state that can be implemented by protecting national language and culture, keeping up national defence system, developing sciences and technology, sustainable development, critical infrastructures, security of telecommunication and information technologies. On the one hand, it can be argued that these are very important security interests of many countries. On the other hand, the further text of the LNSC does not demonstrate which steps should be taken and what instruments should be applied in order to accommodate the above-mentioned interests. Just the opposite, the LNSC

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<sup>6</sup> The LNSC does not refer to European Security Strategy (2003).

<sup>7</sup> In order to avoid criticism from Latvian security policy makers I should admit that the document once refers to the cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region in combating crime but regional undertakings with regard other risks and threats are not appreciated in the LNSC.

<sup>8</sup> *The National Security Concept* (note 1).

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focuses on different other issues but not on the national security interests defined by the document.

As a whole, the LNSC 2005 does not contribute to the new security identity in Latvia. The document does mention several rarely used terms in Latvian security thus enriching the security discourse on such topics as security environment, security landscape, societal security etc., but it is unable to create a firm background for public consensus, which is needed in the implementation of security policy when national security interests are at risk. I would like to argue that instead of bringing new tradition in developing and adopting security policy documents according to traditions of democratic societies, Latvian security policy makers demonstrated shortsightedness, fully excluding relevant actors and society from public debate on national security issues. Even more, it can be said that the LNSC 2005 fully neglects the issues that have been on the front pages of EU ESDP documents for the last 5 years. Thus, it can be concluded that the full ignorance of European Security Strategy and different NATO strategic concepts demonstrates that Latvia is ready to undertake NATO obligations but is not prepared yet to become a creative contributor to the lively debate on international arena concerning the future of international security and stability.

One of the reasons why Latvia has developed a document that does not reflect the real state of affairs and even narrows security identity that has evolved in recent years is the lack of cooperation among security institutions. The Constitutional Protection Bureau, which is the main intelligence institution, drafted the LNSC 2005 but other institutions played only a passive role in the process. In addition, the Parliament adopted the document without any serious debate.

## 2. Institutional adaptation to new security environment

One can raise the question why under such challenging and promising conditions that a country enjoys as a full NATO and EU member there was no shift in security discourse in Latvia. Furthermore, is there a new security identity on the way for Latvia? Different answers and reasons could be provided, but I would like to focus on some institutional issues.

Security policy in Latvia, which was dominated by NATO membership considerations, was mostly delegated to the Ministry of Defence, while EU integration was undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It created substantial institutional division in security policy making. The Ministry of Defence pulled all resources into NATO membership exercise, thus, for years associating regional and international security with alliance policy. In contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealt with NATO membership only on the political level and in a limited scope, while EU

integration was a priority. During the EU accession process the experience that was gained demonstrated that security and defence are by-products of the EU policies that should not be considered as crucial. EU membership negotiations on the Chapter dealing with CFSP were opened and closed in a couple of hours and this chapter was included in the first negotiable package that was less controversial. Although debate on EU accession was going on in Latvia for years, issues of European security and defence were almost not included. Even despite the fact that the development of CFSP and ESDP were going on in full speed starting with 1999, Latvian security policy makers hesitated to be involved in that exercise on national and European level. Two main arguments were mentioned during the interview with security policy makers from the Ministry of Defence explaining the state of affairs. The first was related to the Latvian capability to simultaneously cope with several security challenges. It was important before the accession to NATO to pull all political resources into alliance integration policy. The second answer describes Latvia's attitude towards the EU as far as security policy is concerned. The policy maker argued that the EU did not have credible military capabilities to implement tasks formulated in several EU documents, therefore Latvia as a country with limited resources could not allow itself the luxury to be involved in fragile and implausible projects. In addition he argued that the EU did not have a credible and effective decision-making process that would make the system fully operational.

The hesitant attitude of policy makers towards the ESDP is only one reason why there has been no shift in security policy thinking regarding new challenges in international and regional security setting. The other is related to the existing division over the ESDP policy between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of political issues but the Ministry of Defence of military, thus reducing the substance of the policy to the list of activities that is required by Brussels. Even within one Ministry (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) there are two approaches to security policy. One represents the Transatlantic perspective on security and the other is Eurocentric. The clash of views was evident during the debate on the European Constitutional Treaty. The first guideline document drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Eurocentric, while the last one showed prevalence of Transatlantic vision in Latvian security policy. The coordination mechanism between the Ministries is somewhat lacking, with "hard security" cooperation being in place while it is very weak on the level of "soft security".

On the Ministerial level each concerned institution has defined its priorities within the ESDP frame. The Ministry of Defence lately has decided to focus on three main activities: 1) European Neighbourhood Policy giving priority to Georgia and

Moldova; 2) European capability initiative; and 3) Defence Agency.<sup>9</sup> Latvia also announced its participation in the EU Battle group under Polish command together with German, Slovak and Lithuanian counterparts. Latvia has sent 3 persons to the mission in Bosnia Herzegovina. The limited number of personnel involved in the mission is related to the issue of priority, as at the moment Georgia is prioritised over Southern Europe. As far as Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned there are several priorities defined: ENP with particular concern about Belarus and Moldova; participation in crisis management efforts; participation in the political dialogue on ESDP issues. In order to ensure participation in ESDP the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned a special representative to ESDP affairs.

## Some concluding remarks

The general assessment of Latvian security policy from the analysis offered before could leave a rather depressing impression. However, the real state of affairs does not correspond to the ability of policy makers to present country's goals, resources and achievements. Even though the security discourse has begun to change slightly and to adapt to the contemporary challenges, security policy is developing more rapidly than how it is presented. It can be said that NATO still remains a priority while ESDP is treated as one of EU projects that should be followed but not treated as a substitute to NATO. This position hinders Latvian policy makers to view security picture in more comprehensive and complex way that would help to adapt policy instruments to the new security environment. For instance, crisis management has been mentioned as a substantial part of Latvian security policy, but so far no institution is established to coordinate crisis management in the country. Overall, Latvia is adapting to the new security challenges but there is still long way to go.

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<sup>9</sup> See the homepage of the Ministry of Defence Republic of Latvia: [www.mod.gov.lv](http://www.mod.gov.lv)



**Bartłomiej Lachowski\***  
*Collegium Civitas, Poland*

## ESDP from the Polish perspective. A contribution to the debate

The article presents as wide and precise as possible point of view of Poland on the issue of the role of ESDP in the European security. Provided vision is mostly base on the speech given by Polish minister of foreign affairs Mr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld who widely and precisely described Polish approach. The main goal of the article is to show in possibly most detailed way all aspects considered by Poland to be of great importance. Therefore it is divided into six parts of which each provide an explanation to different dimension of ESDP, as it is seen in Poland. The first deals with an essential question whether ESDP should replicate institutions and activities of NATO. It shed some light on the doubts that are vital in Poland and on some of the convictions that seems to determine polish attitude. The second part of the article introduces the reader to the Polish understanding of the role of integration, which is not seen only as the enlargement in sense of joining new members. The following part presents how important for Poland is right understanding of European consensus and multilateral dimension of European cooperation. The fourth part describes the Polish approach to the civilian dimension of further development of ESDP and the other security mechanism in the EU. The next part provides the reader with the answers to the subject concerning military aspects of present and future instruments possessed by the European countries. The last part draws some conclusions and generalizes the Polish approach to the issue of present and future role and shape of ESDP.

### Introduction

The following essay is a fruit of ongoing discussions in both Poland and Europe. It is to present to the reader the Polish approach to European Security and Defence Policy. I have tried to deprive the text of any personal points of view so that it is as close as possible to official Polish policy in the field of the European Union and its ESDP. Therefore it is important for the reader to bear in mind that all of the ideas (even presented "I believe.." etc.) are based on the Polish approach to the subject presented in a speech by Adam Daniel Rotfeld<sup>1</sup> entitled "Does the European Union need a European Security and Defence Policy", given on 17th March 2004 during the debate, "A Strong Poland in a Strong Europe". In his speech Mr. Rotfeld gives a wide and precise description of the Polish attitude toward ESDP.

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\* Bartłomiej Lachowski is a postgraduate, the Collegium Civitas, Department of International Relations.

<sup>1</sup> Adam Daniel Rotfeld until October 2005 was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From Polish perspective, the need for creating, and now developing an ESDP, is unquestionable. What seems more appropriate, is to ask what should be the shape and role of the policy. Neither the Western European Union (WEU) nor the EU were effective instruments in providing security and stability in Europe. The one truly effective organization was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite contemporary and temporary problems, NATO was, and still is, the institution ensuring peace and a secure environment across the continent. NATO seems the only organization which has passed the test of time. Its policies and powers that are providing security and peace have proved their effectiveness. Perhaps the best example is the Balkans in the 1990s, where the EU was unable to take any decisions, responsibilities or actions to effectively stabilize the situation. This ineffectiveness of the EU in the Balkans was one of the impulses to create the European Security and Defence Policy<sup>2</sup>. The question that may be asked today is:

## 1. Should or Should not the ESDP Replicate the Institutions and Activities of NATO?

Some countries, for example France, take the position that the ESDP should play the leading role in securing Europe. Moreover, the French approach represents the worrying opinion that the ESDP should work fully independently and even in opposition to NATO. This raises the question of the rationality of such opinions.

First of all, the ESDP is still a relatively young initiative and has not yet developed the independent instruments and capabilities which will guarantee its effectiveness. Secondly, European countries do not have adequate military capabilities at their disposal to actively participate in both NATO and ESDP. Mostly, all that they can offer are the same military units that have already been assigned to NATO. According to D. Rotfeld: "There is no room for competition between NATO and EU in this field. The common denominator for both organisations is: capabilities. Most of the states participating in this process are members of both those organisations simultaneously or are shortly to become so. They all possess single set of capabilities.

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<sup>2</sup> Rotfeld A. D., "Does European Union need European Security and Defence Policy?", speech given on 17th March 2004 during the debate "Strong Poland in Strong Europe"; prof. Adama Daniel Rotfeld „Czy Unia Europejska potrzebuje Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony?”, wystąpienie w debacie *Silna Polska w silnej Europie* Pałac Prezydencki, 17 marca 2004, [http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/file\\_library/29/silna\\_11194.doc](http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/file_library/29/silna_11194.doc)

It clearly means that building up mutual ties in political and operational spheres will benefit both organizations”<sup>3</sup>.

Thirdly, what makes the building of independent logistics and infrastructure, potentially in opposition to NATO’s, both irrational and unwise, would be simply its high costs. Why not, then, use what NATO has and can offer ? “Berlin Plus arrangements” creates an excellent field of co-operation for the two organizations. It took more than 50 years for the Allies to create and develop what is now at their disposal. Consequently, we have to expect that building “NATO-Bis” - as some visions of ESDP may be called - with adequate military support capabilities, demands long-term action. Moreover, it is common knowledge that NATO focuses its activities rather beyond European borders leaving at some point its own “playground”. The European Union, relying, as far as possible, on NATO’s instruments can cover all the niches left unfilled by NATO itself and thereby becoming a flexible, independent force while maintaining close collaboration with the NATO organization, and at the same time will constitute the core institution of European security.

The conclusion may be: ESDP should not double or replace any of the instruments, functions and activities of NATO. Both the organizations could, if there would be a political consensus on the issue, effectively co-operate and collaborate in building a secure and stable environment in Europe.

## 2. The Role of Integration

NATO is a military arm of the Alliance, which was built after World War II to protect western democracies from any conceivable Soviet invasion. After the collapse of the Soviet Bloc the Alliance has changed its policies and strategies towards a new situation, the ability to counter contemporary threats. Although NATO is both a political and a military organization, the second aspect of its function is the core one. It has little or even no other capabilities that seems to be of use nowadays. NATO is lacking in civilian missions that could contribute to preventing conflicts or managing those already existing. As the Polish minister of foreign affairs, Adam D. Rotfeld, said “all the concept of common security and defence is based on the lessons of history”<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Rotfeld A. D., “European security in the beginning of the XXI century”, Speaking points at the First Polish-Israeli Dialogue, Warsaw, 25 November 2004,  
[http://www.msza.gov.pl/files/file\\_library/29/israel\\_11423.doc](http://www.msza.gov.pl/files/file_library/29/israel_11423.doc)

<sup>4</sup> Rotfeld A. D., “Does European Union need European Security and Defence Policy”, speech given on 17th March 2004 during the debate “Strong Poland in Strong Europe”; prof. Adama Daniel Rotfeld „Czy Unia Europejska potrzebuje Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony?”, wystąpienie w debacie Silna Polska w silnej Europie Palac Prezydencki, 17 marca 2004,  
[http://www.msza.gov.pl/files/file\\_library/29/silna\\_11194.doc](http://www.msza.gov.pl/files/file_library/29/silna_11194.doc)

Both world wars have been waged in Europe because of conflicting national interests, which subsequently led to great tragedies of humanity. European integration is not only an enlargement in the sense of access for new members<sup>5</sup>. It is also spreading common values of democracy, human rights and legal concepts. From the broader perspective, this aspect is the key element of preventing potential conflicts. Furthermore, a frequent cause of conflicts, among many others, is a misunderstanding of the policies, values and actions of other parties. This broadly understood integration, not only in the geographical and geopolitical senses but also the psychological, presents a great value as an instrument of common European security.

Collaboration with neighbouring countries and regions provides a unique opportunity to influence non-EU-countries to share the same visions of Europe. A great example of this during 2005 occurred with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was strongly supported by the Polish government. Moreover Poland canvassed support from Brussels for the changes, understood in Warsaw as positive ones, in Ukraine. The present situation, namely the working government of President Juszczenko and its desire to integrate with the EU and, broadly speaking, with Western European institutions, can be seen as a great change for the better and the fruit of the idea of influencing and supporting non-EU countries through integration. From a Polish point of view there is still at least one country in need of profound and urgent attention, namely Belarus, which is very dependent upon Moscow. As far as Belarus is concerned I believe one can say that the Polish perception is that the support and interest of Brussels is lacking. Nonetheless I am also of the opinion that this situation is temporary and will be re-evaluated in the foreseeable future. One may say it is naive to believe that some values, such as those presented above, are timeless, however if they are discarded I do not see any future for the European Union. Although EU members follow their particular interests they, at the same time, are able to find a common field on which consensus can be built.

### 3. European Consensus & Multilateralism

The main aspect which to some extent unifies all EU members is a strategic security environment for the XXI century. The European Security Strategy - “A secure Europe in a better world” - shows the consensus among European Allies on strategic issues and defining threats that are to be faced by the EU. However, the problem is in agreeing upon substantial matters and how the EU should act. There has been a ‘natural’ division in Europe on almost every issue, and especially on this issue of

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<sup>5</sup> See note 4.

security<sup>6</sup>. The great division among Europeans was seen in the case of the Iraqi conflict, when France opposed the US attitude to the problem whereas some of EU members, including the UK and Poland, were in support. This showed that Europe, although trying to integrate in more than the economic sphere, is unable to reach a consensus and implement a common position. It is not my intention to decide who had the right but to show the difficulties in reaching a common approach. However, the multilateral dimension of ESDP, based on a common understanding of strategic issues, provides a unique opportunity – that cannot be offered by any other organization – to fight contemporary threats in such a wide scope including other than military options. At this point let us focus for a while on what Europe considers to be the “key threats”. As already mentioned, the European Strategy names the following challenges; first of all, terrorism “poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe” and further, “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism”<sup>7</sup>. In March 2004 Madrid and then in July 2005 London became victims of brutal terrorist attacks. However it is also of great importance to notice that EU countries are also bases for terrorist organization cells, including UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and France<sup>8</sup>.

Bearing in mind that 25 European countries are members of the EU and borders within the Union are not as strictly controlled as they used to be, the question arises of what action can be effectively implemented. Secondly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction “which is potentially the greatest threat to our society”<sup>9</sup>. It is common knowledge that proliferation also concerns biological and chemical weapons but it is also commonly known that there is a great danger of the spread of such weapons, especially in Middle East, which poses a great threat to European security. Much importance has been given to preventive actions, but it goes without saying that some problems in this field have occurred. Namely, how effectively Europe can counter such a threat. Similar challenges arise when speaking of other threats listed by European Strategy: regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime<sup>10</sup>. Although broadly speaking I am of the opinion that the best framework for countering proliferation of WMD and means of delivery, terrorism, organized international crime and failed states demands a much wider and more complex attitude than purely a military or unilateral one. At this point European multilateralism seems to be the best field of co-operation. It gives, as was already mentioned, a great opportunity for threatened states to permanently co-operate, consult and together

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<sup>6</sup> European Union, *A Secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy*, December 2003

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem, pp. 6-7.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, pp. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, pp. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, pp. 8-9.

implement wide and long-term actions. This, moreover, should be based on information sharing and on finding common conclusions that could lead to common effective actions. Otherwise I am afraid countries are too weak to deal with those threats by themselves. Such a multilateral dimension of co-operation enables EU members to use different instruments in their policies, such as both civilian and military ones.

#### 4. Civilian Dimension of ESDP

Another question, which needs to be answered is whether the above listed threats can be prevented just by military actions, of whatever kind of. Obviously not. What, subsequently, can be defined is what ESDP will not or should not become over the next decade. It surely will not be a political-military alliance with its own armed forces. Also, there will not be a “NATO Bis” in Europe. What then can the ESDP become ? The instrument seems to be very valuable in facing present and future threats. What the EU has already done in this field is create soft instruments for preventing or managing conflicts. The ESDP represents 25 European countries and in this context may play the important role of common forum for dialogue and action to prevent such conflicts from arising, as did the previous two world wars and the more recent Balkan crisis. In contemporary times solving or preventing conflicts, both social and military, is simply impossible with just armed forces, as was believed in the past. Unquestionably civil society has a great role to play. In this sense, the EU with its ESDP and civilian capabilities presents power and value which is difficult to overestimate. The examples of complex attitudes to security issues are the missions: “EU Just Themis” in Georgia, where the Union has sent legal experts, and “EU Just Lex” in Iraq, where the EU is planning to organize courses for administration in the area of legal, judicial and criminal proceedings.

The European Union, therefore, should and does develop its civilian capabilities based upon ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’, which implies qualitative improvements in civilian crises response. The EU will improve its capabilities not only in the field of police, law and civil administration but also in monitoring. The idea is to equip the Union with instruments that will be useful at each stage of the crisis. Subsequently there is a process of creating “Crisis Response Teams” that would be at Brussels’ disposal at any time. This idea, although generating costs, seems to be a good direction for the ESDP. Equipping the EU with such instruments created in an ad-hoc system gives Europe a unique supplement in building a complex mechanism of response. Poland has made a great contribution to the European group of experts by declaring 722 Polish experts. This results from a deep conviction that nowadays military forces although important are no longer capable of resolving conflicts from

the beginning to the very end. If at the first stages, of-course in certain situations military involvement is essential for so-called peace enforcement, for the later developments and stabilization they do not seem to play the key role but rather a supportive one. Nevertheless, the need for the creation and development of such a capability is unquestionable and necessary to enable the EU to act effectively and to give credibility and reliability in its activities in the field of security<sup>11</sup>.

## 5. Berlin Plus & Military Aspects of ESDP

When we talk about security and defence policy what first comes to mind is the military aspect, and it is obvious that all such initiatives should include armed forces – in an adequate form – as an inseparable instrument. However it always should be appropriate to the environment and requirements. In the case of ESDP, bearing in mind NATO capabilities, the question to be answered is: in what form the EU needs its own forces? In accordance to the Union's vision of its engagement and commitment to building the architecture of a security environment we may say it requires rather small, mobile forces, available at any time, the main goal of which would be to support civilian activities rather than prosecuting typical military action. Moreover, if the Union wants to be capable of providing a wide range of support in managing crises at all their stages, it does not have to build up such capabilities that are at NATO's disposal. The point is that although the ESDP should dispose armed forces, they do not have to be either large or to have planning, operational command and intelligence support. Those areas become the role and responsibility of NATO and Berlin Plus arrangements concluded in March 2003<sup>12</sup>. They cover the main aspects of any proceeding operations: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command and use of NATO capabilities and assets. First of all, it was agreed that the Alliance will provide the EU with the operational planning which would be contributed by SHAPE in Mons. Secondly, at the request of the Union, NATO European command for EU-led operations will be made available. Thirdly, the EU may use, on request, various NATO assets and capabilities<sup>13</sup>. The already on-going missions have proved that the Berlin Plus arrangements did work. By the end of 2004 the EU took over "Operation Althea" in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Both Union and NATO commands

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<sup>11</sup> Gnesotto N., "EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004)", Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2004, p. 40.

<sup>12</sup> Institute for Security Studies European Union, *European Defence: A proposal for a White Paper*, Paris, May 2004, p. 56-57.

<sup>13</sup> Lindley J., "The ties that bind", *NATO Review*, 2003, 3.  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/art2.html>.

concluded that in practice the mechanisms of “Berlin +” do work very well. If time confirms the success of this co-operation there will be no need to build independent structures which would increase costs (the total budget of the ESDP is approximately 55 million Euro). It goes without saying that the EU does not need to develop its own capabilities in fields covered by “Berlin +”.

Bearing in mind all previous conclusions, the EU Battle Groups’ concept seems the perfect one. Those small, high level units (1500 soldiers) on operational stand-by (approximately 15 days) within a range of not more than 6000 kilometres from Brussels, can be an effective and sufficient military instrument capable of taking action in close neighbourhoods and beyond<sup>14</sup>. The importance of BG or anything similar in its concept has been a common conviction since the conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s. “The practical effectiveness of this choice was evident during operation Artemis in the Republic of Congo, where, for the first time, one could see around 2.000 soldiers under the EU flag”<sup>15</sup>. Poland has expressed its support for this concept by signing a Declaration of Intent and then a Letter of Intent with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. Those countries constitute one Battle Group, which will reach its operational readiness in 2010.

## Conclusions

The core conclusion is this: the ESDP as the instrument of building and strengthening a peaceful, secure and stable situation is of great and unquestionable importance. What is inevitable in the discussions, as I have tried to present, is the shape and the role of the ESDP. It should not double the instruments and functions of NATO, rather it should use the mechanisms of Berlin Plus arrangements to strengthen its capabilities without increasing costs. The co-operation with NATO under Berlin + or any other arrangements should be developed and improved. In other words the EU, under any circumstances, should not develop its security instruments in opposition to NATO. Nonetheless, the creation and further development of Battle Groups in an adequate form is required as the concept of equipping ESDP with hard instruments able to create an environment needed for implementing other means – mostly civilian

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<sup>14</sup> Institute for Security Studies European Union *European Defence: A proposal for a White Paper*, Paris, May 2004, p. 59

<sup>15</sup> Wieczorek M., „Can the intensification of Polish participation In the koncept of Battlegroups influence its position In European Union?”, *International Relations*, 7th November 2005 Warsaw; Wieczorek M., „Czy intensyfikacja udziału Polski w koncepcji „battlegroups” może pozytywnie wpływać na jej pozycję w Unii Europejskiej?” <http://www.stosunki.pl/main245126020210.2.yisvp.htm>, *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 7 listopada 2005 Warsaw,

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ones. Civilian dimension of the ESDP provides the EU with a mechanism of key importance in managing or preventing conflicts at any stage.

Furthermore, the ESDP should be a part of integration processes in Europe through which the Union can prevent potential conflicts by harmonizing values and the perception of threats, and lead, in the long term, to the co-ordination of national security policies. This aspect, as previously illustrated, is a vital part of conflict prevention policy, and if used properly can solve conflicts and problems before they escalate to the point when resolution will simply be impossible, or even before they occur. Therefore, the ESDP should again be a forum for dialogue and information sharing in Europe that could lead to the creation of common approaches and attitudes to contemporary and future problems, as well as to better understanding among European Allies.

Although reaching consensus in substantial issues is difficult, if not sometimes impossible, the ESDP creates a multilateral arena which is a key instrument in facing contemporary threats (proliferation of WMD, terrorism, organized international crime) through the co-ordination of actions undertaken by states. All the challenges listed above (following European Security Strategy) require a multilateral approach and collaboration among Allies. Otherwise the resolution of any of them would seem to be difficult, if not impossible.

The only conclusion that may come to one's mind is that Poland supports the idea of a strong and effective ESDP as long as it does not oppose or duplicate NATO initiatives. Moreover, strengthening of the policy cannot increase costs to be covered by member states. In agreement with minister Andrzej Towpik, I believe that the harmonization of national security and defence policies within the European Union will be a progressive process and nothing can stop it in the longer term. Furthermore, security in Europe is dependent on Euro-Atlantic mechanisms with a strong presence of the European ingredient.

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